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Cities, Autonomy, and 
Decentralization in Japan
Japan is known as a country in which a potent central power reigns over a compliant 
hierarchy and, for planning, this has meant strong centralized government control. 
Nevertheless, examples of autonomy have always existed in the politics, society, 
and economy of Japan and thrive today in various forms, particularly within urban 
areas. Following the growth and subsequent collapse of the bubble economy in the 
early 1990s, and in response to globalization, new trends toward local autonomy 
and political and economic decentralization are emerging that must be evaluated 
in the context of Japan’s larger political and socioeconomic setting as it becomes 
increasingly integrated into the global system. 
Cities, Autonomy, and Decentralization in Japan addresses these new initia-
tives, providing a cogent compilation of case studies focusing on the past, present, 
and future of decentralization in Japan. These include small-scale developments 
in fields such as citizen participation (machizukuri), urban form and architecture, 
disaster prevention, and conservation of monuments.
The book offers the first in-depth analysis of this development outside Japan, 
approaching the subject from a unique urban studies/planning perspective as 
opposed to the more common political science method. With contributions from 
a leading group of international scholars on Japanese urban planning, Cities, 
Autonomy, and Decentralization in Japan provides a valuable new addition to the 
current English-language literature.
Carola Hein is Associate Professor in the Growth and Structure of Cities Program 
at Bryn Mawr College, USA.
Philippe Pelletier is Professor of Geography at Lumière-Lyon 2 University, 
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various levels of Japanese government, among citizens, and in academia.
At a time when Japan is ever more integrated into the global system, attempts 
at autonomy occur on the level of the neighborhood, the city, the region, and 
the islands. Small-scale developments and community-building (machizukuri), 
disaster prevention, urban form and architecture, and protection of monuments 
and townscapes are flourishing. While the cities remain major centers for these 
initiatives, regions are making their own attempts at autonomous development or 
inter-regional collaboration. However, although the politics of “decentralization” 
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change and, if so, in what way?
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Association for Japanese Studies (EAJS) in Budapest, when Carola Hein and 
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Note on spelling
In keeping with Japanese custom, Japanese proper names appear in this volume 
with the surname followed by the given, first name (unless the authors are based 
outside Japan). Long vowels are indicated by circumflexes, but well-known place 
names (Tokyo, for example) are written without circumflexes, as is conventional 
in English. Japanese names are provided for agencies, institutions, and legal 
documents, in order to make it easier to locate them.
Carola Hein and Philippe Pelletier
1 Introduction
 Decentralization and the tension 
between global and local urban Japan
Carola Hein and Philippe Pelletier
Since World War II, urban planning in Japan has undergone a profound 
transformation, despite important political and economic continuities. The last 
two decades in particular have seen major changes in terms of urban governance 
and relations between the center and the periphery, the national government, 
the municipalities, and the citizenry (DeWit 1998). The ongoing process of 
the redistribution of political power and financial responsibilities as well as 
spatial restructuring are particularly visible in the relationship between the 
capital city, Tokyo, and the peripheral areas and fall under the broad headings 
of “decentralization” and “autonomy.” Although the problematic relationship 
between center and periphery is a thread that runs through Japanese history 
(Fukashi 1996), many of these changes are rooted in the “rapid growth” phase of 
the 1960s and in new technological and socioeconomic conditions (the culture of 
the automobile and the high-speed train, for example).
The New City Planning Act of 1968 (shin toshi keikaku hô) – despite the fact 
that many of its original ambitions were unrealized (see also Chapters 2 and 5 by 
Ishida Yorifusa and André Sorensen in this volume) – and the creation of the first 
National Land Agency (Kokudochô) in 1974 reflected an attempt, at least in the-
ory, to decentralize power and give more rights to citizens and local governments. 
Since the 1980s, the redistribution of political power has gone hand in hand with 
globalization, the relocation of Japanese industries overseas, and their insertion 
into the global financial economy, as well as redeployment within the boundaries 
of the Japanese archipelago and reconcentration within the megalopolises, most 
notably Tokyo (Berque 1993, 1994). Over the same period, the Japanese govern-
ment has promoted decentralization through policy measures such as the new 
Law for the Promotion of Decentralization (chihô bunken suishinhô) issued in 
May 1995 (see Chapter 8 by Hein and Pelletier in this volume). At the same time, 
other policies effectively counteracted the transfer of national power to local insti-
tutions. Notably the reform of the central administration pursued since January 
2001 – aimed at reducing the number of ministries and governmental agencies 
– has effectively reinforced the power and efficiency of the national government, 
raising multiple questions, such as: What are the political, economic, financial, 
social, and cultural contexts, ties, and interests that help to maintain the status 
quo of the highly centralized Japanese structure as well as those that push for a 
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redistribution of political power, economic infrastructure, and population to the 
periphery? How does decentralization fit into the larger picture of public projects 
in Japan? How do globalization and the request for strengthened local powers fit 
into the discussion on decentralization and autonomy? In this complex discussion, 
the role of Tokyo is a special one. Questions that need to be answered include: 
What role do cities – and particularly the capital, Tokyo, as the political capital 
and economic metropolis, seat of the government, major companies, educational 
and cultural facilities – play in the context of centralization and decentralization?
The capital city of Tokyo: the heart of decentralization 
policies
The complexity of decentralization movements in Japan, and their implications 
for urban as well as many other issues, can only be understood through an analysis 
of the relationship between Tokyo – established as Edo by the Tokugawa shoguns 
in 1603 – and other urban areas in Japan. Following its creation, Edo quickly 
became one of the largest metropolises, if not the largest, of its time. Through the 
system of sankin kôtai (alternate attendance), provincial lords were required to 
regularly spend time in the shogunal capital, thereby increasing its population. The 
Meiji restoration in 1868 meant further centralization of politics and ultimately 
population in Tokyo. In the early years of modern Japan, the city experienced a 
steep decline in population, as the members of the provincial aristocracy returned 
to their home towns. This development left the center of the city outside the 
shogunal palace gates empty and ready to host new capital functions without 
having to displace or relocate citizens established in the area. As the population 
experienced a second rapid increase in the late nineteenth century, Tokyo became 
home to the national government and a new business district – located just outside 
the shogunal palace – and major infrastructure programs, including a new railway 
and the Tokyo station.
The history of decentralization movements in Japan, examined by Ishida 
yorifusa in Chapter 2, begins with the chaotic Meiji period, during which individ-
ual cities embarked on many planning initiatives. The plans for Tokyo, however, 
in spite of requests for more local autonomy, were conceived as national projects 
from 1888 on. The central government’s dominion over Tokyo’s planning affairs 
culminated in the 1919 City Planning Law (1919 nen toshi keikaku hô or kyû toshi 
keikaku hô) and the Urban Building Law (shigaichi kenchikubutsu hô) of 1919, 
which put urban planning under the control of national law and may be seen as 
a high-handed approach toward centralizing planning, to the detriment of local 
initiatives. As the major showcase for government power, both within Japan and 
beyond its borders, it was essential that the capital city of Tokyo display effective 
national leadership and serve as a model.
Beginning with the Meiji era a double contradiction developed: first, among 
the various types of spatial concentration (urban, industrial, and tertiary) favoring 
the extension of Tokyo over the balanced development of rural areas; second, 
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between the state and the special Tokyo government faced with the difficult admin-
istration of an increasingly complex new urban body. Like other cities, Tokyo’s 
urban planning was strictly controlled by the Ministry of the Interior (Naimushô), 
which at the time appointed mayors and exercised direct authority over urban 
planning and which strongly opposed local governance, particularly in Tokyo. 
The national government needed its principal sites to function appropriately and it 
did not want to equip the capital with too much local power. For the Meiji period 
leaders the capital was meant to represent the central authority. In many East 
Asian nations, both communist and democratic, ancestral Asian despotism has left 
a legacy of dominance by a single authority, which is reflected in a strong, central 
capital city. These common aspects led to a developmental ideology and national 
strategy aimed at propelling the country out of underdevelopment – compared 
with the leading European countries and the United States – and an urge to “catch 
up” that is particularly pronounced not only in Japan but also in Korea and to a 
certain extent in China. From this perspective, the state policy toward develop-
ment is articulated logically and naturally around nationalism and planning based 
in national ideologies.1
Following the Meiji restoration, the traditional understanding of the capital had 
to adapt to the changing needs of a modern metropolis. The political and admin-
istrative organization of the Japanese capital was revised several times between 
1868 and 1945, reflecting the difficulties of finding common ground.2 While both 
the Municipal code (shisei) and the Town and Village code (chôsonsei) enacted in 
1888 provided relative autonomy for the Japanese local entities (shi chô son), in 
August of that year, Tokyo became the first city in Japan to have urban legislation. 
Instead of elected mayors, a prefect was designated by the central government, 
and the city of Tokyo (Tôkyô-shi) was formed, composed of 15 wards (ku), the 
designated administrative units of major cities. From 1898 on, voters elected the 
Tokyo municipal assembly, but its president remained under the tight control of 
the Ministry of the Interior. In October 1932, the perimeter of Tokyo expanded 
when 82 neighboring communes were included to form 20 new wards. In the 
intervening time the law of 1919 and the 1923 reconstruction plan following 
the Great Kanto Earthquake had been established and provided a framework for 
Tokyo’s urban planning.
The centralization of Japanese planning was fully established in the 1930s 
– as the Fifteen Years War (jûgonen sensô), which led directly to the country’s 
involvement in World War II, intensified – and only a few local initiatives still 
remained, among them the land-readjustment initiatives emanating from Nagoya 
under urban planners such as Ishikawa Hideaki and Kaneiwa Den-ichi. During the 
war years (1930–45), the first attempts at decentralization also occurred, with the 
relocation of industrial production and related industries to the outskirts of cities 
as a means to protect them from Allied bombing. Before the military defeat of 
World War II, in July 1943, the prefecture (fu) and the city (shi) of Tokyo merged 
into a single capital city entity: Tôkyô-to. Each of the central, original wards of 
Tokyo was given the status of city, with the governor responsible for the admin-
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istration of the whole. At the height of the war the creation of a larger Tokyo with 
limited autonomy reflected the national desire to centralize and promote Tokyo as 
a structural model.
Postwar reconstruction, however, largely revolved around the central govern-
ment, as local cities lacked the manpower and financial means to develop and 
implement plans (Hein, Diefendorf, and Ishida 2003). This highly controlled 
system did not disappear with the first local elections in 1947. American attempts 
at decentralization, such as that embodied in the so-called Shoup Mission of 
1949 – named after Carl Sumner Shoup, an American economist, who studied 
Japan’s tax system and recommended revisions in 1949 – existed but the 1919 
law remained virtually unchanged until 1968, when citizen movements spurred 
reform. The national government remained in control, particularly in regard to 
financing (Ansart 1995; Hagihara 1998; Shigemori 1998). The status of Tôkyô-to 
was preserved and the head of the prefecture became a governor, to be elected 
every four years. The city wards were reorganized and their number was reduced 
from 35 to 23. Each ward elected mayors, but their powers were fewer than 
those of other communes (even the Tokyo communes outside the central wards). 
Between 1952 and 1972 direct elections were even abolished inside Tokyo. The 
particular administrative and political history of Tokyo led to the creation of a 
political–administrative structure that is at odds with its urban geography.
The ambiguous role of Tokyo is reflected in its name. The term to reveals this 
confusion. Although its literal translation is “capital”,3 making its governing body 
the Tokyo Capital Government (Tôkyô tochô), official statements translate the term 
as “metropolis” and thus identify the main authority as the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government (TMG). This confusion is furthered with the generalized use of the 
term daitoshi, meaning “big city” or “metropolis,” which can mean either the 
“metropolitan area” of Tokyo within a 50-kilometer radius from the center (of 
Tokyo) (Tôkyô daitoshi-ken) or the 15 special-status cities.4 Since the 1930s, the 
urban development of Tokyo has in fact witnessed two trends that complement 
each other, as Nakabayashi Itsuki points out in Chapter 3. On the one hand, the 
city attracts and nourishes central economic, political, and cultural functions for 
Japan as a whole; on the other, many of these functions are being relocated to 
the larger periphery of the city, often even beyond the administrative boundar-
ies of Tôkyô-to, a development that is discussed in this volume under the term 
“deconcentration.”
The size and power of both Tokyo and the central government create tension 
between the two. In Japan, the provinces (chihô) – which can also be character-
ized as “non-Tokyo,” the Japan beyond Tokyo – begin right outside the capital of 
Tokyo. Yokohama, only some 25 kilometers from Tokyo, is thus considered part 
of the provinces. The word chihô literally translates as “on the side of the earth,” 
encompassing not only rural Japan but also the major cities located in this area, 
including Osaka and Nagoya, and even the iconic ancient capital of Kyoto. The 
conception of the railway system mirrors Tokyo’s central position relative to the 
rest of Japan. Tokyo is the heart of all railway lines that “go up to the capital” 
(jôkyô) or “go down to a province” (gekô).
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Parts of the provinces, such as yokohama, are located just outside the admin-
istrative area of Tôkyô-to, and are effectively part of the larger metropolitan area 
of Tokyo. Their elected officials, however, do not have the same status as the 
governor of Tokyo and feel to some extent dominated by the capital. They were 
among the first that, supported by citizen movements, agitated in the 1970s for 
an equalization of the various Japanese territorial and governmental entities and 
for the “era of the provinces” (chihô no jidai).5 More recently, the term chihô has 
also been used to refer to “local” (chihô jichitai) (Abe and Yorimoto 1988). Tokyo 
itself is a local entity, a situation that reflects the complexity of the topic and the 
relations between the different territorial actors.
The dichotomy between Tokyo and the provinces could also be taken to mean 
the larger urban area versus all areas beyond, something that is difficult to delineate 
precisely.6 In recent years, the strict separation between Tokyo and the provinces 
has begun to disappear even in administrative terms. The former National Land 
Agency, subsumed by a larger ministry in January 2001, distinguishes two spatial 
categories based on the prefecture (ken): the 15 metropolitan prefectures (daitoshi-
ken) and the 32 provincial prefectures (chihô-ken). According to this conception, 
the province (chihô) is thus everything that is not metropolitan (daitoshi). The 
difficulties of defining national and local levels of administration and the center 
and periphery of urban and rural areas highlight the complexity of the analysis of 
issues of decentralization, deconcentration, and local autonomy in Japan.
From a political and administrative point of view, the central, national authorities 
(government, ministries, and the national administration) are often distinguished 
from the local governments (jichitai), which include the prefectures (todôfuken) 
and the urban and rural communes (shi chô son) (Figure 1.1). There are more than 
65,000 local elected representatives and almost 3,300 heads of local governments. 
Local governments employ some 2.8 million people (1996), more than the 1.5 
million who work for the central government. With budgets larger than that of the 
national government, local governments thus make up a huge part of the public 
sector (Jain 1999: 118). These statistics highlight the ongoing struggle between 
the various central and local constituencies.7
The relationship between the national capital and the local governments exists 
on three levels: political, administrative, and financial. As Alain Schebath explains 
in Chapter 4, local budgets depend for one-third on central government transfers 
of funding. Another third comes from local taxes (chihô zei), with the final third 
deriving from local bonds (chihôsai), which need to be approved by the national 
government (specifically the Ministry of Autonomy), active revenues, and other 
resources. The national government, through the allocation of these monies, con-
trols their spending to a significant extent (see Namikawa 1996).
One of the characteristics of the financial system is a distribution arrangement, 
instituted following the work of the Shoup Mission and recommendations by the 
Kanbe Committee in 1949–50,8 which was meant to assist all local governments 
equally (Hill and Kim 2000). While this system provides essential aid for local 
entities experiencing financial difficulty, it has also been criticized for penaliz-
ing wealthy communities and favoring peripheral regions with fewer resources. 















Furthermore, public services (infrastructure, health, welfare, and education) are 
the financial responsibility of the local governments even though they are largely 
administered by the national government. Thus, sociologists Richard Child Hill 
and Kuniko Fujita have concluded that “the center collects two-thirds of the 
nation’s taxes and then reroutes half back to local governments” (Hill and Fujita 
2000), effectively using local taxes for national funding. This system is one reason 
for geopolitical tensions. As Schebath points out, the fiscal crisis of the 1990s and 
early 2000s has led to financial problems for Japan’s local public sector even as 
decentralization has given local governments increased opportunities to generate 
new taxes.
Granting more power to local governments and revising the system of urban 
governance and citizen participation raises questions about the role that the long 
existence of centralization has played in shaping local urban governance in Japan 
(Numata 1996). In Chapter 5 André Sorensen investigates the issue of civil soci-
ety – a concept that some have considered absent in Japan while others have 
highlighted the existence of numerous citizen representations. Sorensen points to 
long-standing traditions of self-governance in Japan and discusses their particular 
characteristics, while examining how citizen groups have been co-opted into a 
hierarchical governmental system under national leadership or kept comparatively 
small, local, and irrelevant on a national level.
In Chapter 6, Watanabe Shun-ichi continues this line of investigation by spe-
cifically addressing the advent of machizukuri (community-building) in Japan and 
its effect on urban planning. Analyzing various neighborhoods that have taken 
on essential functions in the development of machizukuri in Japan, Watanabe 
examines the planning tools that have been employed by these initiatives and 
suggests that citizen participation should be essential to municipal decisions made 
in relation to urban planning. To make this possible, a legal system is necessary 
that provides an appropriate framework for participation and citizens need to have 
the appropriate skills and support from the municipality.
Christoph Brumann studies a specific example of citizen participation in Japan 
in Chapter 7, examining the impact of local autonomy and self-rule on deci-
sions concerning the historic Kyoto townscape. Using a social-anthropological 
approach, Brumann examines three different models of participation: traditional 
neighborhood organizations (chônaikai), citizen groups, and municipal dialogic 
approaches (often characterized as pâtonashippu (partnership)), focusing in par-
ticular on a proposal to build a replica of Paris’s Pont des Arts in central Kyoto. 
Brumann’s surprising finding is that an individualistic approach to landownership 
is present in Japan’s society, stereotyped as collective.
The above explorations in this volume thus highlight the difficulties on the 
national as well as the local level in establishing a comprehensive decentralization 
of political power and urban self-determination. In spite of various quasi-federalist 
attempts in Japan’s 1947 constitution, inspired by the American model, Japanese 
local governments have only relative autonomy vis-à-vis the central government. 
In addition, as the last three chapters in this book suggest, local initiatives have 
been constrained, with citizens receiving inadequate support to make informed 
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decisions, as well as engaging in individualistic behaviors that work against a 
powerful, collective local representation.
The differences and tensions between the national and local levels in Japan 
are further exacerbated by globalization. The current relationships between the 
local and the national, and the local and the global, and the reorganization of local 
forces in Japan would be incomprehensible without an analysis of how Japan 
as a whole operates. This system, which can be described as “state capitalism,” 
while challenged by the neo-liberal policies of the Nakasone government in the 
early 1980s, has been accelerated by globalization, particularly since the end of 
the Cold War. Chapter 8, in conclusion to the preceding essays, asks how current 
discussions on decentralization, the ongoing national government focus on public 
works, and the relocation of capital functions unfold in the context of globaliza-
tion and localization. In order to frame the essays in this volume, the following 
discussion explores the features of the Japanese system, specifically the close 
cooperation of politics and industry since the postwar period and their expression 
in the economic and spatial trends since the 1960s, through the example of the 
development of “technopolises.”
Modern Japan: state capitalism and a war economy in 
peacetime
The influence of the Japanese government is marked in all of the nation’s economic 
activity, particularly that of the large industrial and commercial monopolies, 
and their physical location is partly an expression of clear national strategies. 
The state policy of creating great public works as an economic and spatial tool 
and means of national pride is often referred to as “the state as builder” (doken 
kokka) (see Chapter 8). This political scene has been dominated for the past half 
century almost continuously by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – named for 
its advocacy of a liberalized economy and known commonly in Japanese as the 
Jimintô – a conservative party, which has been characterized by factional fights 
and obfuscating practices. Decision-making processes tend to be opaque and a 
techno-bureaucracy reigns that is powerful, anonymous, and omnipresent. All 
these elements would seem to cast Japan as a variation of the repressive, Soviet-
style state communism that existed during most of the second half of the twentieth 
century. But other factors militate against this similarity. Japan is clearly involved 
in an American alliance and consumerism is all-pervasive. Rather than a form of 
state communism, Japan can accurately be called, based on the ideas of Karel van 
Wolferen, a capitalist war economy in a time of peace (van Wolferen 1989).
The Japanese system can be broken down into two periods that have many ele-
ments in common: the first established in 1940, the second starting in 1955. In the 
early 1940s (before the defeat of 1945), Japan was organized along imperial–mili-
taristic lines as a war economy with a national government intervening strongly in 
all the sectors of economy and society. This strong interventionist policy was the 
result of a compromise between various political actors and numerous ideological 
tendencies: agrarian, ultra-nationalist, liberal–imperialist, and even Marxist.9
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The economic and planning programs elaborated in the Japanese archipelago 
and in Manchuria during the 1930s served as models for managed economies 
and urban planning in the first half of the 1940s and again during postwar recov-
ery, as the Marxist economist Arisawa Hiromi (1896–1988) has explained (Gao 
1994; Hein 1994). A convergence emerged between the defenders of planning, 
more or less Marxists, and right-wing parties, based on a common recognition of 
imperialism and expansionism. Between the two dominant tendencies within the 
Japanese ruling class from the Meiji period to 1945, a strong expansionist desire 
characterized the liberals, whereas the conservatives were more pragmatic and 
concentrated on the archipelago (Norman 1975).
The war’s destruction and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
on August 6 and 9, 1945, did not result in a new Year Zero for Japan – a point 
at which the country made a fresh start – a claim often made in public state-
ments by Japanese and foreign sources alike. Many of the political, economic, and 
social structures as well as the urban planning system put into place before the 
1940s extended into the postwar period despite the American occupation and the 
desire of the occupation forces to democratize Japan (Dower 1999; Hein 2003a). 
Attempts at transforming Japan, including the new constitution promulgated in 
1946–7 – which retained the emperor as the symbol of the nation in spite of his 
role in the militaristic period – took a new turn in 1948–9 when China embraced 
Maoism and the nationalists of the Guomindang took refuge in Taiwan (Hein, 
Diefendorf and Ishida 2003). This upheaval precipitated a change in the American 
occupation strategy. The Americans stopped the purging of the Japanese military, 
and only a handful of leaders, including Tôjô Hideki (1884–1948), were tried and 
executed. Other war criminals were released and quickly put into new, and often 
important, positions.
Subsequently, Japan was gradually promoted by the United States as a model 
and an alternative to the communist danger. With the Soviet Union remaining 
Stalinist and China becoming Maoist, Japanese communists were integrated into 
Japan’s plan for rapid growth. This so-called “miracle” was in turn presented to 
East Asian and other Third World countries as a model for economic develop-
ment. While Japan obtained political support from the United States, the Korean 
War, in 1950–3, provided help for its industry. The promotion of this system by 
both the American and the Japanese governments in the post-World War II period 
was less a new – American – way of life than a recycling of the system in place 
during the 1940s, as well as of its former leaders.10
In 1955–73, the years that became known as the “rapid growth” period, the 
Japanese war economy was given new life in a type of state-sponsored capital-
ism. The main difference from the war period was a democratic political system 
that included elections and freedom of the press. The “new” system, however, 
was compromised by the fact that the postwar LDP effectively functioned as a 
monolithic authority, crippling the government by nepotism and corruption.
One of the most important postwar changes was the dismantling of the for-
merly powerful Ministry of the Interior, which also oversaw local governments 
and urban planning. While urban planning was initially the domain of the Ministry 
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of Construction (Kensetsushô), created postwar, and then partially of the National 
Land Agency, local governments became part of the new Ministry of Autonomy. 
Since that time, the national government has tried to recuperate the powers it lost 
after World War II.11
Throughout the postwar era and continuing more than 50 years later, provin-
cial and rural representatives have assured the industrial and metropolitan destiny 
of Japan, exemplified by the hyper-concentration of Tokyo. Nonetheless, some 
structures inherited from the 1940 period continue to play an important role in 
urbanization, directly or indirectly. Land readjustment (kukaku seiri), for example, 
a technique refined after the 1923 earthquake, remains in effect to this day.12
Economic and spatial trends since the 1960s: decentralization 
and technopolitan development
The analysis of economic sectors generally considered at the helm of the Japanese 
economy and their spatial translation reveal a major aspect of regional rebalancing 
since the 1960s and highlight the particularities of Japanese decentralization.13 
Technological invention and the location of the relevant industries often seem 
disconnected in Japan. The American occupation’s authority over the ownership 
of the country’s industrial sites, which lasted for more than 10 years following 
the end of World War II, had originally discouraged the Japanese, leading them 
to ignore research and development and instead import technology. As a result, 
a relative disconnection ensued between the business world and the universities, 
in which research affecting industry was conducted. Rather than advances made 
through research, competition between the various companies in regard to the 
improvement of imported technologies became paramount (Matsui 1998).
Decentralization of production sites began in the early 1960s when heavy 
industry in the Kyushu region (the southernmost of the four main Japanese islands) 
started to experience an economic crisis and major electronics companies moved 
there.14 The main reason for their move was the availability of a young, female 
workforce that was cheaper than the male workers in the metropolis and that ini-
tially did not require many qualifications. The area offered a good transportation 
network (airplanes, trains, highway), proximity to large cities in northern Kyushu, 
and a decade later on to the Asian market, as well as enthusiastic local politicians 
and the support of those at the national level. While several large factories moved 
their production sites to the provinces (particularly Kyushu or Tôhoku), research 
and development as well as production for the semiconductor industry remained 
in Tokyo (notably around Minato-ku and Shinagawa-ku and bordering districts 
in Kawasaki and Tama, in addition to suburban areas such as Mitaka) and Osaka, 
where the sophisticated machines used in the industry were made (Takeuchi 1993; 
Takeuchi and Mori 2001).
Industrial decentralization often occurred in several steps, as illustrated by the 
spatial strategy employed by the major software, semiconductor, and automo-
bile industries, including NEC and Toshiba (Kitagawa 1994). The first step was 
marked by the expansion of companies (1960–70) to centers in the vicinity of 
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Tokyo and other major cities. The second step (1970–80) saw an expansion into 
the provinces (Kumamoto, central Honshû, and Tôhoku) where cheap labor was a 
major argument for relocation. Third (1980–2000) was a return of activities to the 
vicinity of Tokyo, as the proximity to an airport and the existence of good truck-
ing networks assumed primary importance. In the case of Toshiba, a clear spatial 
hierarchy exists, from the sophisticated headquarters plant in Ôme in the western 
suburbs of Tokyo, employing highly skilled workers, to the more labor-intensive 
processes located in the provinces and rural areas (Kashima 1995).15 Overall, the 
leading sectors of Japanese industry have begun reconcentrating in the Tokyo 
metropolis, which, in fact, has paved the way for a revitalization of some of the 
historically multifunctional and socially mixed urban districts characteristic of 
Japan and a metropolitan regionalization toward adjacent areas (Ide and Takeuchi 
1980). The effects of globalization, however, may also come to play a part in their 
socio-spatial structure.
These trends in the location of industries and their hierarchies have undergone 
a political and social evolution. Regional rebalancing (chihô bunken), labeled 
decentralization, became a major political concept at the end of the 1970s. The 
Third Comprehensive National Development Plan (sanzensô, 1977), which 
emphasized decentralization, criticized the accumulation of industrial and other 
headquarters in the unipolar center of Tokyo and suggested their redistribution. Its 
decentralization logic was nonetheless quickly eclipsed by the reinvigoration of 
the megalopolis and the relocation of industries there during the “bubble” period 
(1985–90). The Plan for the Reconstruction of the Capital (shuto kaizô keikaku, 
1985) and the Fourth Comprehensive National Development Plan (yonzensô, 
1986) project the relocation of only some headquarters functions into new busi-
ness centers within the Tokyo megalopolis.
Only toward the end of the rapid growth period and as a result of the oil shock 
did the Japanese leadership, particularly the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI), abandon importing technology and launch research and develop-
ment as a close collaboration between the government and the private sector. By 
1970, Japan had caught up, notably with the United States, which had been the 
primary source for imported technology. Shortly thereafter, other new technol-
ogy sectors emerged and by the early 1980s Japan had developed sophisticated 
procedures in industries such as those producing semiconductors and electronic 
multi-media (Shimada 1998, Edgington 1994).
The rapid development of technological activity in conjunction with a recogni-
tion of the need for regional planning led to the development of plans for new towns 
focusing on these activities, the so-called “technopolises,” a concept that had been 
discussed as early as 1977 in the National Science and Technology Agency. Soon 
after, MITI began to explore the same idea and inaugurated a “Technopolis Plan” 
in 1983, although the original impetus for this plan is unclear. Sociologist Kuniko 
Fujita points out that following the rapid growth period many local governments 
looked to high technology to spur regional development (Fujita 1990).16 It was the 
desire of the prefectures for a technopolis that led MITI to conceive many more 
than the two or three it had initially projected in its plan.
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The Technopolis Plan was a product of projects for new industrial cities (shin 
sangyô toshi) promulgated in a 1962 law, the same year as the first national plan, 
and of the famous kaizôron (Remodeling Plan) of 1972, proposed by Prime 
Minister Tanaka Kakuei (1918–93), whose book on the reconstruction of the 
Japanese archipelago (Nihon rettô kaizôron) became a blueprint for regional plan-
ning. The kaizôron integrates the political characteristics of the rapid growth period 
(1955–73), such as the construction of industrial complexes (konbinâto) and mass 
transportation, including the high-speed railway. It also introduced new elements 
such as the improvement of the quality of life and the environment and regional 
rebalancing. The project was left uncompleted following a series of political scan-
dals surrounding Prime Minister Tanaka, economic instability due particularly to 
the oil crisis, and popular refusal to sacrifice quality of life to economic growth. 
However, at the beginning of the 1980s, during a new growth period, some of 
the planning ideas spelled out in the kaizôron became applicable.17 Among them 
were the planned infrastructure projects, including the bridges and viaducts on the 
Inland Sea and new airports. The only major difference was that the relocation of 
heavy industry in the northeast and southwest of the archipelago was abandoned 
in favor of the redistribution of new technology industries. The creation of 26 
technopolises in 1983 was followed by the designation of 11 “research cores” 
(risâchi koa) in 1986, based on the “law for the promotion of the participation of 
private enterprise,” better known as Minkatsu, proposed by MITI and financed by 
revenues gained following the privatization of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph 
(NTT).
Apart from the changes in the kinds of industry – from heavy chemicals in 
1962–4 to high technology in the 1980s and 1990s – the plans of 1962, 1972, and 
1982 were based on a similar spatial development. Just like the new industrial 
cities, the construction of the later technopolises privileged industrial investment 
and the participation of public (notably local) powers, and saw a late realization 
of basic necessities, including housing. In spite of their original ambitions, urban 
design questions were neglected. The locations of the two types of new construc-
tion differed: the 1960s industrial parks were situated along the Pacific Ocean, on 
plains, and on landfill sites, in contrast to the 1980s technopolises, which were 
built mainly in the hilly back country. The logic of their implantation was none-
theless similar to that of the rapid growth period. The technopolises were usually 
located close to major cities or major infrastructures associated with them. The 
technopolises that are most integrated into the major urban centers – Utsunomiya, 
Kôriyama, Shinanogawa, Hamamatsu, Kibi-Kôgen, Kumamoto, and Ôita – are 
the most successful economically.
The location of a technopolis was decided by the national government (MITI) 
after prefectural choices based on inter-prefectural competition and following 
intense negotiation. The southwestern region of Japan, which has traditionally 
produced many national politicians, has a large share of technopolises and hosts 
almost all those built in the early years (1984–5). Kyushu had its own advocates 
in Hiramatsu Morihiko, the longtime governor of Ôita and former director of 
MITI, who played a central role in the creation of the Technopolis Plan, and in 
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Hosokawa Morihiro, who became governor of Kumamoto in 1983 and prime 
minister in 1993 (the latter also inspired the so-called Kumamoto Artpolis Project 
that aims to promote architecture and design in the Kumamoto area). The politi-
cal and juridical problems of LDP senior leader Kanemaru Shin may explain the 
stagnation of the Kôfu technopolis that he had spearheaded. Competition for tech-
nopolises during this period was as stiff as it had been for the construction of the 
industrial cities: only 15 industrial cities were chosen in 1962 from 37 candidates, 
compared with 26 technopolises from 40 candidates in the 1980s.
Local governments intervened in these projects on several levels in addition 
to promoting their candidates – by giving financial support to industries, offering 
advantageous loans, and investing heavily in infrastructure.18 Their infrastructure 
budget has been much larger than that of other public investments, such as housing 
or water purification. In 1990, the public infrastructure (road, water, electricity, 
and so on) expenditure for technopolises totaled 7 trillion yen, with 930 billion 
yen going to Shinanogawa, 630 billion to Kôriyama, 370 billion to Kumamoto, 
and 150 billion to Hamamatsu (Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
1997). Local governments were encouraged to provide significant financial sup-
port (Cavasin 1996), leading to heavy debt accumulation. The Toyama prefecture 
even created a special tax to finance its technopolis. The local governments are 
thus deeply involved in the financing, which has led to heavy debt accumulation. 
MITI provided only indirect financing.19
The results of the Technopolis Plan are so far mixed. Some prefectures went 
beyond their means and at times the technopolis label was attached to places that 
did not have any economic and industrial unity (Suzuki 1999). In 1998, when the 
Technopolis Plan was suspended, the central government shifted responsibility for 
the sites to the local governments, demonstrating its willingness to permit local 
control of the planning for the location of industries. This transfer of power has 
also occurred with research parks (risâchi pâku), small or medium-sized zones in 
which research and development activities for industries are concentrated (similar 
to the technopolis concept). In 1995, out of hundreds of such parks, 46 were led 
by prefectures, 24 by cities, 18 by public agencies (kôdan), and 13 by mixed pub-
lic–private corporations. In this case, it may be that private industry left the devel-
opment of these activities to local entities because of the economic downturn. Here 
again, planning lay first with the national ministries and their think tanks, while 
local governments were primarily interested in the financing they could obtain by 
being part of the program. An analysis of Kôriyama in Fukushima-ken has shown 
that private investment is attracted by short-term factors, such as the presence of 
infrastructure, a cheap workforce, and land (Kyaw 2001). Long-term factors, such 
as proximity to the market and provider industries, are less important.
The technological advances made were one determinant that allowed Japan to 
overcome the shock of the oil crisis in the 1970s. During the following decade, 
Japan accumulated a commercial surplus and the capital generated led to the real-
estate and speculative bubble of 1985–90. The rising price of the yen, prompted 
by the 1985 agreement among the G5 countries (France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) on a need to adjust 
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the current exchange rates (Plaza Agreement), precipitated the industrial reloca-
tion of Japanese businesses outside the country in order to reduce their export 
costs while circumventing the quotas for foreign imports adopted by other nations 
vis-à-vis Japanese products. These economic phenomena translated into a new 
industrial geography in which Tokyo began to develop as a “global” city, with all 
that the term implies in regard to urbanization and planning, but which also bears 
on the megalopolis as a whole and its surroundings. A tendency toward centraliza-
tion around major urban centers and further population concentration particularly 
in the Tokyo area, observed since the 1980s, is becoming more and more visible20 
(Figures 1.2 and 1.3).
Local governments and the redistribution of urban 
populations
The vitality of local governments, in terms of economic development and 
financial power, has been largely dependent on demographics and the number 
of tax-paying individuals and companies. Urban communities typically contain 
a large percentage of the Japanese population in a relatively small percentage of 
the nation’s territory. In 2000, cities (shi) accounted for almost 79 percent of the 
Japanese population – more than 99 million inhabitants out of 127 million on 
little more than a quarter of the territory (28.4 percent): an urban density of 943 
inhabitants per square kilometer. Since the mid-1950s the urban population has 
surpassed the rural.21
The increase in urban populations has gone hand in hand with the demographic 
exodus from the peripheral prefectures for the past 20 years.22 Between 1995 and 
2000, 23 of 47 prefectures (ken) in Japan were losing residents. Conversely, pre-
fectures that were part of the Tôkaidô urban axis that reaches from Tokyo via 
Nagoya to Osaka continued to grow and extend to Kumamoto via Fukuoka in 
the southwest, and to Sendai via Kôriyama in the northeast. The Tôkaidô urban 
axis is now home to 90 million inhabitants on 1,300 kilometers and includes parts 
of 24 prefectures. Most of the Japanese cities are prospering, especially those 
within the Tôkaidô axis. Decreasing urban population numbers are found only in 
peripheral cities (with the exception of Kobe in the Osaka area, where the popula-
tion decrease is connected to the 1995 earthquake). Although the megalopolis as a 
whole is growing along the Tôkaidô axis, the numbers are not identical. Between 
1985 and 2000, Tokyo megalopolis saw a growth of 9.41 percent, Nagoya mega-
lopolis 7.7 percent, and Osaka megalopolis 4 percent. These figures suggest that, 
within the general pattern of urbanization, concentration is particularly strong in 
the Tokyo metropolitan area.23 The influx of new citizens from the greater Osaka 
area to Tokyo further highlights this phenomenon.
The growth of the megalopolis is concentrated in the outer areas, confirming 
the trend toward suburbanization and deconcentration. Tokyo has seen population 
increases particularly in areas neighboring its administrative boundaries (within 
its official borders it has maintained a steady population of 11 million since 1970) 
– in Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba prefectures – with a growth of 17.29 percent 
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at a distance of between 40 and 50 kilometers from the center. In Osaka and 
Nagoya, areas somewhat closer to the center are prospering. Meanwhile the inner 
areas of the major cities are generally losing inhabitants, leading to the so-called 
“doughnut phenomenon” (dônatsu genshô).
A shift has been occurring in recent years, however, symbolized again by 
Tokyo and its demographic evolution. Some of the central districts that lost 
population during the past 20 years – Chiyoda-ku, Minato-ku, and Shibuya-ku in 
Tokyo, for example, which lost almost 20 percent between 1985 and 1995 – have 
gained population between 1995 and 2000 (5.6 percent, 3.79 percent, and 3.79 
percent, respectively) (Hohn 2002).24 This development appears to be based on a 
restructuring of the relationship between residence and workplace, demonstrated 
by the decrease in the number of daily commuters from the surrounding areas 
into Tokyo between 1995 and 2000, from 3.69 to 3.445 million (6.7 percent). 
The repopulation of central Tokyo is due partly to gentrification, known in Japan 
by the neologism okushon,25 the result of a public and private move to attract a 
wealthier population to the center, one that has been accompanied by impoverish-
ment in several urban areas
Tokyo thus continues to grow in population and size, a phenomenon that shows 
no signs of slowing down even while many citizens deplore the gigantism and 
congestion of the city. The recent spatial plan by the TMG published in April 
2001 effectively plans for a capital megalopolis of 33 million inhabitants (Watabe 
2002). Because of exorbitant land prices, skyscraper construction for an affluent 
clientele appears to be the only viable solution.
Together with London and New york, Tokyo is regularly considered one of the 
three “world” or “global” cities (sekai toshi), as attested to by economic indicators 
(Sassen 1991).26 Tokyo nonetheless differs markedly from other world cities and 
its status has been questioned in recent years (Saitô and Thornley 2003). Foreign 
investment, in particular, is not as strong as in its counterpart cities.27 In fact, 
Tokyo is still primarily the Japanese national, political, and industrial capital. The 
city’s role as capital, however, as “state-centered political–bureaucratic” global 
city, distinguishes Tokyo from New York, a “market-centered bourgeois” global 
city (Hill and Kim 2000).
Decentralization in Japan: from a national to a global issue
The relationship between the global, the national, and the local is one of the 
major geopolitical themes at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Japan is 
a prime example of this interplay. One of the most important democracies in the 
world, in spite of its current economic difficulties, it is the second most important 
international economic power. Its socioeconomic system has been considered 
a model for the world over the last half century. Japan is also one of the most 
urbanized countries on the globe, marked by its huge capital, Tokyo – with over 
30 million inhabitants, one of the most populated metropolitan areas – and the 
increasingly urbanized area stretching from Tokyo to Osaka and beyond.
Globalization of the economy leads to a restriction of the role of the national 
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governments. The metropolises, and particularly the largest among them, have 
become the spearheads of economic dynamism while being subject to the varia-
tions of international exchanges. Japan, as well as other countries, is faced with 
contradictory issues: problems related to growth and gigantic cities, the need to 
face competitors not only inside one nation but globally, the desire for large-scale 
spatial planning and the absence of appropriate territorial models, the necessity of 
metropolitan governance and the desire of citizens to control development at the 
local level. These issues are particularly important in capital cities such as Tokyo, 
where the central government is present and from where it controls the entire 
national space, while local forces aim at capturing the benefits of globalization, 
unwilling to share with the rest of the country represented by the central govern-
ment.
Japan’s economic miracle in the postwar period is reflected in its urban spaces 
and so is the country’s current crisis in almost all areas – economic, political, and 
socio-cultural. While it may be risky to speculate on the future of this crisis, as 
a period of passage toward a new uprising or the end of the Japanese miracle, an 
examination of decentralization policies, spatial restructuring, and the growth of 
the Japanese city brings to light a paradox that characterizes the country. Japanese 
urbanization has been criticized for its negative aspects – high density, congestion, 
pollution, small number of square meters of housing available per person, lack of 
green spaces, high land prices, and sprawl – and rarely praised for its virtues 
– efficiency of public transportation, a low crime rate, social vitality. At the same 
time, over the past 15 years, the possibilities for architectural and urban experi-
mentation have attracted the attention of designers and urban planners interested 
in community-building. Scholars worldwide examine the effects of globalization 
in Japan and their local effects and responses, gleaning lessons that have impli-
cations for other countries and other cities. With increased globalization, local 
institutions have become increasingly integrated, or passed over. Urban agents 
and citizens and their respective actions, as well as the various forms of interac-
tion, differ from one place to another – from the metropolises to large or small 
cities to neighborhoods – making Japan an excellent case study in the context of 
local, national, and global relationships.
Notes
 1 On the interaction between Marxism and Japanese nationalism, see Hoston (1986, 
1994).
 2 In a first step (1868–78), Edo became the Tokyo prefecture (Tôkyô-fu), divided into 15 
wards. In a second step (1878–89), the prefecture extended to include the Ogasawara 
islands, in danger of falling into American hands, and the Izu islands that had been 
detached from Shizuoka in 1888, as well as the Tama district, detached from Kanagawa 
prefecture in 1893.
 3 The Chinese character to for the Japanese word miyako means “capital.”
 4 In 1956, five cities were designated Cabinet Ordinance Designated Major Cities 
(seirei shitei toshi) (Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe, Kyoto, and Osaka). Since then several 
cities have been added: Kitakyûshû (1963), Sapporo, Kawasaki, and Fukuoka (1972), 
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Hiroshima (1980), Sendai (1989), Chiba (1992), Saitama (2003), Shizuoka (2005). As 
of April 2006, Sakai will become the fifteenth seirei shitei toshi.
 5 In 1978, the city of Yokohama hosted a symposium called “The Era of the Provinces” 
(chihô no jidai), a name that was reused to characterize all decentralization initiatives. 
Nagasu Kazuji, then governor of Kanagawa prefecture, of which yokohama is the main 
city, requested that the central government let local entities manage environmental 
and urban issues. The best-selling novel Kirikirijin (The people of Kirikiri) by Inoue 
Hisashi, published in 1981, reflected the dissatisfaction of the Japanese citizens with 
the central government.
 6 While it is possible to statistically calculate specifically determined areas, such as 
the Densely Inhabited Districts (DID) (jinkô shûchû chiku) – defined by the Japanese 
national statistics bureau as urban spaces with a density of more than 4,000 inhabitants 
per square kilometer in communities with over 5,000 citizens – the fluidity of the 
megalopolis, which is marked by processes of expansion and compression, and the 
difficulties that the Japanese themselves have in distinguishing between urban and 
rural spaces, present challenges.
 7 See Pelletier (1997: 163–6; 2001: 117–18).
 8 Following the findings of the Shoup Mission, the Japanese government established 
the Kanbe Committee (named after its chairman, Kanbe Masao) to investigate local 
administration.
 9 On the Marxist support for Japan’s pan-Asian policies see also Maîtron and Shiota 
(1979).
 10 Of the 16 successive prime ministers in the 42 years following World War II, until the 
arrival of Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–7), only two (Tanaka Kakuei and Suzuki Zenkô) 
had not been politically active before 1945. Furthermore, the gray eminences of the 
LDP were all politically implicated in the prewar militarism. This situation is very 
different from that of postwar Germany, where de-Nazification was more widespread 
(Yoneyama 1999).
See Seagrave and Seagrave (2002) and Thomann (1995) for a discussion of career 
continuities in Japan for prominent figures including Kishi Nobusuke (1896–1987), 
who, detained as a war criminal of the highest category (A), became prime minister 
in 1956, and Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967), who became prime minister five times 
(1947, 1948, 1949–52, and 1952–3).
On issues of continuity in planning, see Hein 2003b.
 11 The creation of national agencies (kôdan) between 1950 and 1960 responsible for 
housing and highway development, among other fields, took planning tools away from 
the local governments (see MacDougall 1983).
 12 Land readjustment was promoted by Ishikawa Hideaki (1893–1955), a key figure in 
the transition from the pre- to the postwar period. An iconic planner of the 1940s, 
he directed the urban planning bureau in Tokyo during and after the war (see Ishida 
1987).
 13 For an analysis of the politics of high technology see also Bass (1998) and Yamazaki 
(1992).
 14 Among the companies that moved to cities in Kyushu are Mitsubishi, to Kumamoto 
in 1967; the US company Texas Instruments, to Ôita in 1968: NEC (Nippon Electric 
Company), to Kumamoto in 1969; and Kyocera, to Kagoshima in 1969 and to Oki in 
1970.
 15 The five major software companies are located primarily in three megalopolises and 
the four provincial metropolises of Sapporo, Sendai, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka (see 
Kitagawa 1996).
The geographical pattern of the plastic-mold manufacturing sector shows even more 
discernible tendencies, with a clear division of work between the headquarters, situated 
in the industry’s birthplace in the Jônan district in southern Tokyo, and the neighboring 
area of Kawasaki–Yokohama (see Oda 1997).
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The automobile industry, beyond its enormous investments abroad, has redistributed 
itself on the Japanese archipelago over the last 20 years, opening new assembly 
sites close to its original headquarters and expanding its sphere of sub-tiers in the 
Tokyo metropolis (see Flüchter and Yamamoto (2002), Miyakawa (1999), and Ogawa 
(1995)).
 16 For example, the city of Nagaoka (Niigata-ken), following a visit by the city’s mayor 
to the new Finnish city of Tapiola, in 1971, launched a technopolis project, later 
known as Shinanogawa Technopolis. Kuniko Fujita states, “Nagaoka city had started 
Nagaoka New Town project long before the State had announced its Technopolis Plan. 
. . . When MITI started the technopolis project, it invited Nagaoka New Town Project 
to join” (Fujita 1990: 244).
 17 According to sociologist Tessa Morris-Suzuki, politicians and media consider 
the Technopolis Plan the result of the combination of the forces of city and local 
authorities, industry, and national government that was typical of the kaizôron (Morris-
Suzuki 1990). The plan privileged rural and partly rural areas, often with a polycentric 
arrangement in a “green” environment. In addition, it constituted a means by which 
the economic and technological development of a region close to an existing city could 
occur. Finally, it allowed citizens to adopt a new concept of urbanity, including new 
lifestyles and new services.
 18 The yamanashi Prefecture thus offered 10 million yen and other incentives to four 
enterprises to encourage them to locate in the Kôfu technopolis (see Bass 1998: 395).
 19 Estimates of MITI’s financial participation vary. Amy Glasmeier states that the 
national budget allocated to the Technopolis Plan in the early years was only a modest 
equivalent to 10 million dollars (Glasmeier 1988). Fujita, however, states that the 
budget was 1.485 billion yen in 1985, one-third for the relocation of industry (Fujita 
1990). Steven Bass finds that the role of MITI is largely indirect (Bass 1998: 394–5).
 20 David Edgington opines that service industries will most likely cluster in Tokyo, 
Osaka, and Nagoya (Edgington 1997).
This tendency was already apparent in the 1980s. Murata Kiyoshi points out that 
Tokyo remains the mother technopolis of Japan, dictating its growth toward peripheral 
regions (Murata 1988).
 21 Although the delimitation of urban areas is often not very precise, the concentration 
of DIDs was 65.2 percent of the Japanese population in 2000, a little over 81 million 
inhabitants on less than 3 percent of the territory.
 22 This phenomenon is not identical with what occurred during the rapid growth period, 
as the redistribution between departments as well as within the metropolises was much 
higher (Morikawa 1998).
 23 According to standard Japanese classifications, the metropolitan area of Tokyo (Tôkyô 
daitoshi-ken) is composed of four departments: Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba. 
The capital area (shuto-ken) includes four more departments: Ibaraki, Yamanashi, 
Gunma, and Tochigi. This entity comprises 41 million inhabitants (one-third of the 
Japanese population) on 34,428 square kilometers, with an average density of 1,111 
inhabitants per square kilometer.
 24 Partial results of the 2005 national census confirm this trend.
 25 Okushon is a play on other Japanese words. The term manshon comes from the English 
“mansion” and characterizes high-end residential housing (or something that aspires to 
be so). Man means 10,000 in Japanese, oku 100 million. Okushon thus alludes to the 
manshon whose prices have exploded.
 26 Economic indicators, such as the growth of financial markets following deregulation 
in the 1980s, the number of transnational headquarters, and growth in high-level 
services underscore Tokyo’s membership in the group of world cities (Machimura 
1994). During the bubble period, Tokyo was the center of information technologies 
and was home to 80 percent of foreign headquarters, 73 percent of foreign banks, 55 
percent of all headquarters for Japanese companies worth more than 5 billion yen, and 
one-quarter of all Japanese university students.
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 27 In contrast to London, New york, Singapore, and Hong Kong, the share of foreign 
exchange markets decreased between 1989 and 1995 (Yoshikawa 1998).
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2 Local initiatives and the 
decentralization of planning 
power in Japan
Ishida Yorifusa
Modern urban planning systems in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, 
Scandinavia, and other European countries follow a decentralized model in which 
local governments hold general planning authority. In Japan, although the system 
of modern city planning has learned much from the experiences of these countries, 
it has been institutionalized as a centralized system for more than half a century.
Only in 1968, with the enactment of the City Planning Law (shin toshi keikaku 
hô), was the first step taken toward transferring power from central government 
to local administrations. Over the next 30 years, citizen participation in planning 
decisions increased and local planning authorities gained power. The next step, 
one that is imminent, both in the field of city planning and in local governance, is 
the decentralization of public administration under a set of laws. The relationship 
between local activity and decentralization – the focus of this discussion – is one 
of the key current issues of Japan’s urban policy.
There is some concern, however, as to how far decentralization will actually 
extend. Some critics of the new City Planning Law, which was amended by the 
Omnibus Law for Decentralization of Powers (chihô bunken ikkatsu hô), effective 
April 1, 2000, have taken it to task for falling short of true decentralization. Others 
believe that local governments and communities lack the means to make the most 
of the laws available.
Before attempting an analysis of decentralization and citizen participation in 
urban planning as an integral part of contemporary history, it is useful to review 
briefly the development of city planning in Japan prior to 1968, especially as 
relates to local control, and to determine what can be learned from the past.
Urban and regional policies in the Meiji period: 
modernization and centralization in Japan
Local initiatives in city planning before the enactment of the Tokyo Urban 
Area Improvement Ordinance (Tôkyô shiku kaisei jôrei)
During the period of chaos that followed the1868 Meiji Restoration, urban issues 
were addressed by individual cities rather than by the central government, which 
was occupied with other matters. Traditional town planning methods, such as the 
request for construction of fireproof buildings along wide roads (hirokôji nurigome 
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zukuri) to prevent the spread of fires, were common – even in the new capital of 
Tokyo. An exception was the construction of a red brick mall along Ginza Street 
initiated by the central government in 1872 (Fujimori 1982: 1–44). Examples of 
the use of planning tools during the Edo era include the creation of open space for 
fire evacuation in Akihabara in 1869; the 1874 ordinance restricting building on 
rights of way to facilitate the extension of roads (Ishida 1987: 127–38); and the 
1881 improvement project in Kanda Hashimoto-chô (Ishida 1987: 69–125). For 
the 1881 project, the money was raised using a “7 percent deposit for the poor” 
(shichibu tsumi kin) collected by the council of townsmen (machi kaisho).1 The 
townspeople used the deposit to buy and manage land and houses.
Other cities carried out their own city planning projects and developed planning 
systems to meet the needs of modern (Meiji) Japan, including the construction of 
districts for local government offices; the expansion of built-up areas; the con-
struction of railways; and the improvement of congested areas and of procedures 
for civil disaster preparedness and recovery. Among notable examples of city 
planning are the following: the Sapporo urban development project undertaken 
by the Hokkaido Colonization Office in 1871; the Sakaechô-dôri road expansion 
project in Kobe carried out by the Hyogo prefectural government in 1873; a plan 
for a local government office district in Yamagata proposed by Governor Mishima 
Michitsune in 1876; a recovery and block readjustment project in Hakodate fol-
lowing a major fire in 1878–9; and a project to expand major roads directed by the 
Kyoto prefectural government in 1882.
These projects met the needs of each city, and often employed unique methods 
of implementation and financing. The 1873 road expansion project in Kobe, for 
example, used a method whereby land along the 20-m-wide road was expro-
priated (excess condemnation) and sold at market prices after the completion 
of the project to pay for it (Tsubohara 1995: 37–8). Among the city planning 
systems created during this period were Osaka prefecture’s Ordinance for Road 
Boundaries (dôro keikai rei) of 1871, which required all existing buildings 
or parts of buildings that jutted out beyond building lines (supposed to be the 
original street boundaries)2 to be demolished and brought back to the original 
building lines; and an attempt by Kyoto prefecture to expand roads through an 
ordinance requiring a two-meter setback from existing road boundaries in 1872 
(Ishida 1987: 138–67). Regulations on row-house construction (nagaya kenchiku 
kisoku) in several prefectures, including Osaka and Kanagawa, went into effect 
circa 1886. Although these regulations were imposed almost unanimously in the 
majority of cities as a result of the campaign conducted by the Home Ministry’s 
(Naimushô) Sanitation Bureau (eisei kyoku) and its auxiliary organ, the Japan 
Public Sanitation Association (Dai Nippon shiritsu eisei Kyôkai), they differed 
from city to city (Tanaka 1991: 87–165), and maintained a local character until the 
passage of the Urban Building Law (shigaichi kenchiku butsu hô) in 1919.
The debate on decentralization and the Tokyo Urban Area 
Improvement Projects
From 1888 to 1918, the central government carried out the Tokyo Urban 
Improvement Projects (shiku kaisei jigyô) intended to improve the capital. The 
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system and framework for what was the first rebuilding plan to take place in 
modern Japan was provided by the Tokyo Urban Area Improvement Ordinance, 
enacted by decree of the emperor; Tokyo prefecture, and later the city of Tokyo, 
implemented and financed the project. The plan for urban improvement and projects 
to be implemented every fiscal year, however, was discussed and established 
by the Tokyo Urban Area Improvement Committee (Tôkyô shiku kaisei iinkai) 
within the Home Ministry, and approved by the cabinet after reporting to the 
home minister (Naimu daijin). Clearly this was a national project. This centralized 
system lived on in the 1919 City Planning Law (1919 nen (or kyû) toshi keikaku 
hô), which gave rise to the centralized nature of Japan’s city planning that would 
exist for a period of 50 years, until 1968.
Probably the first instance in which the issue of decentralization in relation to 
Japanese city planning was raised was in the discussions surrounding the makeup 
of the Tokyo Urban Area Improvement Committee. While many approved of 
the committee’s inclusion of popularly elected members as a step toward self-
governance, many others argued that the composition of the membership was 
problematic. The ensuing debate was captured in a newspaper report of the time: 
“On September 1, 1888, the Sectional Meeting by Members from wards (kubukai) 
of the Tokyo Prefectural Assembly (Tôkyô-fukai) held an election among its mem-
bers for 10 of them to be sent to the Tokyo Urban Area Improvement Committee.3 
The question was raised that this number of 10 was much too small, compared 
with the allocation of 15 members from the central government (selected among 
higher-ranking officials), from the standpoint of local governance” (Yomiuri, 
September 2, 1888). In the meantime the Tokyo Association of Commerce and 
Industry (Tôkyô shôkôkai) requested that the central government include its rep-
resentatives among the committee members. Newspaper editorials were split over 
this issue. One editorial supported the idea, recommending that the balance of 
central government to local members be maintained by adding five members from 
the Tokyo Association of Commerce and Industry. Others demanded that meet-
ings of the committee be open to the public. The central government, in any event, 
did not accede to calls to increase the number of publicly elected members.
The issue of control over the committee by representatives of the central gov-
ernment had an enduring impact. In February 1893 the Tokyo City Assembly 
(Tôkyô-shi gikai) proposed to the central government that the assembly be respon-
sible for the planning of Tokyo’s improvement. The assembly’s argument was 
that it was unfair that the committee should determine Urban Area Improvement 
plans for projects funded entirely by Tokyo when two-thirds of its members were 
central government officials (Tôkyô-to Zaisei-shi Kenkyû-kai 1969: 345).
Local city planning in the late Meiji period
Unlike the situation in the capital, in which the central government tried to take 
the initiative in promoting its improvement plans, planning in the regional cities 
was conducted largely by the voluntary efforts of local governments. Compared 
with Tokyo’s plans, which focused on the improvement of built-up areas, plans 
in other cities confronted two different issues: the new fact of urban expansion; 
and the participation (and, in some cases, leadership) of landowners and private 
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companies. Among such local efforts, noteworthy cases were the improvement 
(shigaichi seibi) of Kobe through land-readjustment projects carried out by the 
landowners’ association (1890); an agreement on the development of new urban 
areas in the town of Washo-machi (currently in the city of Kure) in Hiroshima 
prefecture (1898); a development plan for new urban areas in Osaka, prepared 
at the request of Osaka city (also 1898); the cleaning up of a burned area and the 
installation of a fire protection belt after a major fire in Takaoka city, in Toyama 
prefecture; a report on a civil engineering survey prepared by a committee for 
the survey, arranged by the Kyoto City Assembly (Kyôto shigikai) (1899); the 
demolition of parts of buildings infringing on rights of way in Osaka city during 
the construction of streetcar routes (since1903); three major projects (including 
road extension) in Kyoto city (since 1907); and the repair of areas affected by 
major fires in southern Osaka (1909) and northern Osaka (1912).
The new urban area improvement in Kobe took place seven years before the 
enactment of a law on land readjustment, “on improvement of land plots” (tochi 
kukaku kairyô ni kansuru ken), by the central government in 1897, and can be seen 
as a local initiative that paved the way toward the creation of a planning system 
legally formalized by the central government (Tsubohara 1995: 75–108; Ohara 
2002: 25–38, 165–193). The case of Washo-machi involved a land-readjustment 
agreement among landowners with the participation of the town hall (machi 
yakuba), which detailed project expenses to be borne by the landowners (City of 
Kure 1924: 38–51).
Osaka’s development plan of 1898, prepared by Yamaguchi Hanroku, who had 
studied city planning in France, could be called Japan’s first urban master plan for 
the entire city area. During this period, the issues of urban expansion and indus-
trial location were more pressing in Osaka than in Tokyo (Nishikawa, Fujimoto, 
and Mutô 1989: 316).
From the turn of the century onward, more comprehensive building controls, 
rather than the mere regulation of row-houses and other specific types of build-
ings, emerged in many parts of the country. In 1909, Osaka prefecture established 
Building Control Regulations (Ôsaka-fu kenchiku torishimari kisoku). The city 
of Tokyo commissioned the Architectural Institute of Japan (Nihon Kenchiku 
Gakkai) to draft the Tokyo City Building Ordinance (Tôkyô-shi kenchiku jôrei) 
in 1906, with a final draft submitted in 1913. This ordinance was not put into 
effect, however. At this time, it was still presumed that each local government 
would enact its own regulations, tailored to local requirements. Although Osaka’s 
regulations were criticized for setting a far too lax standard, they reflected the 
land-use conditions in that city and were realistic and applicable tools.
Structure of the prewar city planning laws and the 
completion of centralized city planning
The Tokyo Urban Area Improvement Project (shiku kaisei jigyô), Japan’s first 
modern city planning effort, initiated by the central government in 1888, spanned 
30 years. Its importance is reflected by the fact that in 1988 the City Planning 
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Institute of Japan (Nihon Toshi keikaku Gakkai), the Ministry of Construction 
(Kensetsushô), and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, or TMG (Tôkyô-to), held 
commemorative events celebrating the Centennial of Japanese City Planning.
While the central government focused on improving built-up areas in the capi-
tal under the aegis of this national initiative, other cities faced the new issue of 
urban growth. During the period between 1891 and 1920, the number of cities 
having populations between 50,000 and 100,000 increased from 12 to 31; and 
those with more than 100,000 from six to 16. Most of these cities were dedicated 
to industrial, port, mining, or military functions, and developed in response to the 
industrial and military buildup of the nation. Urbanization and industrialization 
rapidly progressed in regional cities. As a result, a new type of city planning was 
much more necessary in these cities than in Tokyo.
The City Planning Law and the Urban Area Buildings Law (shigaichi kenchi-
kubutsu hô) of 1919 are credited as being the first modern city planning systems 
applicable to all Japanese cities. It could also be argued that these were a high-
handed attempt by the national government to centralize Japan’s city planning 
system at the expense of local planning initiatives and building controls that had 
been put in place during the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. These 
early local achievements merit some examination.
Seki Hajime and Osaka: local initiatives
Around the turn of the twentieth century, city planning efforts undertaken by 
local authorities shifted from project-specific to more general and comprehensive 
in nature. Local governments began to use new methods and tools, including 
performing general surveys of urban issues, planning, and project implementation. 
In Kyoto, for example, a temporary committee for the purpose of producing 
a survey of public works (rinji doboku chôsa iinkai) was established in 1899. 
It compiled an advisory report on civil engineering that included plans for the 
expansion of the city area as well as of the water supply and roads. Based on this 
report, the city of Kyoto launched a project to extend 11 routes (mainly roads used 
by streetcars) in 1907. This became known as one of Kyoto’s “Big Three” projects 
(sandai jigyô). Following Kyoto’s example, Nagoya (1911) and Kobe (1914) 
initiated surveys for urban improvement. Had the central government supported 
these local efforts both financially and institutionally, a decentralized and locally 
specific city planning system might well have developed in Japan.
The most notable of these initiatives took shape in Osaka. In 1917, the city of 
Osaka established a committee on urban improvement (toshi kairyô chôsa-kai), 
which in January 1918 compiled a draft of the Osaka Urban Area Improvement 
Law (Ôsaka shigai kairyô hô sôan) to enforce a completely new city planning 
system for the city of Osaka and its environs. The committee also started a cam-
paign to request that the central government enact the draft into national law. The 
historian Watanabe Shun-ichi has regarded this draft as the missing link between 
the Tokyo Urban Area Improvement Ordinance and the 1919 City Planning Law 
(Watanabe 1987) and reprinted the draft in his book (Watanabe 1993: 261–2). In 
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some respects, the draft was much more innovative than the system that would be 
instituted by the 1919 City Planning Law. For example, one of the draft’s provi-
sions on land-readjustment projects (kukakuseiri jigyô) was similar to the method 
introduced in the 1919 City Planning Law, which followed the agricultural land-
readjustment system (kôchiseiri seido). But the draft’s method was based on plan-
ning tools already in use in Osaka and Kobe and was far more sophisticated and 
practical than the 1919 City Planning Law’s system.4
The key figure on the committee was Seki Hajime, then the deputy mayor of 
Osaka and later its mayor.5 A former professor at the Tokyo Higher Commercial 
School (Tôkyô kotô shôgyô gakkô) who had studied in the Netherlands and 
was familiar with European city planning, Seki did not attempt to merely copy 
European experiences, but tried to reflect Osaka’s particular local conditions in 
city planning.
Seki did not consider the idea that city planning be kept in the hands of local 
government. Article 1 of the draft stipulates that the authority “to design and to 
decide projects to be implemented every year” should be given to the “Osaka 
Urban Area Improvement Committee”(Ôsaka shigai kairyô iinkai), to be super-
vised by the home minister. This contrasts with the demand made by the Tokyo 
City Assembly in 1893 that the central government give city planning power to 
the assembly. Article 12 of the draft granted the authority to permit land readjust-
ment by the landowners’ association to the home minister rather than to the mayor 
of Osaka. This may be further evidence that Seki considered city planning to be 
a national issue.
The draft proposed giving authority over a number of issues to either the city of 
Osaka or its mayor: financing the cost of urban improvement projects (Article 3); 
appointing the executor of urban improvement projects (Article 4); levying taxes 
on profits from the increased land value (tochi zôka zei), surtaxes (fuka-zei) on 
local taxes, and betterment levies (juekisha futankin) (Article 5); conducting land 
readjustments for joint executors at their request (Article 12 section 4); and estab-
lishing an ordinance concerning “restrictions on buildings and land use” (Article 
18). The only article in the draft related to local government involvement in city 
planning authority is the last, which concerns an ordinance that also required a 
decision by the Osaka Urban Area Improvement Committee under the auspices of 
the Home Ministry, and final approval by the home minister.
It seems that Seki was more concerned with the financing of projects than with 
the decentralization of city planning. Thus, when the Home Ministry promised to 
apply the Tokyo Urban Area Improvement Ordinance (which stipulated the cen-
tral government’s financial support for city planning projects) to Osaka and other 
cities, and enact the City Planning Law early, he was quick to abandon Osaka’s 
plan and approve the Ministry’s offer. Other cities also called for the involve-
ment of the national government in city planning – in the expectation of financial 
support. Monetary considerations thus prevailed over local governance and local 
initiatives. In the years following the enactment of the 1919 City Planning Law, 
Seki again expressed a strong wish to levy taxes on gains from increased land 
value.
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The debate on financing city planning
The 1919 City Planning Law and the Urban Area Buildings Law laid the foundation 
for national and centralized city planning in Japan. Of all the discussions and 
debates to occur in the City Planning Research Committee (toshi keikaku chôsa 
iinkai), established within the Home Ministry, the most controversial was how to 
finance city planning (Akagi 1968: 522–33).6
Sources of revenue included those specified in the Tokyo Urban Area 
Improvement Ordinance, subsidies, taxes on land value increases (tochi zôka zei), 
betterment levies imposed on those benefiting from planning projects, and taxes 
on unutilized urban land (kanchi zei). The argument was between the vice minis-
ter for finance, Jino Katsunosuke, who opposed any sources of revenue other than 
those listed in the Ordinance, and the many other members of the committee who 
supported the new sources of revenue.
Consequently, the subsidy was not specified in the City Planning Law. The 
introduction of taxes on land value increases or on unutilized urban land, which 
local governments hoped would be formalized, was postponed. These taxes were 
intended to be institutionalized by imperial decree (chokurei), but their planning 
took too long and the draft was turned down by the House of Peers, which counted 
many of the propertied classes among its members (Sumisaki, Kobayashi, and 
Ôba 1981).
One new revenue source – the betterment levy – was institutionalized, and 
became an important revenue source for the construction and widening of roads 
in regional cities (Tôkyô Shisei Chôsakai 1929). In most cases (there were slight 
regional variations), owners of roadside land were charged a certain portion of 
project expenses (typically one-third). These landowners strongly opposed the 
levy and called on the government to clarify the meaning of “betterment” and 
whether they would actually benefit from the development. As a benchmark of the 
benefit, the landowners demanded that a land evaluation be made. The govern-
ment tried to avoid introducing the land-evaluation system and used vague terms 
such as “tangible and intangible benefits.” The landowners were not convinced 
by this finagling and the system of betterment levies could not be developed in a 
positive way satisfactory to both sides (Ishida and Furusato 1980).7
The Home Ministry’s Ordinance (Naimushô rei) no. 17 of 1922 on the better-
ment levy in Osaka was a special case, including provisions for the appointment of 
appraisers and land evaluation after completion of the project to adjust the amount 
of the payment. Apparently, it was Seki Hajime who initiated the introduction of 
the system of benefit reevaluation. In 1922, Seki invited to Osaka the American 
historian Charles A. Beard, who was an adviser to Tokyo’s mayor, Gotô Shinpei, 
and asked him to give a lecture on the betterment levy (Beard 1923: 92–111).8 In 
his lecture, Beard emphasized the importance of land evaluation in the American 
betterment levy system. Without having conducted a single case of land evalua-
tion, the peculiar system in Osaka was eliminated when Osaka’s ordinance was 
amended in 1933 (Ishida and Furusato 1980).
Another new planning concept, which Seki recommended in his article and 
which was codified in the 1919 City Planning Law, called for using develop-
32 Ishida
ment profits for city planning projects (Seki 1917). The “excess condemnation” or 
“zone expropriation” (chôka shûyô or chitai shûyô) method, with “land readjust-
ment for site improvement along streets” (kenchiku shikichi zôsei kukakuseiri), 
should have been used to redevelop built-up areas. But in all the years until 1954, 
when it was abolished, this idea was applied in just three projects nationwide. The 
only example in which a development project created profits that were used as a 
revenue source was one to develop a station plaza on the west side of Shinjuku 
Station in the 1930s (Koshizawa 1991: 76–87; Suzuki 1991).
One advocate of the decentralization of city planning in the early twentieth 
century was Miyake Iwao, an Osaka journalist who later became a member of 
the House of Representatives (shûgiin giin). In his 1908 book on urban issues, he 
discussed ways to finance urban improvements and made some important sug-
gestions for specific revenue sources, including a tax on land value increases and 
income from public corporations (Miyake 1908: 222–56). The most important 
of these was his argument that cities must have their own sources of funding. 
Miyake’s way of thinking was similar to that of Seki Hajime, who favored taxing 
land value increases and included that item in Osaka city’s budget even before the 
establishment of the betterment levy system.
A heated debate over funding sources took place among members of the City 
Planning Research Committee, focusing on subsidies as the key revenue source for 
city planning. The occurrence of this debate points up the fact that most members 
did not consider city planning to be a local issue, to be initiated by local govern-
ments. There was no adequate discussion of taxes on land value increase (as a city 
government revenue source) or a betterment levy and the return of development 
profits (linking city planning projects and funding). While the issue of city plan-
ning and funding was addressed to some extent in the pre-World War II period, it 
did not make significant progress.
The centralized structure of the 1919 City Planning Law and the 
Urban Area Buildings Law
As early as 1893, the Tokyo City Assembly had raised the question of whether 
the city lacked sufficient planning authority, despite having to bear virtually all 
project costs. This question, however, together with the issues of transferring 
decision-making power and establishing local funding sources, was not discussed 
at all by the City Planning Research Committee.
The 1919 City Planning Law and the Urban Area Buildings Law, both highly 
centralized, established Japan’s modern city planning system (see also Chapter 
5 by André Sorensen). Most of the members of the City Planning Research 
Committee, which drafted both laws, were central government officials. The only 
“local” representatives on the committee were the mayor of Tokyo (Tajiri Inejirô), 
the deputy mayor of Osaka (Seki Hajime), and the director of the Tokyo City 
Office (Fujihara Toshio). The governor of Tokyo (Tôkyô-fu chiji) and the superin-
tendent general of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (keishi sôkan) also 
sat on the committee, but were appointed by the central government rather than 
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being locally elected. There was virtually no discussion of the decentralization of 
power or the issue of central versus local control.
It was under the 1919 City Planning Law that city planning was first applied 
to regional cities (other than Tokyo and the five metropolises, Osaka, Kyoto, 
Kobe, Nagoya, and yokohama) and some municipalities. The framework for 
planning and decision-making on projects followed that of the Tokyo Urban Area 
Improvement Ordinance, and established the concept of city planning as a national 
project under the authority of the Home Ministry.
The Urban Area Buildings Law established a national building standard to 
replace prefectural regulations governing the construction of row-houses and 
other buildings. This standard was applied uniformly to both built-up areas and 
newly urbanizing suburban areas. In other words, the essence of the zoning 
concept was not included in the law, which ignored differences between places 
that were already urban and those in the process of urbanizing, leading to major 
problems later on.
By this time, a report published by the Deutscher Verein für öffentliche 
Gesundheitspflege (the German public health association) on Germany’s unified 
building control system was introduced in Japan by Mori Ôgai, an army officer in 
charge of public hygiene and a well-known writer, in his essay “Okusei Shingi” 
(Current discussion on building ordinance) (Ishida 1999: 138–58). The German 
report raised the point that, in addition to setting a national minimum building 
standard, there should be some allowance for each local government to address 
its particular needs (Deutscher Verein für öffentliche Gesundheitspflege 1890: 
1–60).
Although the City Planning Research Committee paid attention to regional 
differences – for example, the issue of streets in Osaka being too narrow to apply 
European building-height regulations – it did not consider introducing the idea of 
customizing standards or of applying stricter regulations to urban expansion or 
newly created built-up areas. Rather, it initiated uniformly loose standards.
City planning during the war years, 1930–45
Following the City Planning Law and the Urban Buildings Law, Japanese city 
planning in terms of techniques, practice, and administration underwent significant 
growth. By 1930 the City Planning Law had been applied in 97 cities and the 
reconstruction projects after the Great Kanto Earthquake in Tokyo and yokohama 
were completed in that year. The centralized structure of the Japanese city planning 
system had been fully established by this time (Ishida 2004a: 87–145; Sorensen 
2002: 114–42).
During the 1930s Japan marched deeper and deeper into the so-called Fifteen 
Years War (jûgonen sensô), which led directly to the country’s involvement in 
World War II. The country’s industrial growth accelerated around production for 
the war effort – a trend accompanied by urban expansion and the development of 
regional cities.
In 1932 the boundary of the city of Tokyo was expanded to match the city plan-
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ning area, which corresponds to the current 23 boroughs (tokubetsu-ku). Tokyo’s 
population reached 6.77 million in 1940, while that of Osaka exceeded 3 million 
and that of Nagoya, Kobe, and yokohama increased to nearly 1 million each. The 
urban population, which constituted only 18 percent of the national population in 
1920, increased to 33 percent by 1935. The need for city planning became greater 
in regional cities, and in metropolitan regions and areas where many cities were 
clustered, regional planning was, in fact, required.
Urban growth and the diffusion of city planning to regional cities
In 1933, the 1919 City Planning Law was amended so that it was applicable to all 
cities in Japan. By this time, the number of cities to which this law was applied 
exceeded 100. The number of officials working for the secretariats of local city 
planning committees (toshi keikaku chihô iinkai jimukyoku), which were attached 
to the prefectural offices but were agencies of the Home Ministry, increased 
significantly.
Prior to their work at these agencies, most officials had been involved in 
recovery projects following the Great Kanto Earthquake; therefore their transfer 
to local offices after completion of these rebuilding projects in Tokyo helped dif-
fuse the techniques and expertise of city planning to regional cities. The fact that 
these local committee secretariats, responsible for drawing up city plans, were 
part of the Home Ministry reflects the centralized nature of city planning. At the 
same time, the location of the secretariats in local prefectures, instead of in the 
Home Ministry in Tokyo, contributed to a certain extent to the decentralization 
of city planning by enabling plans to be based on local situations and needs and 
facilitating cooperation with prefectural and municipal officials.
Among the transferred officials who made noteworthy contributions were 
Ishikawa Hideaki and Kaneiwa Den-ichi, city planning engineers employed at 
the local city planning committee’s secretariat in Aichi prefecture who started 
a magazine entitled Toshi Sôsaku (City creation). Later they organized a study 
group on land readjustment by inviting engineers and officials of prefectural and 
municipal governments and landowners in the neighboring area, and founded 
another magazine, Kukakuseiri (Land readjustment),9 in order to publish the 
results of the study. Their efforts helped establish a unique, and to some degree, 
independent city planning framework in Nagoya and the Chûbu region. They also 
developed and put into practice new ideas, systems, and technology related to 
land readjustment and compiled a planning manual for land readjustment that 
preceded that of the central government (Ishida 1991).
Military industries and the decentralization of city planning
During the war years, from 1930 to 1945, military production and other industries 
became more dispersed, to increase production and reduce vulnerability to 
bombing. The dispersal of facilities and factories to the suburbs and regional cities 
was accompanied by a decentralization of city planning. In the Tokyo metropolitan 
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region, however, the unregulated relocation of war industries resulted in the 
diffusion of urban problems to suburban areas not yet covered by city planning.
The period also marked the beginning of the formulation of comprehensive 
plans for regional cities. These plans included the Military City Plan (gunto 
toshi keikaku) and the New Industrial City Plan (shinkô kôgyô-toshi keikaku), 
begun in the mid-1930s. There are 23 reported examples of such plans, extending 
from Aomori in the north to Nagasaki in the west.10 These occurred primarily 
in medium-sized to small regional cities and undeveloped areas not covered by 
city planning (Iwami 1978: 291–305). Master plans formulated during this time 
include the Sagamihara Military City Plan (centered around a military acad-
emy and army arsenal) (Nosaka 1940, City of Sagamihara 1971: 546–667); the 
Toyokawa New Industrial City Plan (navy arsenal); the Hiro New Industrial City 
Plan (steel plant) (Iwami 1978: 296–305); the Koromo New Industrial City Plan 
(automobile factory); and the Taga New Industrial City Plan (factory of heavy 
electrical machinery) (Sasatani et al. 1985). Most of these city planning projects, 
although they used land-readjustment techniques for project implementation, 
were not completed by the end of World War II, but continued into the 1950s 
(Iwami 1978: 294).
Here again, the dispersal and relocation of industries reflected and were spurred 
on by the policy of the central government. Whereas master plans were formu-
lated by secretariats of local city planning committees, prefectural and municipal 
governments were responsible for implementing development projects. In many 
cases, although they received officials from the central government, the local 
governments employed new city planning officials locally and reinforced their 
city planning management structure (Sasatani et al. 1985). Thus, this period can 
be characterized as one of decentralization, in terms of both military industries 
and city planning.
Postwar democratization and urban and regional planning 
policies
Priority on the provinces and dispersing overdeveloped cities during the 
postwar recovery period
Japanese cities were devastated by Allied bombing in World War II. A total of 
215 cities suffered some damage. The War Damage Restoration Plan (sensai 
fukkô toshi keikaku), further discussed by Nakabayashi Itsuki in Chapter 3, was 
applied to 115 severely affected cities. Many of these did not initiate the planning 
of recovery projects until the central government issued basic guidelines on war 
recovery projects in December 1945, four months after Japan’s surrender (Ministry 
of Construction 1957–1963; Ishida 2003). Even after the war, city planning was 
still considered the task of the national government, and it seemed only natural 
for cities to wait for notification and orders from the upper levels of government. 
In fairness, it should be noted that cities lacked sufficient personnel, finances, and 
other resources to carry out their own planning.
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One of the major goals of the basic guidelines was to control the excessive 
growth of large cities and promote smaller regional ones. This was logical, since 
the major cities at that time were devastated, heavy industrial facilities were for 
the most part destroyed, and urban residents were suffering from food shortages. 
Regional cities were given priority in the allocation of funds for recovery and 
proceeded to launch city planning projects on an unprecedented scale, including 
those covering all urban areas and large-scale land-readjustment projects.
During the recovery, prefectures and bombed cities improved their city planning 
capacity by hiring planners and engineers returning to Japan from former colonies 
and occupied territories. Nevertheless, most cities depended on plans provided 
by the central government and on technical standards such as land readjustment 
(which is a relatively standardized planning tool). As a result, they tended to be 
uniform and lacking in local initiatives. Critics retrospectively have blamed many 
of these plans for depriving regional cities of their traditions and local flavor.
The Shoup recommendation and systems of city planning
In May 1947, two years after the end of World War II, the new constitution and 
the Local Autonomy Law (chihô jichi hô) were enacted. Although this moment 
would seem to have offered a window of opportunity for a thorough reformation 
of systems of city planning based on empowered citizens and aligned with the 
concept of local governance, the central government’s planning department did 
not take advantage of this opportunity. A draft prepared in 1948 to revise the 
prewar City Planning Law was basically the same as the old law, except that city 
planning decisions were delegated to the prefectural directors general (todôfuken 
shuchô) by the home minister as agents of the central government.
In August 1949, the Shoup Mission, a group led by the American economist 
Carl S. Shoup, issued its “Report on Japan Taxation” (Shoup shisetsudan Nihon 
zeisei hôkoku sho), a recommendation on ways to reform the Japanese tax system 
(Ishida 1987: 307–18).11 The report, in addition to commenting on general tax 
system reform plans, established principles for budget allocations and the reallo-
cation of administrative services, and mentioned “local planning” or city planning 
as an example of administrative services that could be fully delegated to local 
governments (Shoup Mission 1949: A-8).
Upon receiving the Shoup Report, the Japanese government established a 
Committee to Study Local Administration (Chihô gyôsei Chôsaiin kaigi), known 
as the Kanbe Committee after its chairman. The Kanbe Committee produced 
its own “Recommendations on the Reallocation of Administrative Services” 
(gyôseijimu no saihaibun ni kansuru kankoku) in December 1950. These recom-
mendations clearly stated that “City planning and city planning projects shall be 
the responsibility of municipalities. Laws shall be changed to give municipalities 
autonomous power to decide and implement matters related to city planning.” The 
document even asserted that the legal structure of the 1919 City Planning Law 
hindered the autonomy of local public entities (Chihô gyôsei Chôsaiin kaigi 1952; 
Ishida 1987: 310–12).
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The central government ignored the committee’s recommendation, at least 
for city planning systems, and the 1919 City Planning Law remained virtually 
unchanged until 1968. Incredibly, “air defense,” added to the law in 1940 as one 
of the purposes of city planning, was not eliminated, even under the new constitu-
tion, which declared Japan’s permanent renunciation of war. City planning was 
still regarded as a task of the central government, and local governments would 
implement what they were instructed to do. Citizens were not given any informa-
tion about the decision-making process, nor were they able to participate in it – a 
trend that ran counter to the spirit of the new democracy.
It should be noted that from 1950 to 1952 the Ministry of Construction did try 
to amend, or made a pretense of trying to amend, the City Planning Law, under 
pressure from the Shoup Report and the Kanbe Committee’s recommendations. 
The ministry issued its own draft of the law in 1952, which included provisions 
for decentralization and citizen participation (Ishida 1987: 312–18). The ministry, 
however, chose to keep the reins in its hands and stated that it was unwilling to 
transfer planning power to local governments. The reasons given included local 
governments’ lack of planning resources; the notion that issues of decentralization 
and city planning were not limited to a single city but required regional planning; 
and the possibility of planning being distorted by the interests of local politicians. 
In the political climate that accompanied the developments of the Cold War and 
the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Japan–US Security Treaty, 
the Ministry of Construction was quick to abandon any notion of amending the 
City Planning Law.
The Building Standards Law (kenchiku kijun hô), issued in 1950, replaced the 
Urban Area Buildings Law of 1919. In terms of provisions relating to city plan-
ning, however, this new law was identical to the old because the City Planning 
Law was not revised before the enforcement of the Building Standards Law went 
into effect. Consequently, the Building Standards Law inherited from the old law 
its centralized character and nationwide uniform building standards.
The Special City Construction Laws
Unfortunately, there was very little outcry from local governments and citizens 
against the central government’s antidemocratic stance committed to the 
continued centralization of city planning. One notable development during the 
early 1950s was the emergence of the laws apparently based on local initiatives. 
These were known as Special City Construction Laws (tokubetsu toshi kensetsu 
hô), and were proposed by the members of the Diet at the request of specific cities. 
Examples include the Beppu International Tourism and Hot Spring Cultural City 
Construction Law (Beppu kokusai kankô onsen bunka toshi kensetsu hô) (1950); 
the Yokohama International Port City Construction Law (Yokohama kokusai 
kôto kensetsu hô) (1950); and the Ashiya International Culture and Housing City 
Construction Law (Ashiya kokusai bunka jûtaku toshi kensetsu hô) (1951). The 
laws were applied only to these specific cities and were enacted after popular 
referendums following resolutions made by the Diet.12
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This legislation procedure inclusive of citizen referendums, however, was 
carried out not to decentralize city planning but rather for “special financial con-
siderations” or financial support for cities that were deemed special or unique and 
thus deserving of national attention. These cities did not intend to carry out their 
own city planning projects utilizing local financial resources. In fact, the Special 
City Construction Laws constituted a move against decentralization.
In addition, in 1950 the Capital Construction Law (shuto kensetsu hô) for the 
Tokyo metropolis was enacted. As discussed further in Chapter 3 by Nakabayashi 
Itsuki, it was designed to assist in the recovery and development of the capital 
– largely ignored during the immediate postwar period when the focus turned to 
regional cities, as discussed earlier. During the process of creating this law, the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly (Tôkyô-to gikai) even requested that a central gov-
ernment agency be established to take charge of planning in the Tokyo borough 
area (Tôkyô-kubu). This can also be seen as an abandonment of self-governance 
(Ishida 1987: 273–6). Thus, the opportunity to decentralize city planning and 
involve more citizens in the planning process was completely lost in the early 
years after the end of World War II.
Initiatives by progressive local governments and citizen 
movements in the 1960s and 1970s
The 1960s through the 1970s were marked by the flourishing of progressive or 
innovative local governments (kakushin jichitai). Progressive governors were 
elected in prefectures with large cities such as Kyoto, the Tokyo metropolis, 
Osaka, Kanagawa, Fukuoka, and Saitama. Socialist or communist parties began 
to dominate many local assemblies in these major cities and metropolitan regions. 
These local governments took up initiatives on matters of social welfare and 
environmental pollution that the central government had either dragged its feet on 
or simply ignored (see also Chapter 6 by Watanabe Shun-ichi in this volume).
While city planning fell into a different category because of its centralized 
system of authority, and initiatives could not be adopted to the same extent, there 
were some unique planning approaches, such as in Yokohama (Tamura 1971: 
116–75), and new attitudes toward citizen movement in city planning. In the late 
1960s, many municipal governments tried to regulate the uncontrolled develop-
ments of their suburbs by establishing guidelines on residential land development 
(takuchi kaihatsu shidô yôkô). These movements urged the central government 
to introduce a development permit system in the 1968 City Planning Law (Ishida 
1971; Nihon Hyôron-sha 1970).13
Additionally, during this time, citizen-led movements arose to safeguard green 
space, claim the right to sunlight, and resist land-readjustment projects. Many of 
these movements had a significant impact on the city planning policies of both the 
local and national governments. In 1968, a group of citizens established a national 
liaison association opposing land readjustment (kukakuseiri taisaku zenkoku ren-
rakukai). The association’s members studied theoretical and technical aspects of 
land readjustment, produced a newsletter, and published many books. It is widely 
acknowledged that these organized efforts by citizens influenced changes in the 
methods of land readjustment used.
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Citizen movements to protect residents’ access to sunlight became active in 
the early 1960s. A group of citizens against “building nuisances” (kenchiku kôgai 
taisaku shimin rengô) formed in 1970. In 1973, the group made a direct proposal 
(chokusetsu seikyû) to the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly to enact the Sunlight 
Ordinance (hiatari jôrei). Although the proposal was rejected after a six-year-
long discussion, this campaign stimulated the introduction of provisions relating 
to restrictions on the blocking out of sunlight (nichiei kisei) into the amended 
Building Standards Law of 1976 (Kashiwagi and Nakabayashi 1988; Yûhikaku 
Jurisuto Henshû-shitsu 1974).
The 1968 City Planning Law and decentralization
Decentralization and citizen participation
With the 1968 City Planning Law, the issues of the decentralization of city planning 
authority and the participation of the citizenry were finally given consideration. 
The law, which was intended to have been formulated immediately after the end 
of World War II, was a case of too little too late, however, when it finally appeared 
after 20 years. Contrary to the recommendations of either the Shoup Mission or 
the Kanbe Committee, decision-making and implementation of city planning 
remained the task of the central government, to be delegated to local governments 
with the heavy intervention of the central government. In a slip of the tongue 
that was nonetheless accurate, Ôshio Yôichirô, the Ministry of Construction’s 
director of city planning (Kensetsushô toshi keikaku kachô) commented that the 
new system for citizen participation introduced by the law was included simply to 
“stop citizens’ claims that they didn’t know about city planning projects” (Ôshio 
1968: 68).
There were two problems with the delegation of city planning authority to 
local governments. First, decision-making powers were given mostly to prefec-
tural governments; municipal governments had only limited control, over zoning 
and small projects. Under the law, municipalities found it very difficult to create 
comprehensive plans. Second, the upper levels of government retained strong 
involvement. Important prefectural plans and projects needed the approval of the 
central government, and municipal plans and projects required the prefectural 
government’s consent. In cases of conflict between plans or projects, those of 
upper-level government were given priority over those from the lower ranks.
As a consequence, the fundamental notion that city planning is the national 
government’s task – and the resulting top-down structure – remained unchanged 
under the1968 City Planning Law (see also Chapter 5 by André Sorensen in this 
volume).
Institutionalization of citizen participation
In its provisions for citizen participation, the 1968 law specified public hearings, 
explanatory meetings, displays of the draft plan, and a system whereby written 
opinions from the pubic could be submitted. Before the enactment of the law, city 
planning was just another administrative task about which the government would 
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routinely keep its citizens in the dark. The new methods of popular participation 
included in the 1968 law marked a first step toward citizen involvement in the 
workings of central government (Ishida 1970) (see also Chapters 6 and 8 by 
Watanabe, and Hein and Pelletier respectively).
The citizens’ movement seized on these new methods. Immediately after the 
enforcement of the 1968 City Planning Law and the 1970 amendment of the 
Building Standards Law, citizens had two major opportunities to participate in 
comprehensive plan-making. These were the demarcating of “urbanization pro-
motion areas” (shigaika kuiki) and “urbanization control areas” (shigaika chôsei 
kuiki) in principal cities, and a nationwide revision of zoning plans based on the 
overhauling of the zoning system outlined in the 1970 amendment. Residents of 
Tokyo’s Meguro borough became involved in the decision-making process of a 
rezoning plan of the whole borough area. During this process, citizens conducted 
a detailed survey of their local area, examined criteria for zoning set by the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government (TMG), pointed out problems associated with the 
TMG’s criteria, and came up with their own plan. Both Meguro borough and the 
TMG responded reasonably to the popular requests and came up with a plan that 
satisfied both sides (Takamizawa and Nakabayashi 1973).
In other cases, however, citizens often had to participate in the decision-making 
process without sufficient information and understanding of the plan’s concepts 
and structure. In the city of Machida, located on the outskirts of Tokyo, citizens 
took part in the process of deciding on the urbanization control areas before the 
TMG and Machida officials formally explained the new planning system. Some 
citizens, primarily farmers, demanded that any plan to designate urbanization 
control areas be rejected, based on inaccurate information about the planning 
system they had received from a particular political group to manipulate them 
(Ishida 1973: 187–99).
The 1980 revision of the City Planning Law and introduction of the 
district planning system
The major problem of the1968 City Planning Law and the 1970 amended Building 
Standards Law was that they provided only a system to deal with urban structures, 
which could not adequately address newly emerging community issues, such 
as quality of life and the environment (for example, the right to sunlight, and 
the further subdivision of land lots in built-up areas). In 1971, Tokyo Governor 
Minobe Ryôkichi proposed a model “district environment improvement project” 
(chiku kankyô seibi keikaku) in his plan “Tokyo Concepts on Open Space and Blue 
Sky” (hiroba to aozora no Tôkyô keikaku), designed to establish a system that 
would ensure the shibiru minimamu, or “civil minimum” – (minimum government 
services considered necessary for a satisfactory urban life).14 This was an attempt 
to emphasize the importance of the quality of urban living (Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government 1971). The two national laws of 1968 and 1970, however, did not 
provide a mechanism for approving and implementing these plans. The public 
had to wait until 1980 and the introduction of the district planning system (Ishida 
2004a: 265–9).
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In 1980, both the City Planning Law and the Building Standards Law were 
amended and the district planning system (chiku keikaku seido) was introduced 
and then codified. The system assumed two new roles: that of supplementing the 
structure-level city planning system by district-level plans that were more practi-
cal and accessible to citizens; and that of creating a high-quality neighborhood 
and living environment based on local citizen consensus and through stricter and 
more detailed control of land use.
The amendment of the two laws was a major step toward decentralization and 
public participation. The creation of district plans became the task of munici-
palities, and the opportunities for citizens to become involved in the district plan 
decision-making process increased. From then on, building activities in district 
plan areas were to be regulated by municipal ordinances.
The system was modeled on the German Bebauungsplan (Federal Ministry 
for Regional Planning, Building, and Urban Development 1993: 16–27; Higasa 
1981). At the same time, however, various innovative local approaches also had 
a hand in creating plans tailored to local needs even if they were limited to using 
conventional planning techniques (Morimura 1998: 126–83).
The 1992 Amendment to the City Planning Law
Opposition parties’ plan for decentralization
In terms of decentralization and citizen participation, the significance of the 1992 
amendment to the City Planning Law did not lie in the content of the law but in the 
process through which the revised law was enacted. Members of the opposition 
parties – those other than the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Jimintô), then 
in power – submitted their own counter-bill to the Diet to compete with the 
government’s proposed bill of amendment, a first in such a highly technical and 
specialized administrative field as city planning law. In addition, although the 
opposition’s plan was submitted jointly by what were at the time the Socialist 
Party (Shakai-tô) and the United Social Democratic Party (Shakai-minshu rengô), 
many volunteers contributed to the preparation of the draft. The central figure in 
the volunteer group was Igarashi Takayoshi, a lawyer who later became a professor 
of law at Hôsei University. Other players included citizen groups involved with 
land-use issues and city planning, planners, local government officials, lawyers, 
and scholars in various disciplines (Igarashi 1994; Noguchi 1993).
The major difference between the central government’s bill and that of the 
opposition was that in the latter more authority was granted to municipalities, and 
city plans required the approval of municipal assemblies (shi chô son gikai) – a 
more democratic process. On a more minor level, the counter-plan also proposed 
more zoning categories than the central government’s plan.
Unfortunately, the LDP avoided discussion of this counter-bill and did not pro-
vide enough time for the two bills to be debated. Not surprisingly the counter-plan 
was voted down by the LDP, and the central government’s plan was approved in 
the Diet, but only after a partial revision and a supplementary resolution reflecting 
some ideas proposed by the opposition.
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Local challenges and the central government’s policy: the special 
land-use districts
The City Planning Law as amended in 1992 added two new categories to the 
existing special land-use districts (tokubetsu yôto chiku), such as the special 
industrial district (tokubetsu kôgyô chiku) and the educational district (bunkyô 
chiku). These new districts were the exclusive commercial district (shôgyô senyô 
chiku) and a district called chûkôsôkai jûkyo senyô chiku, in which all upper floors 
of buildings must be reserved exclusively for residential use.
The debate between the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) and the 
Ministry of Construction over the introduction of the new categories was also 
noteworthy. The TMG demanded the addition of these two special-use districts 
and insisted that local governments be permitted to create such districts freely 
according to their needs. The Ministry of Construction, in contrast, took the 
old line that regulations on land use for city planning purposes should be set by 
national law, based on the spirit of Article 29 of the Constitution, which states, 
“Property rights shall be defined by law” (Ishida 2004a: 288–9).
This issue of local governance versus the law is a major point of contention 
in the debate over the right to enact ordinances and the decentralization of city 
planning authority. The Ministry of Construction has long clung to the view 
that the parameters for special-use districts should be stipulated by law and that 
the national government should set the framework and the scope of regulations 
through government ordinance (seirei) before allowing local governments to 
decide the content of regulations with their own ordinances.15
This policy can be criticized in light of the fact that the ministry has not pro-
vided the necessary planning tools and systems to local governments to meet the 
diverse needs of local regions and cities. Although various district- or block-level 
planning systems have been put in place recently, they have been primarily cre-
ated for Tokyo and other metropolitan regions and have been geared to problems 
unique to those regions.
Beginning in the late 1960s through the 1970s, local governments took action 
toward controlling rampant lot subdivision and high-rise construction by estab-
lishing guidelines on land development (takuchi kaihatsu shidô yôkô) and on the 
construction of medium- to high-rise buildings (chû kôsô kenchiku shidô yôkô). 
With these problems largely ignored by the central government, local governments 
had to depend on administrative guidance (gyôsei shidô) which was often infor-
mal and not fully supported by laws or ordinances. In the 1980s, some innovative 
local governments enacted ordinances, based on these guidelines, to more broadly 
direct and regulate regional matters, including land-use control and environmental 
protection ordinances (Noguchi 1993: 170–206; Kobayashi 1999).
The central government tried to hobble these local movements, arguing that 
they were not within the scope of the legal framework or went beyond the national 
standard. One notable example is the ordinance established by the seaside resort 
town of Manazuru in Kanagawa prefecture that attempted to rein in uncontrolled 
development, which was responsible for environmental destruction and water 
shortages (Igarashi, Noguchi, and Ikegami 1996).
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Municipal master plans and city planning
The 1992 City Planning Law introduced a new system of “basic policies for city 
planning by municipalities” (shi chô son no toshi keikaku ni kansuru kihonteki na 
hôshin) (Article 18-2). This system has usually been interpreted as one in which a 
master plan established by a municipality guides the creation of individual plans 
by cities. Although the law states that municipalities “will provide” (sadameru 
mono to suru) a master plan, not “must provide” (sadamenakereba naranai) it, 
in practice this was obligatory, as every planning project by municipalities had to 
“conform with” (sokusuru) their municipalities’ master plan.
It was expected that the master plan would help expand the role of munici-
palities in city planning, in terms of both administrative systems and practice. 
First, in principle, the master plan had to conform with the “basic concepts of 
the municipality’s development decided on by resolution of the assembly,” thus 
indirectly involving the assembly in city planning for the first time. Second, “mea-
sures to reflect citizens’ opinions” were required through the holding of public 
hearings and meetings during the formulation of the plan. Finally, municipalities 
were forced to deal with broader city planning issues and thus improve their plan-
ning capabilities.
Many municipalities could not even begin to create a master plan until they 
had completed the plans for rezoning all areas to be planned, as stipulated by the 
1992 law as having to be completed by 1995. As of December 1999, a total of 608 
municipalities in Japan, or only 30.1 percent of all those requiring city planning, 
had formulated a master plan. This low rate is partly due to the municipalities’ 
lack of planning experience and competence. Many prefectures and local research 
institutes began to put together guidelines to help these municipalities (Tôkyô shi 
chô son Jichi Chôsakai 1996; Kanagawa-ken Toshi keikaku ka 1996);16 and the 
Ministry of Construction has prepared an unofficial guideline for this purpose. To 
date, there is no consensus on the involvement of city planning consultants in the 
process.
The municipal master plan system was established based on the experience 
gained by innovative local governments and city planning experts since the late 
1960s (Morimura 1998: 17–124). A comparison of several municipalities shows 
that, even after the 1992 amendment, a great variation in planning skills and 
approaches among municipalities remains. The extent of city planning knowledge 
on the part of citizens, who are now required to participate in planning, also var-
ies considerably. Although some of the most important issues – protection of the 
natural environment and urban agriculture (Ishida 1990b; Gotô 2003) – are those 
that are discussed most enthusiastically by involved citizens, the City Planning 
Law, while it has undergone a series of amendments, is still insufficient to protect 
the environment as well as arable land.
Decentralization, citizen empowerment, and future city 
planning legislation
In 1999–2000 a grand project to reform the Japanese administrative structure, 
including that of city planning, by decentralizing it, was initiated with the Omnibus 
44 Ishida
Act for Decentralization of Powers. (This project was still ongoing in 2006.) The 
act was accompanied by a series of amendments to the City Planning Law and 
the Building Standards Law and related legislation that would be the first major 
revisions to the Japanese planning system since the two laws were enacted in 
1968 and 1970.
The first major change in the laws took place in June 1999 with the promulga-
tion of the Package Act, and sought to transform city planning administration 
from a system of “agency-delegated administrations” (kikan inin jimu), in which 
administrative functions were delegated to local governments as agencies of the 
central government, to one of local autonomy (jichi jimu), in which functions 
were initiated by local governments (Ishida 2004a: 310–14).
In October 1999, the Ministry of Construction posted on its website an interim 
report on scheduled forthcoming amendments and invited comments from the 
public. More than 500 proposals, including those from local governments, were 
collected and, while their impact was small, they were considered in the formula-
tion of the content of the amendments.
The next step occurred when the Central City Planning Council (Toshi keikaku 
Chûô Shingikai) announced its advisory report in February 2000. In March, a bill 
to create two major amendments to the existing City Planning Law – supplemen-
tary provisions on decentralization and city planning tools that essentially changed 
the framework of the 1968 law – was submitted to the Diet, which approved it in 
May 2000.
The effect of the 1999 amendment on the City Planning Law
The effect of the changes in planning administration from kikan inin jimu to jichi 
jimu brought about by the 1999 amendment to the City Planning Law can be 
evaluated by an examination of the changes occurring in the relationships between 
the central government and local governments and in those between prefectures 
and municipalities (Toshi keikaku Gakkai Chihô bunken Kenkyû Shôiinkai 
1999).
Principally, the amendment marked a change in the vertical relationship 
between different levels of government: between central and prefectural (the lat-
ter previously requiring the “authorization” (ninka) of the former), and between 
prefectural and municipal (plans by a municipality had needed the “approval” 
(shônin) of the prefecture). These relationships, which were usually politely 
termed kanyo (participation), were in reality nothing less than interventions 
(kanshô). According to the amended City Planning Law, however, the lower-tier 
government was to “consult with the upper-tier government and obtain its agree-
ment.” Although the term “consult” (kyôgi) would seem to imply the equal status 
of all levels of government, “agreement” (dôi) clearly meant that the earlier top-
down relationship would be preserved.
Another example of the top-down system being maintained can be seen in 
Article 24 of the City Planning Law, concerning “matters of great importance to 
the interest of the country.” In it, a provision allowing the central government to 
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direct local governments in decisions affecting changes in city planning projects, 
and in some cases to make its own decisions and changes, was retained.
In addition, the national government retained financial control over city plan-
ning through the granting of subsidies. Without sufficient financial resources of 
their own, it is difficult for local governments to execute any city planning project 
that goes against the wishes of the national government.
The relationship between different levels of government is the major issue in 
decentralizing planning authority. The author submitted a letter of opinion to the 
Ministry of Construction in November 1999 outlining a concept for “consulta-
tion that requires ‘mutual’ approval” as the first step in establishing a more equal 
system in which municipalities become the initiators of city planning projects.17 
No important infrastructure projects of national importance can be implemented 
without involving every area affected by the projects and without obtaining local 
consent. The same applies to projects by prefectures. While some may argue that 
projects can never be initiated until an agreement among all parties is reached, 
the author proposes to establish a system of arbitration, either in court or by other 
means.
The 1999 amendment also provided a legal basis for the Municipal City 
Planning Council (shi chô son toshi keikaku shingikai), which had heretofore been 
represented in every municipality, but only informally.
The 2000 amendment to the City Planning Law
A new bill passed by the Diet in May 2000 incorporated a number of changes 
to the City Planning Law. These include supplementary provisions for the 
decentralization of planning authority stipulated in the 1999 City Planning Law; 
drastic changes to the area demarcation (kuiki kubun, or more commonly senbiki) 
system instituted under the 1968 City Planning Law, that of categorizing city 
planning areas as either urbanization promotion or urbanization control sectors; 
changes to the development permit system; the expansion of the purview of the 
zoning system and the development permit system to extend their application to 
urban land use in areas outside the city planning areas; and the introduction of a 
new system for transferring development rights in urban redevelopment.
While it is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss each of these changes in 
detail,18 two issues bear a closer look: namely, the supplementary provisions for 
decentralizing planning powers, and the ways in which citizens and local govern-
ments can better exercise their power through these amendments.
The “outline of the bill” (hôan yôkô), which briefly explained the bill’s inten-
tions, placed the supplementary provisions under items of “rationalization” (gôrika) 
of decision-making processes in city planning, as if they were not fundamental to 
the bill itself. These provisions, however, went beyond simple “rationalization” 
and addressed the issues of decentralization and participation. Notable was the 
establishment of a “suggestion system” (môshide seido) by which citizens, “inter-
ested individuals” (rigai kankeinin), or local governments could bring ideas for 
city or district plans to upper-tier governments. This provision was small but the 
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first step toward creating a bottom-up system that would be empowered to con-
sider and utilize citizens’ or local governments’ initiatives. To date, the amended 
City Planning Law has not provided formal mechanisms for these initiatives to 
be taken up by upper-tier governments or to be reflected in plans. Inevitably, for 
the system to operate successfully, it will be incumbent on local governments 
to elaborate and enact an enforcement ordinance. Many local governments have 
been struggling with this first and very difficult task, exchanging their ideas and 
experiences among local governments.
The amended law allows local governments to execute ordinances governing 
the participation of citizens and interested individuals in city planning decisions. 
Although the amended City Planning Law contains the passive proviso “unless 
contrary to legal regulations, the setting of provisions by the ordinance would 
not be hampered,” this system represents a positive step toward helping local 
governments improve their citizen participation systems. The law can now be 
interpreted as granting legal authority to local governments and imposing upon 
them obligations to citizens.
As to the question of how citizens and local governments can better exercise 
their power through these amendments, the revised City Planning Law is significant 
in two aspects. First, the amended law allows for the “flexible operation” (jûnan 
na unyô) of city planning systems by local governments. One example of this type 
of flexible operation is the “option system” (sentaku-sei), for the senbiki system 
in town planning areas other than those in metropolitan regions, under which 
local governments are permitted to apply the system or not. Second, the amended 
law allows local governments to pass ordinances on many issues, including des-
ignation of areas where new types of land-use control are applicable, “technical 
standards” (gijutsu kijun) for development permits, and citizen participation in 
the planning process. Criteria for development permits have traditionally been 
established by legislation and cabinet orders; however, the amendments allow 
local governments to use ordinances to either strengthen or ease the standards.
As for the planning systems, a major goal of the 2000 amendment to the City 
Planning Law was to introduce new land-use regulation measures for areas other 
than urbanization promotion sectors, even encompassing land outside city plan-
ning areas – in other words, for all unbuilt areas. To this end, the new concept of a 
“gray” area between urbanization-promotion and control areas, a “quasi city plan-
ning area” (jun toshi keikaku kuiki), and a “specific-use buildings control area” 
(tokubetsu yôto seigen kuiki), along with systems to control development and 
building activity in these areas, have been introduced. Significantly, the designa-
tion of these areas and the operation of the system are for the most part entrusted 
to local governments, in particular municipalities (Ishida 2004a: 315–22; Nihon 
Toshi keikaku ka Kyôkai 2003: 9–27).
As has been observed, decentralization is also a major trend in terms of 
planning tools, which will increasingly fall under the jurisdiction of ordinances 
enacted by local governments. This corresponds to the opposition parties’ 1992 
plan to amend the City Planning Law, which called for the greater involvement of 
local assemblies in city planning. In other words, local governments will have to 
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assume a greater responsibility in improving local environments and local living 
conditions by making the most of the power to plan that has been granted to 
them.
One concern regarding the amended City Planning Law is the definition of what 
the revised law terms “national interest” (kuni no rigai). If the central government 
equates projects of “national interest” solely with such works as bullet trains and 
highway networks, new airports, military bases, or relocation of the capital, and 
tries to intervene in city and regional planning by local governments, it will most 
assuredly run contrary to the spirit of decentralization. Clearly, the central govern-
ment has a responsibility to guarantee a minimum level of government services 
required to maintain a basic level of environmental protection and standard of liv-
ing, a responsibility that was abdicated when a concept to “strengthen systems to 
protect and create green space,” proposed in the interim report of the Central City 
Planning Council in 1999, was not included in the amendments to the law. This 
is particularly relevant, since the central government still controls finance and 
taxation without giving sufficient financial independence to local governments.
Ongoing progress and current problems: 2000–5
Since the 1999–2000 amendments to the City Planning Law, the decentralization 
of planning authority and functions has continued to move forward, although it 
vacillates between the central government’s policies and local initiatives. In 2005, 
it remains difficult to summarize and evaluate the ongoing situations, other than 
to offer several fragmentary comments.
Three policies established by the central government are noteworthy. These 
are the Special Measures Law on Urban Regeneration (toshi saisei kinkyû toku-
betsu sochi hô), in short the Urban Regeneration Law (toshi saisei hô), enacted 
in March 2002; the policy to forcibly merge cities and municipalities (shi chô 
son gappei sokushin); and the so-called three-in-one reform (sanmi ittai teki 
kaikaku) of the local finance and taxation system (chihô zeizaisei seido). The 
Urban Regeneration Law enables the central government to designate Urban 
Regeneration Areas of Urgent Needs (toshi saisei kinkyû seibi chiiki) and to focus 
directly on implementation of the urban regeneration projects (toshi saisei jigyô) 
in these areas (Ishida 2002, 2004a: 323–6). The number of Japanese cities and 
municipalities had been reduced gradually since the enactment of the Exceptional 
Law on Local Government Amalgamation (shi chô son gappei tokurei hô) in 1965 
– from 3,392 to 3,229 in 2000. The central government amended the law via the 
Package Act for Decentralization of Powers in 2000 and planned to reduce the 
number of cities and municipalities to one-third of those in 2000, employing more 
powerful promotion measures. According to a briefing by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications (Sômushô) on April 14, 2005 (Sômushô website), 
the number was 2,521 at the end of March 2005 and will be 1,822 in 2006. The 
excessive amalgamation of cities and municipalities and the resulting enlarge-
ment of administrative areas will cause many problems in the decentralization of 
urban and rural planning. While the three-in-one reform aims to reduce or abolish 
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national subsidies and expenses (kokko hojo futan-kin) for local projects, to trans-
fer tax revenue sources (zeigen ijô) to local governments, and to review the local 
allocation tax system (chihô kôfuzei seido), even at the end of 2005 the specific 
means by which to realize these reforms was still being debated among the central 
government, the ruling political parties, and local governments.
In the arena of local government and citizens’ initiatives, recent significant 
contributions include an array of local planning ordinances (Kobayashi 2002) and 
the creation of many types of nonprofit organizations related to urban and rural 
planning. There have also been some unsuccessful local efforts to elaborate new 
local ordinances to compensate for inadequate amendments to the national laws. 
For example, many local governments were forced to enact ordinances to possibly 
prohibit high-density condominiums built on high-pitched slopes – which could 
have many sub-standard housing units in the basement – as a result of the irrelevant 
1994 amendment to the Building Standards Law (Ishida 2004b). Most of these 
efforts, however, largely promote the decentralization of urban and rural planning. 
In 2004, Kokubunji city in Tokyo, for instance, adopted the new comprehensive 
planning ordinance after intense discussion among citizens that covered almost 
all issues, including those delegated to local governments by recent amendments 
to the planning laws and those particular to the city (Matsumoto 2005). During 
this process the city sought the temporary input (shukkô) of invited officials 
experienced in planning-ordinance legislation, not from the central government 
or the TMG, but from a local government in the Kanagawa prefecture, which 
had considerable administrative experience in enacting and enforcing planning 
ordinances. Kokubunji city’s planning ordinance, and the process by which it was 
legislated, would become the model for other local governments.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has attempted to outline the history of modern city 
planning in Japan in terms of the centralization or decentralization of planning 
authority. During the Meiji period of the nineteenth century, planning was not 
centralized, with the exception of the capital city of Tokyo. In many cases local 
governments adopted their own initiatives; or rather, they were forced to do so 
because of neglect by the central government. Along with the modernization of 
Japan came a long period of centralization, spanning the pre-World War II and 
postwar periods. City planning failed to keep up with trends toward democracy 
and popular participation until the 1968 City Planning Law was enacted. Even 
after 1968, citizens and local governments continued to apply pressure to further 
decentralize planning.
As discussed earlier, three issues that required central intervention were pointed 
out concerning centralization and decentralization in city planning. Those include 
ways to handle city planning not limited to a particular city or area, empower 
local governments and improve their planning capacity, and prevent intervention 
in local politics, which may hamper effective planning. This essay has also exam-
ined the issues of local governments’ lack of financial power in city planning and 
centralized (using the term in a legal context) land-use control.
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An analysis of these issues indicates that democracy in local governance, 
emphasizing citizens and their initiatives, is the key to achieving decentraliza-
tion. The issue of land-use control by national and local governments is a prime 
exemplar. In legal terms, the two major effects of the national law have been to 
set the lowest common denominators for land-use control to guarantee a “national 
minimum” and to authorize local governments to establish their own land-use 
control measures to cope with issues specific to their region. On the other hand, 
empowered local governments must take several steps in order to utilize that 
authority, formulate an adequate land-use plan, and exercise effective city plan-
ning. These include undertaking studies of the social factors of land ownership 
and land-use rights, the examination of new concepts of land-use rights based on 
such studies, and the establishment of a land-use planning system that is clear to 
citizens based on these concepts.
In the age of decentralization that lies ahead, it is imperative that citizens be 
involved at every step of the planning process. Outcomes should be shared by 
citizens and used to reach consensus in land-use plans. Once this is accomplished, 
Japan will have achieved democratic city planning centering on citizens and their 
initiatives. Meeting this grand challenge will mean nothing less than the creation 
of a new planning culture (keikaku fûdo) in Japan (Ishida 2004a: 326–34).
Notes
 1 Machi kaisho refers to autonomous bodies of townsmen (chônin) that operated during 
the Edo period and were especially active in merchant and port towns. In Edo (later 
Tokyo), however, their activities were limited mainly to relief for the poor.
 2 Streets in the city center of Osaka were originally planned and constructed in 1594–9 
by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and had a width of 7.8 meters (east and west) and 6.0 meters 
(north and south) in the Edo period.
 3 Ku refers to an administrative unit in major cities that have a population of more than 
half a million and are so designated by cabinet order (seirei shitei toshi, literally Cabinet 
Ordinance Designated Major Cities) and the Metropolis of Tokyo. There are two types 
of ku, those with a local assembly and publicly elected head and those without. For the 
purposes of this chapter the former can be translated as borough and the latter as ward. 
Tokyo only allowed the former since 1947. For the history of Tokyo’s ku, see Ishida 
(2000a: 191–221).
Kubukai, the Sectional Meeting of the Tokyo Municipal Assembly, was composed 
of members from the 15 wards of Tokyo. In 1889 the area comprising the 15 wards 
became the City of Tokyo.
 4 The 1919 City Planning Law used almost all provisions of the 1909 Agricultural Land 
Readjustment Law (kôchi seri hô) corresponding to its land-readjustment system. This 
simple and easy legislation caused unexpected difficulties. The draft, however, applied 
only a few selected provisions that had been necessary in the cases of Osaka and 
Kobe.
 5 For biographical information on Seki Hajime and his work related to urban problems 
facing Osaka, see Shibamura (1989, 1998) and Hanes (2002).
 6 Akagi Suruki also introduced a number of arguments regarding the centralization of 
planning power around 1919, when the City Planning Law was enacted (Akagi 1968: 
502–9).
 7 For the historical development and an analysis of the concept and system to recoup the 
betterments in Japan, see Ishida (1990a).
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 8 The American historian and political scientist Charles Austin Beard (1874–1948) was 
invited in 1922 by Gotô Shinpei, the mayor of Tokyo, to serve as an adviser on urban 
administration. Beard also gave lectures on urban policy in many cities. After the 
Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, he returned to Japan and offered many suggestions 
regarding reconstruction.
 9 The reprinted edition of Kukakuseiri was published by Kashiwa-shobô in 1991. 
After World War II, a magazine with the same name was published, and it still exists; 
however, these two magazines are independent of each other.
 10 Though not designated as New Industrial Cities, some regional small towns, such as 
Oguni-machi in yamagata prefecture, accepted dispersion of munition industries and 
worked to create industrial parks and to improve built-up areas.
 11 Carl Sumner Shoup (1902–99) was an American economist. After graduating from 
Stanford University, he received his doctoral degree from Columbia University in 
1930. He went to Japan in 1949–50 as the head of a mission to study and recommend 
revisions for Japan’s taxation system. He also worked as the head of taxation missions 
to Venezuela and Liberia.
 12 The results of the referendums were mostly affirmative, with the exception of that on 
Tokyo, in which 44.9 percent of voters abstained and 39.7 percent objected.
 13 For urban policies by reformist local governments in general, see Ishida (1971) and 
Nihon Hyôron-sha (1970). Although historical studies on their achievements have 
been insufficient, for Tokyo see Tôkyô Jichi mondai Kenkyû-sho (1994).
 14 “Civil minimum” was a term coined by Governor Minobe and his advisers. For details 
and an analysis of Minobe’s “civil minimum” policy on city planning, see Ishida 
(1971: 192–204).
 15 A 1998 amendment to the City Planning Law abolished national control over special-
use zoning. This is another example of a change effected in the legal system through 
the initiative of local governments.
 16 In 1986 Tokyo shi chô son Jichi Chôsa-kai, a research institute on local administration, 
was created for the cities and municipalities of Tokyo Metropolis. The establishment 
of many organizations of the kind has accompanied decentralization.
 17 In March 2000, the author was invited to the Lower House Construction Committee as 
an expert to give an opinion on the bill of revision and proposed the same concept. See 
the Proceedings of the Committee on Construction of the Lower House, Term 147, No. 
8: 5–9 (available online at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/147/0014/main.
html).
 18 For details and an analysis of the changes in the Japanese city planning system since 
1995, see, for example, Ishida (2000b, 2000c, 2004a: 315–22) and Nihon Toshi 
keikaku ka Kyôkai (2003).
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3 Concentration and 
deconcentration in the context 
of the Tokyo Capital Region 
Plan and recent cross-border 
networking concepts
Nakabayashi Itsuki
From 1600 onward, when it was selected as the center of government by the first 
shogun of the Tokugawa regime, Edo grew rapidly, becoming the largest city in 
the world by the eighteenth century – despite several civil disasters. The Meiji 
restoration of 1868 changed the name of the metropolis from Edo to Tokyo and 
it was this city that became the capital of a modernizing nation. During the Meiji 
and Taisho periods, Tokyo went from a city of 1 million to one of 2.5 million 
people.
Tokyo’s reconstruction after the Great Kanto Earthquake, 
and the first stage of deconcentration in the 1930s
The Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 rocked the Tokyo and Kanagawa prefectures 
and caused severe damage in both Tokyo and yokohama. In the wake of this 
disaster, the population of Tokyo city dropped from 2.5 million to 1.5 million. 
The evacuation of 1 million people to the countryside and suburbs was, in part, a 
temporary response, but it also represented a permanent migration to the suburbs. 
The population of Tokyo’s inner areas never returned to its pre-disaster level and 
was outstripped by the growth in the suburban areas. During the reconstruction 
of Tokyo between 1923 and 1930, not only did people move to the neighboring 
suburbs, but large factories and temples were relocated there as well, as a result 
of completion of land-readjustment projects in central Tokyo. It can be said that 
this phenomenon was the first “centralized deconcentration” of Greater Tokyo. 
These neighboring suburbs were developed without urban and site planning and, 
as densely built areas of wooden houses surrounding the center and sub-centers 
of Tokyo, were the most vulnerable to the devastation wrought by earthquakes 
(Nakabayashi 1980: 111).
The revival and growth of Tokyo’s industrial strength in the 1920s was 
astonishing. During this period, many factories were constructed in the sub-
urbs outside central Tokyo. Some of these suburbs, such as Fuchû, Musashino, 
Higashi-Murayama, and Akishima, were located in cities in the outlying areas 
of Tokyo. Others were in the adjacent prefecture of Kanagawa, in Kawasaki and 
Sagamihara, approximately 20–40 kilometers from the heart of Tokyo. Others lay 
still farther out, such as Ôta in Gunma prefecture, some 40–80 kilometers from 
the center of the capital.
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By the 1920s, the Keihin industrial zone, one of the four largest industrial 
zones in Japan, was spreading along the coast between Tokyo and yokohama. 
(“Kei” signifies Tokyo and “hin” Yokohama.) Along with the factories, residential 
districts constructed for workers were developed without site planning, result-
ing in unrestrained growth and sprawl. In 1924, the year after the Great Kanto 
Earthquake, at the International Conference on City Planning held in Amsterdam, 
a proposal was made for a regional planning system to control this sprawl. This 
concept called for metropolitan planning based on satellite cities and green belts. 
By the 1930s, regional planning became the focus of considerable discussion in 
Tokyo.
The regional plans for Greater Tokyo were drawn up after the reconstruction of 
Tokyo (Figure 3.1). One was the Kanto National Land Plan of 1936 (Kantô kokudo 
keikaku); the other was the Tokyo Green Space Plan (Tôkyô ryokuchi keikaku) of 
1939 (Figure 3.2). These offered a way to prevent the uncontrolled growth of 
Tokyo by creating green belts and removing the industrial functions from central 
Tokyo to satellite towns, using the establishment of industry promotion zones on 
the outer edge of Greater Tokyo as an incentive (Ishida 1987: 180–5).
Against the background of regional planning during the 1930s, the clouds of 
war were gathering. The City Planning Law (toshi keikaku hô), which had been 
enacted as a modern urban planning system in 1919 and initially applied to the 
major cities (see Chapter 2 by Ishida Yorifusa in this volume), was finally realized 
for all cities in 1933. However, in 1937 the Air Defense Law (bôkû hô) was passed, 
which entailed the relocation of factories for defense against aerial bombing and 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual plan for the Kanto region and Greater Tokyo (Toshi keikaku Tôkyô 
chihô iinkai) published in 1940 by Tokyo city planning local committee. 










Concentration and deconcentration 57
the creation of green belts around the built-up area of Tokyo as military protec-
tion. Subsequently the Urban Building Law (shigaichi kenchiku butsu hô), which 
had also been enacted in 1919, was revised in 1938 to include a new system of 
zoning open space in urban areas (kûchi chiku seido). Significantly, this planning 
was a strategic national project conducted until the end of World War II not by the 
Tokyo prefecture (Tôkyô-fu) but by the Home Ministry (Naimushô) which after 
the war was divided into the Ministry of Local Affairs (Jichishô) and the Ministry 
of Construction (Kensetsushô).
A new administrative system was established after the war, with implications 
for planning. The hierarchy extended from the national government to the pre-
fecture (Tôkyô-to, Hokkai-dô, Ôsaka-fu, Kyôto-fu and 43 prefectures (ken)) to 
the lower levels of local government (city, town, and village, or shi, chô/machi, 
and mura/son). A city (shi) is classified principally as a “great” city or Cabinet 
Ordinance Designated Major Cities (seirei shitei toshi), having a population of 
over approximately 1 million, a “big” city (chûkaku shi), more than approximately 
200,000, and an “average” city (shi). Tokyo’s system is exceptional in that cen-
tral Tokyo is composed of 23 special wards (tokubetsu ku), although the regular 
system of city, town, and village exists in the Tama suburban region. A “great” 
city has powers almost identical to that of the prefecture in terms of independent 
policy-making and administration. There are 15 cities with this status: Sapporo, 
Sendai, Chiba, Saitama, Kawasaki, yokohama, Shizuoka, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, 
Figure 3.2 Tokyo Green Space Plan (1939). Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
(1994: 36).
: ' i I 111 IU 1I1,J. : i 
i • . . • • • • . . .. :- . .. • • •• .u M 
; . . . :. '.o: :.;,. .. . ~ .. ~ •• . '
58 Nakabayashi
Kobe, Hiroshima, Kitakyushu, Fukuoka, and Sakai city. At the same time, the 
special wards of Tokyo have had almost the same status as an “average” city in 
this regard since the 1970s. Despite a trend toward the deconcentration of power 
in Tokyo, its mayor has power to affect the administration of the wards. In the city 
planning system, the land-use regulation zoning plan (yôto chiiki seido) and the 
plans of large-scale infrastructures, such as roads and parks, are designated by the 
mayor of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG).
A postwar reconstruction plan for Tokyo and the 
development of a concept for Tokyo’s decentralization
The Allied bombing in 1945 razed 162.3 square kilometers, some 27 percent of 
the 23 wards that compose the traditional center of Tokyo. Almost half the homes 
in the ward area – approximately 759,000 houses – were burned down. Many 
people were evacuated from Tokyo, but numerous others stayed behind. A total 
of 93,000 households (approximately 310,000 people) were living in makeshift 
shelters among the ruins as of September 1, 1945, just two weeks after the end of 
the war.
In 1946, the national government devised a strategic initiative for reconstruct-
ing 115 devastated cities (see also Chapter 2). Within these cities, a total area of 
632 square kilometers had been bombed and 2.3 million houses burned. More 
than 330,000 people had been killed. The foundation of this initiative was that 
the reconstruction and revitalization of local cities would have primacy over 
the rebuilding of large cities, especially Tokyo. This was intended to preclude 
an insatiable surge in demand for housing, food, jobs, and various services that 
would occur if people were to rapidly return to large urban centers, in which these 
necessities were in acutely short supply.
Even before this initiative was issued, what was known as the Reconstruction 
Plan for Tokyo (Tôkyô sensai fukkô keikaku) emerged, modeled essentially on 
the wartime planning concept devised under the leadership of Ishikawa Hideaki, 
chief planner of Tokyo prefecture. This concept consisted of two kinds of plans: 
a plan for the rebuilding of central Tokyo (ku-bu, in Japanese, the 23-ward area) 
and a regional plan for the entire Kanto region.
The reconstruction plan for central Tokyo was decided in 1946, and set a tar-
get population of the center of 3.5 million (half the peak prewar population) and 
called for the reduction in size of the capital itself through the designation of green 
belt zones around the central city and the creation of open spaces to separate the 
residential zones. Considering that the population of the Tokyo ward area had 
been approximately 6.5 million at its prewar zenith, the rehabilitation plan was 
clearly overly optimistic (Figure 3.3). The plan’s goal was to reduce the size of 
the central city and to distribute the population and industries into suburban cities 
following the idea of the satellite city, a concept proposed at the International 
Conference on City Planning that took place in Amsterdam in 1924.
Ishikawa believed that Tokyo was destined to grow and become a magnet 
for population and industries. Accordingly, he created several plans, including a 
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plan to restrict growth in central Tokyo and a plan to redistribute inhabitants and 
industries to suburban cities in the Kanto region, not only to Tokyo prefecture 
but to other prefectures, such as Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Ibaraki, Tochigi, 
Gunma, yamanashi, and Shizuoka. These idealistic ideas to rehabilitate Tokyo 
were repudiated, however, as there was no system in place for a regional plan 
beyond the prefectural boundary. The plan for central Tokyo was promulgated in 
1946, but the regional plan of Kanto was not designated at this time. In his plan 
for central Tokyo published under the title “Tokyo Reconstruction Plan after the 
War,” Ishikawa commented, “Although Tokyo will become an industrial city in 
the future, the priority for the present should be on development as a political, 
economic, and cultural center. When the time comes, its political and cultural 
functions shall be moved to other areas” (Ishikawa 1993a: 708–11).
The regional plan for the Kanto region focused mainly on areas in the surround-
ing prefectures of Tokyo. This plan envisioned a population of approximately 5 
million through the expansion of existing cities located within a 40- to 50-kilome-
ter radius of central Tokyo as satellite cities beyond a green belt. These satellite 
Figure 3.3 Land-use plan as part of the Reconstruction Plan for Tokyo (1946). Source: 
Ishida (1987: 224). Just after the air bombings of Tokyo in 1946, land use was 
unclear in many districts, which thus were designated “not yet specified” zones 
(mishitei chiku). Land use in “unspecified zones” (mu shitei chiku) was not 
specified in order to reserve land for the future.
D Residential zone 
- Commercial zone 
~ Industrial zone . 
(mishitei chiku) Not yet specified zone 
lillll (mu shitei chiku) [g Unspecified zone 
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cities were each projected to have a population of 100,000. Among them were 
Yokosuka, Hiratsuka, and Atsugi in Kanagawa prefecture; Hachiôji, Tachikawa, 
and Machida in Tokyo prefecture; Kawagoe, Omiya, and Kasukabe in Saitama 
prefecture; and Chiba, Noda, and Kashiwa in Chiba prefecture. The regional plan 
also included suburban cities with an anticipated population of around 200,000, to 
be attained by expanding the major existing cities, such as Odawara in Kanagawa 
prefecture, Mito in Ibaraki prefecture, Utsunomiya in Tochigi prefecture, Maebashi 
and Takasaki in Gunma prefecture, Kofu in yamanashi prefecture, and Numazu in 
Shizuoka prefecture. The existing cities would be within a 60- to 100-kilometer 
radius of central Tokyo (Ishikawa 1993b: 596) (Figure 3.4).
Tokyo prefecture drew up the reconstruction plan for central Tokyo with the 
approval of the national government, but without any discussion with neighbor-
ing prefectures. Moreover, Tokyo prefecture had no authority to adopt the Kanto 
regional plan for other prefectures and no power to implement the plan for cities 
that were not a part of its territory. This regional plan for the greater metropolitan 
area was only a visionary scheme at this time – with no possibility of being carried 
out. It was not until 1958 that a plan for the Kanto region was accepted, when 
the first Tokyo Capital Region Plan (shutoken seibi dai ichiji kihon keikaku) was 
drawn up by the national government.
As a result, Tokyo’s master plan for reconstruction came under the land-use 
regulation system of the Special City Planning Law (tokubetsu toshi keikaku hô) 
Figure 3.4 Sketches for regional planning as part of the reconstruction plan for Tokyo 
proposed by Ishikawa Hideaki (1946). Source: Ishikawa (1993b: 596). 
(a) Hierarchy of residential zones for daily, weekly, and monthly life needs. 
(b) The Kanto region.
(a)
(b)
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in 1946, but without being designated a regional plan. Both land-readjustment 
projects and road network construction projects were scaled back dramatically. 
Although this land-use plan envisaged a population of 3.5 million people in the 
Tokyo ward area by the allocation of a wide “green space” in accordance with 
land-use zoning (mushitei chiiki) and with so-called green space zoning (ryokuchi 
chiiki), the actual postwar growth of Tokyo was so rapid that the population of 
the ward area increased from 1.5 million in 1945 to 3.44 million by 1946, to 3.82 
million by 1947, and 5.38 million by 1950 (Ishida 1987: 226).
From the National Capital Construction Law (shutoken seibi 
hô) to the National Capital Region Development Law and the 
first National Capital Region Development (NCRD) Plan (dai 
ichi shutoken seibi kihon keikaku)
Faced with accelerated population growth and severe financial constraints, Tokyo 
appealed to the national government to enact a law under which the latter would 
be directly responsible for constructing a capital for Japan out of the wards of 
Tokyo. This meant in effect that Tokyo asserted its autonomy of city planning. 
Voters of the Tokyo metropolitan area approved this legislation (at 55 percent 
participation) with 60 percent voting to accept. As a result, the National Capital 
Construction Law (shuto kensetsu hô) was enacted in 1950 and the National 
Capital Construction Committee (shuto kensetsu iinkai) established in 1951.
The National Capital Construction Committee produced a five-year plan for 
national capital construction (shuto kensetsu kinkyû goka nen keikaku) in 1952, 
mainly to provide parks and green spaces for the ward area of Tokyo. The committee 
proposed the Plan of Freeways in the Capital Region (shuto kôsoku dôro keikaku) 
in 1953, and drafted a Conceptual Plan for Capital Region Development (shuto-
ken seibi kôsô keikaku soan) in 1955. Although the National Capital Construction 
Law (shuto kensetsu hô) covered only the Tokyo wards, the committee considered 
a conceptual plan for capital region development. As the capital region would 
extend beyond the boundary of Tokyo and the city’s workers commuted from 
outside Tokyo prefecture’s territory in the early 1950s, with this conceptual plan, 
the committee discussed different approaches to the development of a National 
Capital Region that would encompass an area extending to a 50-kilometer radius 
from the heart of Tokyo, of which the ward area occupied the area within a 15- to 
20-kilometer radius. The 20- to 50-kilometer radius zone included a green belt 
development and a cluster of smaller cities to be developed as satellite cities in 
suburban areas, besides the urban renewal zone in central Tokyo (Figure 3.5). 
This conceptual plan for the development of the Capital Region was modeled 
after the Greater London Plan of 1944 (Figures 3.6 and 3.7). The Japanese plan 
divided the Capital Region into three zones according to distance from the center: 
the Inner Urban Zone (naibu shigai chitai), the Suburban Zone and Built-up Area 
(kinkô chiiki and shigaika kuiki), and the Peripheral Zone and cities within that 
zone (shûhen chiiki and shûhen toshi). The conceptual plan called for a green belt 
to be established in the Suburban Zone, and the existing cities to be developed as 
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satellite cities in the Peripheral Zone. In addition to the green belt and satellite cit-
ies, a key issue was the appropriate size of the primary city – central Tokyo – for 
the region as a whole. The tremendous demands of Tokyo’s growth necessitated 
the development of a new plan that would extend the metropolis beyond Tokyo 
proper. To achieve this, a new planning system for the development of the Capital 
Region that would cross prefectural boundaries (“cross-border”) was legislated in 
1956 (Nakabayashi 1983: 14–16; Kawakami 1990: 14–15).
The National Capital Region Development Law (shutoken seibi hô) of 1956 
replaced the National Capital Construction Law (shuto kensetsu hô) of 1950. The 
purpose of this new law was to provide a solution to overcrowding, traffic conges-
tion, and urban sprawl in the Tokyo metropolis and surrounding suburbs. The law 
redefined the Capital Region to cover an area within a 100-kilometer radius from 
the heart of Tokyo, rather than the 50-kilometer radius specified in the earlier 
conceptual plan. This larger area included the entire Kanto Plain and consisted 
of eight prefectures: all of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba prefectures in 
southern Kanto; and parts of Ibaraki, Tochigi, and Gunma, all in northern Kanto, 
and Yamanashi prefectures. The first National Capital Regional Development 
(NCRD) Plan was established in 1958 (Figure 3.7).
The 1958 NCRD Plan divided the Capital Region into three sub-regions: the 
Existing Urbanized Area (kisei shigaichi, defined as the built-up area in 1955) as 
the primary city in an inner sub-region; the “Proposed” Suburban Zone (kinko chi-
tai “yotei chi”) as green belts including existing towns in a suburban sub-region; 
Figure 3.5 Comparison of development approaches proposed for the Capital Region by 
the National Capital Construction Committee (NCCC). Source: City Planning 
Institute of Japan (1988: 45). (a) Uncontrolled expansion. (b) Suburban fringe 
development. (c) Cluster of small cities development. (d) Urban renewal 
development. (e) Linear development. (f) Special cities development.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
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and the New Urban Development Area (shigaichi kaihatsu kuiki) as satellite cities 
in a peripheral sub-region. The strategic goal of the first NCRD plan was to curtail 
the expansion of central Tokyo through the creation of green belts and the reloca-
tion of industrial functions away from central Tokyo and into the satellite cities.
Limiting the expansion of the Existing Urbanized Area, however, could not 
solve the problem of Tokyo’s burgeoning growth. Both the establishment of green 
belts with development of satellite cities and the redevelopment of inner areas 
were important responses to this issue.
Figure 3.6 Conceptual plan for the development of the Capital Region by the National 
Capital Construction Committee (NCCC) (1955). Source: Kawakami 
(1990: 15).
Figure 3.7 Comparison of the first National Capital Region Development (NCRD) Plan 
(1958) and the Greater London Plan (1944). Sources: Nakabayashi (1983: 
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In the 1960s, urban redevelopment projects designed to transform the ward area 
of Tokyo into a high-density city were promoted within the Existing Urbanized 
Area. Under this policy, new systems for high-density land use were established. 
One example was the Super Block Development System (tokutei gaiku seido) of 
1961; another was the Floor-area Ratio Regulation System (yosekiritsu seido), 
which regulated building volume but not height. It was brought into effect previ-
ously in Tokyo in 1963, and the Kasumigaseki Building, opened in 1968, is the 
first high-rise building with a height of more than 100 meters. This Floor-area 
Ratio Regulation System was fully brought into effect with the abolishment of the 
absolute height limit of 30 meters and the change of both the City Planning Law in 
1968 and the Building Standards Law in 1970. These new systems paved the way 
for the construction of high-rise buildings more than 30 meters high.
The concept of the green belt was the dream of many Japanese city planners 
since the 1924 International Conference on City Planning. Planners were eager 
to include a green belt system under the first NCRD Plan, along with simultane-
ous industrial and residential development in the satellite city zones to relieve 
the pressure on Tokyo to expand. This crucial planning concept, however, met 
with strong resistance from landowners and all 16 cities occupying the proposed 
green belt zone. In fact, the land-use controls for the conservation of green space 
specified in Tokyo’s reconstruction plan were deregulated for the needs of urban-
ization, especially for the construction of public housing. As a result, the green 
space zones earmarked by the Special City Planning Law for reconstruction after 
World War II were radically reduced. Urban expansion of central Tokyo could 
not be controlled and new residential areas sprang up, creating sprawl. Concerns 
centered around the control of these zones and belts and the means by which 
landowners would have received compensation. The plan thus was unable to real-
ize its initial objective of limiting the size of the Existing Urbanized Area. At 
the same time, Tokyo’s industries grew more rapidly than expected and many 
factories were relocated away from central Tokyo. In the suburban areas, urban 
sprawl continued in the development of both residential and industrial areas that 
had not yet combined into satellite cities (Nakabayashi 1983: 16–18).
In order to control new development and the construction of large factories 
and universities in the Existing Urbanized Area, a new law was promulgated in 
1959, the Factory Regulation Law in Tokyo Capital Region’s Existing Urbanized 
Area (shutoken no kisei shigaichi ni okeru kôgyô tô seigen hô). In spite of the 
new law, however, the influx of people and industries into the Capital Region 
could not be limited sufficiently and caused the size of the population to exceed 
all expectations. Although the first NCRD Plan envisioned a target population of 
26.6 million within a 100-kilometer radius by 1975, the actual population reached 
27 million by 1965 – a decade earlier than anticipated (Ishida 1987: 271–7).
This ballooning of the Existing Urbanized Area and lack of implementation 
of the green belt proposal represented a major failure in cross-border regional 
development, the goal of which, in addition to decentralization, was to suppress 
the emergence of a huge metropolis without adequate green space. The various 
local governments in the Tokyo Capital Region – which in 1956 consisted of 
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eight prefectures (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, 
and Yamanashi), two “great cities (Yokohama and Kawasaki), and more than 
250 local governments (cities, towns, and villages) – had been unable to work 
together effectively to realize a regional development plan that would distribute 
green space and urban development evenly. Consequently, every local govern-
ment pushed for urban development and ideal plans for the Tokyo metropolis 
were relinquished. A number of scholars have subsequently viewed as one of 
history’s ironies the fact that this failure of planning and the resulting extreme 
concentration of economic activities in Tokyo in fact gave the Japanese economy 
an extra impetus for growth.
From green belt to “metropolitanization”: the second  
NCRD Plan
The NCRD Law was radically amended in 1965, according to the conceptual plan 
by the National Capital Development Committee (shutoken seibi iinkai) for new 
development of the Capital Region (Figure 3.8). The amendment abolished the 
green belt concept and expanded the target area to cover all territories of eight 
prefectures, extending to the mountains of the northern Kanto region, which 
included the catchment area of the Tone River. Many dams were constructed 
within this catchment area to supply water to Tokyo.
In 1968, a second NCRD Plan (dai niji shutoken seibi kihon keikaku) was 
announced. It divided the capital region into three new sub-regions: the Existing 
Urbanized Area (as in the first plan), the Suburban Development Zone (kinkô 
seibi chitai), and the New City Development Area (toshi kaihatsu kuiki). The 
Suburban Development Zone, corresponding to an area within a 15- to 50-kilome-
ter radius from the center of Tokyo, consisted mainly of green belts and the new 
urban development areas designated as satellite cities under the first plan. The 
Suburban Development Zone was designed to help develop planned urban areas 
that included the preservation of valuable small green spaces and was based on 
the Suburban Green Space Preservation Law (kinkô ryokuchi hô) enacted in 1968. 
These small green spaces, however, were not substitutes for a green belt, as there 
were very few of them (Ishida 1987: 277–80). The New City Development Zone 
was a designated Peripheral Zone beyond a 50-kilometer radius from the center, 
covering new manufacturing and other industrial satellite cities, but encompass-
ing areas other than those assigned to the New Urban Development Area under 
the first NCRD plan,
The revised concept for the second NCRD Plan called for the development 
of Tokyo as a metropolis that would feature planned development and avoid 
suburban sprawl. Its basic policy went from the earlier regulation of “metropoli-
tanization” using green belts to the planned growth of the metropolis. In terms 
of planning strategy, its aim was to counter the centralization in Tokyo with a 
deconcentration of urban functions from the Existing Urbanized Area to the 
Suburban Development Zone and New City Development Areas in the northern 
Kanto region beyond a 50-kilometer radius from Tokyo’s center.
Figure 3.8 (a) Proposed concept for the second NCRD Plan (1967). Source: Nakabayashi 
(1983: 16–17). (b) The second NCRD Plan (1968). Source: Nakabayashi 
(1983: 16–17). (c) Highway network plan under the second NCRD Plan 
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The second NCRD Plan proposed a metropolitan traffic system that would 
connect the Suburban Development Zone, the New City Development Area, and 
the Existing Urbanized Area of central Tokyo and called for a highway network 
consisting of several ring roads within the Capital Region and the Tokyo Bay 
road. To support the New City Development Areas, the Northern Kanto Intercity 
Highway – extending from Mito city in Ibaraki to Takasaki city in Gunma – was 
proposed.
Under the second NCRD Plan, the 1919 City Planning Law was abolished 
and a new City Planning Law (shin toshi keikaku hô) enacted in 1968 to imple-
ment planned urban development and avoid sprawl (see Chapters 2 and 5). The 
law attempted to control urban sprawl by creating two new forms of zoning: the 
designation of an Urbanization Promotion Zone (shigaika kuiki) and Urbanization 
Control Zone (shigaika chôsei kuiki) within the City Planning Area, and a detailed 
zoning system of land-use regulation in the Urbanization Promotion Zone. Under 
the new law, these zoning regulations were established by prefecture, based on 
recommendations from local governments. According to the zoning regulation 
system, each local government had its own city planning administration respon-
sible for granting permits for buildings and urban development. This system was 
only partially successful at containing urban sprawl: while it could control the 
small-scale urban development and the construction of small, densely packed 
housing, it was not effective in the area of large-scale urban development – for 
example, in the Suburban Development Zone, which was transformed into a 
mosaic of numerous small-scale residential developments without regional infra-
structures. Because the pressure for residential development continued to be 
strong, progress in regional infrastructure development was delayed, as funds 
inevitably ran short.
Urban development progressed, especially in the suburban areas of the metrop-
olis. The estimated population under the second NCRD Plan was projected at 
33.1 million by 1975, an increase of about 6.1 million from 1965. The actual 
population in 1975 reached 33.62 million in the Capital Region and 25.56 million 
in the Tokyo metropolitan area (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba), which 
mainly consists of the Existing Urbanized Area and the Suburban Development 
Areas. While the population of the Existing Urbanized Area began to decrease, 
the Suburban Development Area was the most important area for the growth not 
only of the National Capital Region but also of the Japanese economy. During this 
period, Tama New Town in Tokyo, Kohoku New Town in yokohama, and Chiba 
New Town began to be developed as large-scale bedroom communities in the 
Suburban Development Area. Tsukuba University and Science City also emerged, 
for the deconcentration of capital functions from the Existing Urbanized Area to 
the New City Development Area. Tokyo Educational University was demolished 
and Tsukuba University was established in the Tsukuba New City Development 
Area. Many national institutions, such as the Institute of Architecture and the 
Institute of Civil Engineering, were removed from the Existing Urbanized Area to 
the New City Development Area.
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The third NCRD Plan: from manufacturing to service-
oriented industries
The Japanese economy grew exponentially from the latter half of the 1950s to the 
early 1970s. Then, in 1973, the oil shock struck. As a result, the economic growth 
of the nation slowed down dramatically, as did the rapid metropolitanization of 
the capital region. An additional outcome of this crisis was that the economy of 
Tokyo, as was occurring elsewhere, began to move from manufacturing-based to 
service-oriented industries.
The third NCRD Plan (dai sanji shutoken seibi kihon keikaku), a revision to 
the second plan, appeared in 1976. Projecting a target population for the Capital 
Region of 38 million by 1985, it kept the designations of Existing Urbanized 
Area, Suburban Development Zone, and New City Development Area (Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government 1978: 4–9).
Under the third NCRD Plan, the key concept of development in the Capital 
Region began to shift focus, from the deconcentration of manufacturing industries 
and the growth of industrial satellite cities to resolving the issue of concentration 
of new urban functions in central Tokyo. The headquarters of new and growing 
companies were moving their operations to Tokyo from all over the country for 
business opportunities in an increasingly information-oriented society. This trend 
prompted the service industries to grow rapidly in Tokyo. Their concentration in 
Tokyo resulted in a new hierarchy of Japanese cities – with functional polariza-
tion producing an urban system that established Tokyo’s primacy over the other 
metropolises.
The focus of the Third Comprehensive National Development Plan of 1977 
(dai sanji zenkoku sôgo kaihatsu keikaku or sanzensô) shifted from the metropolis 
versus the periphery to Tokyo versus the rest of Japan. The issue now was how to 
deconcentrate or decentralize these new urban functions from the center of Tokyo 
and spread them out into other metropolises nationwide and into the satellite cores 
of the Suburban Development Zone in the National Capital Region.
The third NCRD Plan put forward the concept of two sub-regions within 
the Capital Region: the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, combining the Existing 
Urbanized Area and the Suburban Development Area; and the Peripheral Zone 
in which the National Capital Development Areas were located. For the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area, the plan proposed the construction of five sub-centers in 
the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, each of which would be designated a “Business 
Node” (gyômu kaku toshi) and would function as a business and commercial sub-
center. These would share the power of the central business districts of Tokyo. 
The proposed Business Nodes included yokohama and Kawasaki in Kanagawa 
prefecture; Hachiôji and Tachikawa in Tokyo prefecture; Urawa and Ômiya in 
Saitama prefecture; Tsuchiura and the Tsukuba Science City in Ibaraki prefecture; 
and Chiba in Chiba prefecture. In addition, a “cross-border” network was pro-
posed that would connect the Business Nodes and the Central Business District 
(CBD) of Tokyo. Such a network would be changed to lead to the construction of 
a central ring road (kenô dô) and a Tokyo Bay ring road (Tôkyô wan kanjô dôro) 
(Kawakami 1990: 16–17) (Figure 3.9).
Figure 3.9 (a) The changing concept of metropolitan structure under the third NCRD Plan: 
from unipolar to multipolar (1975). Source: Kokudo chô (1990). (b) The third 
NCRD Plan (1976). Source: Kokudo chô (1990). (c) Highway network plan 
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Figure 3.10 Conceptual draft plan for Capital Region Renewal Plan (1984). Source: 
Kawakami (1990: 18).
Figure 3.11 (a) Conceptual drawing of the fourth NCRD Plan (1986): concentrated 
deconcentration concept for the Capital Region with a multinuclear sub-
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In the end, the Business Node concept never materialized, despite the growth 
in computer networks, internationalization, and the rise of the service industries. 
In the 1980s, the National Land Agency (Kokudo chô) conducted studies on the 
renewal strategy for the National Capital Region. The agency announced its 
Conceptual Draft Plan for Capital Region Development (Tôkyô daitoshi ken kinô 
tenkai zu) in 1984 (Figure 3.10). In this draft plan, the Business Nodes were des-
ignated as the core of a future self-sufficient urban sub-region. The draft plan led 
to the fourth NCRD Plan (Dai yon ji shutoken seibi kihon keikaku), announced in 
1986 (Kawakami 1990: 18) (Figure 3.11a).
A comparison of the concepts of the Fourth Comprehensive 
National Development Plan, the fourth NCRD Plan, and the 
Long-term Plan for the Tokyo Metropolis
At the national level, in the Fourth Comprehensive National Development Plan 
of 1986, designated according to the Comprehensive National Development 
Law (zenkoku sôgô kaihatsu keikaku hô) promulgated in 1950, the primary task 
was the correction of Tokyo’s unipolar growth. Its proposed goal was to create a 
multipolar (or polycentric) network. In 1988, a new National Development Law 
for a Multipolar Structure (takyoku bunsan gata kokudo keisei hô) was legislated 
in order to move from a unipolar to a multipolar structure at the national level. 
This law aimed to advance the development of business centers in major cities 
throughout Japan instead of industrial parks development. While Japan’s industrial 
structure was becoming more service-oriented, Tokyo’s one-sided development 
was a severe problem, the resolution of which would set a precedent for every 
other Japanese city, including Nagoya and Osaka.
At the Capital Region level under the Fourth Comprehensive National 
Development Plan, the fourth NCRD Plan was announced in 1986. This plan 
divided the capital region into two zones: the Tokyo Metropolitan Region, con-
sisting of the Existing Urbanized Area and Suburban Development Zone; and 
a Peripheral Zone in which the satellite cities were designated as New City 
Development Areas. In the fourth plan, the construction of Business Nodes was a 
major goal of the development of the Suburban Development Zone as an extension 
of the existing cities, most of which were designated as industrial satellite cities 
in the previous NCRD plan. A special feature of the fourth plan was a proposed 
new urban structure for the Tokyo Metropolitan Area to correct Tokyo’s lopsided 
growth. Many Business Nodes and core cities were proposed for the development 
of the Suburban Development Zone and were intended to surround the Existing 
Urbanized Area. Such cities receiving urban functions from central Tokyo were 
designated in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, and Ibaraki prefectures. It 
was anticipated that self-sufficient sub-regions, such as the commuting sphere, 
would grow surrounding each Business Node. If this plan succeeded, the unipolar 
structure of the Tokyo metropolitan area would be transformed into a double-
layered structure consisting of a basic layer (the downsized sphere of the Tokyo 
metropolitan area with the heart of Tokyo as the single pole) and five secondary 
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layers (the self-sufficient sub-regions newly grown around each Business Node) 
(Figure 3.11b). According to the plan, by the target year of 2000, the population 
of the Tokyo Capital Region was projected to be 40.9 million (Kokudo chô 1990: 
94–111).
At the local government level, the TMG designated the first Long-Term Plan for 
the Tokyo Metropolis (Tôkyô-to chôki sôgô keikaku) in 1982. This plan, initiated 
by Tokyo Governor Suzuki Shun-ichi, consisted of two parts: a basic conceptual 
plan and a 10-year operational plan, and was revised periodically. The conceptual 
goal of this plan was to implement the multipolar structure of central Tokyo to 
promote a network of business centers in the Existing Urbanized Area of Tokyo. 
Its major goal was the creation of sub-centers (fuku toshin) that included Shinjuku, 
Shibuya, Ikebukuro, Ueno-Asakusa, Kameido-Kinshicho, Ôsaki, and the Seaside 
Center (rinkai fuku toshin) in the Existing Urbanized Area and would share vari-
ous urban functions with central Tokyo (including Marunouchi, Ôtemachi, Ginza, 
Nihonbashi, Kasumigaseki, Toranomon, and other areas) (Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government 1994: 92–3). Not only a multinodal structure consisting of seven 
sub-centers in the ward area (as the Existing Urbanized Area), but also five core 
cities in the Tama area (Tama no shin) – Kichijôji, Tachikawa, Hachiôji, Tama-
center, and Machida – as a Suburban Development Zone of Tokyo, were proposed 
as a basic conceptual plan for Tokyo in the twenty-first century. It was clear in 
this plan that the Tokyo prefecture did not want urban functions moved from the 
Existing Urbanized Area of central Tokyo to the Suburban Development Zone 
in neighboring prefectures. In 1997, Tokyo’s new governor, Aoshima Yukio, 
announced the new Development Plan for Resident-Friendly Tokyo (seikatsu 
toshi Tôkyô kôsô). Under this new plan, a concept of the deconcentration of urban 
functions centralized in the territory of the Tokyo prefecture took the place of the 
previous plan. Representing the TMG’s effort to correct its lopsided structure in 
which urban functions were concentrated in the center of Tokyo, this concept for 
the centralized deconcentration of Tokyo entailed shifting urban functions to the 
surrounding secondary centers and Tama’s core cities in the Tama suburban area 
belonging to the Tokyo prefecture. With this idea it is clear that the TMG rejected 
the distribution of urban functions outside Tokyo. This planning concept stood in 
direct opposition to the notion of Business Nodes, as laid out in the fourth NCRD 
Plan (Tokyo Metropolitan Government 1990: 3–15, 1998a: 26) (Figure 3.12).
In the second half of the 1980s and most of the 1990s, the three different levels 
of deconcentration policies were adopted to ameliorate the unipolar urban struc-
ture of the capital region. First, on the national level, the model of a multipolar 
national structure was promoted by the relocation of central urban functions from 
Tokyo to the other major cities in accordance with the Fourth Comprehensive 
National Development Plan. This is a deconcentration policy. Second, on the 
Capital Region level, the model of a multipolar metropolitan structure built in 
five Business Nodes as self-contained sub-regions independent of each other was 
advanced by removing urban functions from central Tokyo to the Business Nodes 
according to the NCRD Plan. Third, on the level of the Tokyo prefecture, the multi-
nodal structure with a network consisting of a center, seven secondary centers, and 
Figure 3.12 Spatial relationship between the multipolar structure of the fourth NCRD Plan (1986) and the creation of sub-centers of the Long-term Plan 
for the Tokyo Metropolis (1994). Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government (1998a: 26).
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many core centers was promoted by the Long-term Plan for the Tokyo Metropolis. 
This is a policy of national concentration and regional deconcentration.
The effect of the fourth NCRD Plan and implementation 
of the fifth NCRD Plan: toward cross-border relationships 
among prefectures and cities for the creation of a structure of 
centralized deconcentration
The fourth NCRD Plan materialized during the excesses of the Japanese 
economic bubble in the late 1980s. In the middle of the 1980s, against a backdrop 
of internationalization, the growth of information-based businesses, and the 
restructuring of Japanese industry from industrial to tertiary, the National Land 
Agency reported that more than twice the existing amount of office space would be 
needed in the Tokyo ward area. The report prompted many business-center urban 
redevelopment projects to supply quantities of office space in central Tokyo. This 
urban redevelopment boom accelerated both a steep increase in land prices and 
a decrease in the population of central Tokyo (Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
1998b: 5–12).
The draft plans for a development of Business Nodes were produced during 
this period. However, after the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, 
the trend toward concentration in central Tokyo appeared to slow down, as the 
decrease in population also slowed and land prices declined.
The key issue to be considered in analyzing the fourth NCRD Plan is whether 
or not the development of Business Nodes was successful. The developments 
were implemented in accordance with the Act for Promotion of Development 
based on a Multipolar National Structure (takyoku bunsan kokudo keisei hô). The 
Chiba Business Node was designated first in 1991, followed by Urawa–Omiya 
in Saitama prefecture in 1992, Tsuchiura–Tsukuba in Ibaraki prefecture and 
Yokohama in Kanagawa prefecture in 1993, Hachioji and Tachikawa cities in 
Tokyo prefecture in 1995, and Kawasaki in Kanagawa prefecture in 1997.
The details of all of these development projects are very similar. Each plan 
stipulates the construction of an exhibition hall; international convention center; 
commercial complex and shopping malls; cultural and entertainment facilities 
such as museums and theaters; hotels; office space; condominiums and apart-
ments; and open spaces and plaza-style parks. The situation in Tachikawa city and 
Hachioji city was somewhat different, however, since the centers of both cities 
are rather small. These development projects were not part of the Long-term Plan 
of the Tokyo Metropolis. In addition, these developments are hampered by the 
severe financial constraints and the drawn-out economic recession of the post-
bubble period.
The fifth NCRD Plan (Dai goji shutoken seibi kihon keikaku) was announced 
in 1998. There were five major objectives for the fifth NCRD Plan: the comple-
tion of Business Nodes accompanied by the construction of a ring road linking 
the Business Nodes and sub-centers; the renewal and expansion of residential 
functions in the central Tokyo ward area along with the effective allocation of 
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urban functions to the Business Nodes; the creation of space for housing in central 
Tokyo to offset the pressure of office and commercial development; the improve-
ment of infrastructure, such as roads and parks; and the upgrading of international 
transportation and information systems, along with the establishment of telecom-
munications systems befitting Tokyo as a world city.
The fifth NCRD Plan set 2015 as the target year for its goals. In contrast to 
the previous plan, the fifth version projects a decline in population during the life 
of the plan – not only in Japan as a whole but also specifically within the Capital 
Region. The decrease in population is anticipated to be accompanied by a rise in 
the average age of citizens in the Capital Region and a lower rate of economic 
growth, which causes less incoming migration from other areas in Japan (Kokudo 
chô 1999: 264–307).
In light of these expectations, the Fifth Plan lays out the following social objec-
tives for the region: the facilitating of opportunities for economic, social, and 
cultural activity in the Capital Region in order to increase the productivity of 
Japan; the freeing of social and geographical constraints to enable all citizens to 
participate in various social activities; the creation of an ecologically sound and 
sustainable society and the improvement of the safety and convenience of the 
urban environment; and the creation of a Capital Region more resistant to natural 
disasters such as earthquakes and with a durable infrastructure to pass on to future 
generations.
The fifth NCRD Plan prescribed the general direction for the new structure 
of the Capital Region in the twenty-first century as a deconcentrated network-
ing structure. The plan divided the Capital Region conceptually into two new 
zones: the Tokyo Metropolitan Zone (Tôkyô dai toshi ken), within a 60-kilometer 
radius of the center, and the Peripheral Zone, beyond the 60-kilometer radius. 
The Peripheral Zone consists of four zones, including the Northern Kanto Zone 
(kita kantô renkei toshi ken), Eastern Kanto Zone (higashi kantô renkei toshi ken), 
Western Inland Zone (seibu nairiku renkei toshi ken), and Islands Zone (tôsho 
ken) (Kokudo chô 1999: Appendices 1–8). Within these zones, the plan delineates 
four kinds of nodal cities: central Tokyo (Tôkyô toshin) and Business Nodes in 
the Tokyo metropolitan area, core cities (kôiiki renkei kyoten toshi) for the col-
laboration between neighboring sub-regions in the capital, and sub-cities (chiiki 
renkei kyoten toshi) for the collaboration between cities and each sub-region in 
the Peripheral Zone (Figure 3.13).
In the above hierarchical structure of two zones and four nodal cities, the core 
city and sub-city are new planning concepts for a new kind of collaboration. The 
characteristic of the relationship of both these entities with sub-regions and cities 
can be characterized as a “cross-border” collaboration, in which urban functions 
are shared by each city and each sub-region. For example, a large-scale com-
mercial development may be implemented in one city and cultural facilities in 
another city.
For the implementation of the above concept, the Tokyo metropolitan area 
encompasses an area within a 60-kilometer radius that legally consists of the 
Existing Urbanized Area and the Suburban Development Zone, just as under the 
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fourth NCRD Plan. In reality, the Tokyo metropolitan area resembles the area 
within commuting distance of central Tokyo, and can be divided into two sub-
zones with different planning objectives: the Existing Urbanized Area including 
central Tokyo within a 20-kilometer radius, and the Suburban Development Area, 
encompassing the area surrounding the Existing Urbanized Area within a radius 
of 20–60 kilometers. The main planning objectives for this area are not only the 
community’s revitalization but also the upgrading of residential areas, particularly 
those that contain densely packed wooden houses (mokuzô jûtaku misshû shigai 
chi; the most vulnerable to earthquakes), and the promotion of effective use of 
vacant or underutilized lands intended for office buildings in the bubble-economy 
period.
Within the Suburban Development Zone, the main goal of the development 
plan is the continued creation of Business Nodes and the network of connecting 
roads. These cities have included yokohama, Kawasaki, Atsugi, and Sagamihara 
in Kanagawa prefecture; Machida, Tama-center, Hachiôji, Tachikawa, and Ôme in 
Tokyo prefecture; Kawagoe, Kumagai, Urawa, Ômiya, Kasukabe, and Koshigaya 
in Saitama prefecture; Tsuchiura, Tsukuba, and Ushiku in Ibaraki prefecture; 
and Kashiwa, Narita, Chiba, and Kisarazu in Chiba prefecture. The number of 
Business Nodes designated under the fifth NCRD Plan is three times greater than 
in the fourth plan and includes formerly designated sub-centers.
Under the fifth NCRD Plan, new projects have been added. One is encouraging 
Figure 3.13 Conceptual drawing of the fifth NCRD Plan (1998). Source: Kokudo chô 
(1999: Appendix 8). (a) Deconcentrated network structure of the future 
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the growth of core cities as new business nodes and sub-centers in the Peripheral 
Zone by upgrading the quality of life, increased business opportunities and more 
urban functions. The plan anticipates that the core cities will become a nodal point 
for the cross-border collaboration in this area.
Another project is an infrastructural development related to core cities and 
sub-centers in cross-border collaborations. Called the Outer Ring Expressway of 
the Capital Region, this network of roads links core cities in the Capital Region. 
Specifically, the fifth plan’s conceptual direction for development in the northern 
Kanto Zone, western Inland Zone, and eastern Kanto Zone is embodied in this 
project, which is expected to link every core city in three zones in the future and 
promote growth and exchange.
On the prefectural level, in 2000 the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
announced a new political vision and designated a long-term plan under the 
direction of Governor Ishihara Shintarô. In accordance with this long-term plan, 
a master plan for new regional development, called the Development Plan for 
Tokyo Megalopolis was announced in 2001 (Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
2001). The underlying concepts of this plan, which has a target year of 2050, are 
very similar to those of the fifth NCRD Plan, with the exception of a separate 
urban-development master plan produced by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
(Figure 3.14). Unique to the TMG, it includes concepts such as sustainability, 
ecological symbiosis between urbanization and nature, networks of transition and 
information in the Tokyo Metropolis, growth of core areas and the core city, world 
city development amid internationalization, safe urban life, cross-border collabo-
ration with neighboring cities, and public participation. Usually a local govern-
Figure 3.14 Conceptual drawing for the Tokyo Megalopolis in 2050, proposed by the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government (2001). Source: Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government (2001: 22).
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ment drafts a plan for only its own territory, not that of neighboring governments, 
so as not to interfere with their autonomy. The new TMG plan, however, includes 
as a target area not only Tokyo prefecture but also the neighboring prefectures of 
Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba. The first “cross-border” plan produced by a local 
government, it was made possible by the existence of the Convention of Eight 
Prefectures and Designated Cities (kenshi kyôgikai), which – composed of the 
four prefectures of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba and the four “special 
designated” cities of Yokohama, Kawasaki, Saitama, and Chiba – facilitated dis-
cussion, coordination, and collaboration (Tokyo Metropolitan Government 2001) 
(concerning Governor Ishihara, see Chapter 8).
Conclusion: collaboration and cross-border relationships in 
the Capital Region of the twenty-first century
The 1924 International Conference on City Planning held in Amsterdam clarified 
that the regional planning system under the cross-border relationship of local 
governments was a very important issue for the metropolitan area, which consisted 
of many local governments. The national government announced development 
plans for the Kanto region several times before World War II and endeavored to 
implement a succession of such plans nationwide, as well as three metropolitan 
plans, during the second half of the twentieth century.
Presently, the fundamental concepts underlying the various plans for the Capital 
Region differ from one another. The Comprehensive National Development Plan 
was based on the idea of a decentralization of urban functions from the capital, 
Tokyo, to other regions. Under the NCRD Plans managed by the national govern-
ment, there has been a centralized deconcentration of urban functions from the 
heart of Tokyo to the business nodes in the Suburban Development Zone and to 
the core cities in the Peripheral Zone, accompanied by collaboration and cross-
border exchange within each local government in the Capital Region.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s current urban development master plan 
represents a centralized deconcentration in the territory of Tokyo prefecture. The 
TMG’s goal is to continue as the capital of Japan, and thus to deconcentrate urban 
functions from the central part of Tokyo to secondary centers in the heart of the 
capital and to Tama’s core centers in Tokyo’s suburban area, not beyond Tokyo 
prefecture. At the same time, the TMG has begun to discuss and to collaborate 
with neighboring governments in a cross-border approach.
In the early twenty-first century, all the plans produced at the national, capital 
region, and prefectural levels feature key terms such as “deconcentration,” “cross-
border,” and “collaboration,” aimed at developing and improving the Capital 
Region and the Tokyo metropolitan area in the face of an aging and shrinking pop-
ulation and the slow growth of the Japanese economy. Nevertheless, the National 
Capital Region Development Law does not yet provide a complete system for the 
administration of metropolitan planning. To achieve the goals of the NCRD Plans 
on cross-border collaboration with neighboring prefectures and cities along with 
decentralization of governmental power, it is necessary to establish a new system 
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of metropolitan administration based on cross-border relationships for collabora-
tion with each government.
It is noteworthy that in the fifth NCRD Plan the cities of Machida and Sagamihara 
are designated as a group of business nodes, demonstrating the first case of cross-
border collaboration between Tokyo and Kanagawa prefectures. In addition, four 
zones defined in the fifth NCRD Plan are established as cross-border zones among 
adjacent prefectures, so as to grow various cross-border relationships.
The concept of both the cross-border relationship and collaboration between 
adjacent prefectures and cities is key to developing the new Capital Region in the 
twenty-first century. This will reinforce the vitality of the Capital Region, which 
is necessary for the sustainable growth of the Japan of the future. In the twentieth 
century, the expansion of Tokyo was the most important issue to be resolved in both 
national policy and Capital Region planning in order to lessen the gap between 
Tokyo and the other metropolises and local regions. However, it is recognized 
that the growth of Tokyo leads the economic growth of the Japanese economy in 
the twenty-first century. In the post-bubble Tokyo of today, there are many urban 
redevelopment projects that operate under a national policy of deregulation and 
urban revitalization, not only in the center and sub-centers of Tokyo but also in 
other areas, such as Roppongi, Aoyama, Shinbashi, and Shinagawa. For example, 
a private company directed the creation of Roppongi Hills Projects, a large-scale 
construction project in Tokyo, which includes a museum, hotel, offices, and 
shops. In Shinbashi and Shinagawa, large vacant sites of former railway yards are 
redeveloping as business parks composed of high-rise office buildings combined 
with hotels, recreation areas, retail shops, and residences.
The coming era will be one of competition among urban governments to 
attract both residents and urban functions against a backdrop of depopulation 
and economic slowdown. While local governments are gaining more administra-
tive authority, they must collaborate in order to ensure urban growth for all. The 
means by which this can occur most efficiently is an administrative apparatus for 
cross-border collaboration operated independently by prefectures and cities under 
a model of decentralized authority.
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4 Financial stress in the Japanese 
local public sector in the 1990s
 Situation, structural reasons, solutions
Alain Schebath
The issue of local autonomy, although written into the Japanese constitution 
(Articles 92–95 of Chapter 8), remains a controversial matter, especially in 
the arena of financing. Public services in Japan are primarily the purview of 
municipalities and prefectures, which account for some two-thirds of public 
spending on such services but only receive one-third of all public revenues. This 
difference results in an important shift of revenue-generating from the national 
level to local communities that bears very little resemblance to the systems in 
place in other countries. The issue raised is that of local revenues versus taxation 
from national subsidies in regard to the borrowing capacity of local communities. 
Moreover, the financial issue also means that the state necessarily intrudes in 
the local sphere. Prefectures and municipalities are responsible for a wide range 
of services, mainly public works, including town planning, transportation, and 
industrial and educational infrastructure. The decentralization law enacted in 
2000 was aimed at reforming the old system of responsibilities delegated to local 
communities under the control of ministries, with the goal of moving toward a 
redistribution of powers based on mutual cooperation rather than subordination 
(see also Chapters 2 and 8). Changes also occurred in local financing but do 
not appear to have kept pace with the current financial difficulties of Japanese 
communities.
At the end of the 1990s, newspaper and television reports portrayed the finan-
cial situation of the Japanese local public sector as a state of crisis. Since the 
collapse of the “bubble” economy that occurred at the beginning of the decade, 
the Japanese economy has taken more than 10 years to recover.
According to the media, the country’s financial crisis (Japan’s public debt 
represented approximately 150 percent of the GDP in 2004) can be traced to 
public-works projects realized during the bubble era and a neglect of financial 
restructuring, as well as a lack of awareness. The public sector previously expe-
rienced two periods of financial trauma, one after World War II and the other in 
the 1970s as a result of the oil shock, but these were not as severe as the situation 
today. After examining a number of indicators that demonstrate the extent of the 
local public sector’s current financial crisis, this essay will outline its underlying 
causes and analyze the solutions proposed by the national and local governments 
as well as by experts.
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Financial issues for Japanese local communities in the 1990s 
and early 2000s
Financial stress in the Japanese local public sector can be charted through a series 
of comparative rates that show the actual deterioration of the local financial 
picture. One of the major trends that can be observed is a decrease in revenue 
from local taxes in the 1990s, which has leveled off at the beginning of the 2000s. 
As in European countries, Japanese municipalities and prefectures levy taxes 
whose imposition is governed by national law. While rates and tax bases are fixed 
by the national Diet, local communities can change these rates within a small 
range (Wada et al. 1999).1
Even if the 2000 law on decentralization introduced a measure of financial 
reform by permitting municipalities and prefectures the ability to generate new 
taxes outside legal standards as well as the freedom to establish rates for local 
taxes, the main sources for local revenues have scarcely changed and their posi-
tion has rarely evolved in the local budget.
Of the different kinds of local taxes, the main ones are the resident tax (on 
individuals and corporations), business tax, and fixed-assets tax (Schebath 1999: 
156–7). The sources for local revenues in 2002 included local taxes (36 percent), 
global grant (20 percent), central government disbursements (financial transfers 
from ministries) (14 percent), borrowing (14 percent), miscellaneous (13 percent), 
charges and fees (3 percent). While local taxes represent the largest share of the 
revenues, they did not really experience favorable growth overall during the 1990s. 
Representing 45 percent of the total revenues in 1990, local taxes decreased to a 
total of 35 percent in 1995 and since that year have stabilized at between 35 to 37 
percent (Figure 4.1).
As the local tax base is primarily dependent on business profits, local tax mon-
ies naturally decreased after the collapse of the “bubble” in 1990. Fluctuation 
in taxable revenues has had a strong negative impact on the financial status of 
Japanese local communities, especially in the intergovernmental relationships 
(between national and local) in terms of local autonomy (Kanazawa 1997: 39).
Another trend is the increase from 1995 to 2000 in the percentage of local rev-
enues derived from the global grant (the portion of national tax monies allocated 
to local communities). But, as is the case with local taxes, this growth is linked to 
the decline in budget expenditures. If central government disbursements are added 
to the global grant representing financial transfers from the national government 
to local communities, the total amount actually decreased in 2002 – 34.8 percent 
of the revenues in 2001 and 33.6 percent in 2002.
In order to cope with the decline of revenues from local taxes, starting in the 
early 1990s, local communities began to issue more local bonds than previously, 
with the approval of the national government. The share of local revenues rep-
resented by bonds rose from 8 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 1995, falling 
to 11 percent in 2000 and then increasing again, to 14 percent in 2002. These 
figures show that recently loans have been the main means for local communi-
ties to alleviate their revenue problems. Nevertheless, as many municipalities and 
prefectures find themselves in a worsening financial situation, it will be more dif-
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ficult for them to receive permission from central government to issue local bonds 
(Kaneko 1998). Moreover, some local communities, knowing that they will not be 
able to repay their loans in the future if they do not have a steady, stable revenue 
stream, are eager to reduce the use of bonds to finance public works.
The issuance of more bonds in the 1990s generated an increase in the total 
amount of local debt, which is revealed by many indicators. Among these has been 
a significant increase in the amount of debt carried by Japanese prefectures and 
municipalities, which, according to the data compiled by the Ministry of General 
Affairs (Sômushô), more than doubled during the 1990s. Table 4.1 presents the 
pattern of increase in local debt in trillions of yen from 1990 to 2004 together with 
the percentage of the gross national product (GNP) occupied by local debt.
Local debt is made up of three components: the largest consists of the bonds 
issued by local communities, which represented 70 percent of the total debt in 
2002. Bonds for the financing of the global grant system and the debt carried by 
local public companies each represented 15 percent of the total, with significant 
increases in recent years. Therefore, even if prefectures and municipalities attempt 
to reduce the issuance of loans, the total amount of local debt could continue to 
grow. The first reason is that local public companies are facing deficits. One solu-
tion has been a proposal by the national government to privatize these companies, 
a risky undertaking – especially with the debt burden of public companies – that 
seems unlikely to occur. The second reason for an anticipated increase is that the 
national government, which normally finances the global grant system, is in a 
worse financial situation than the local communities. It is probable that loans will 
be used increasingly to finance this global grant (for an overview of the global 
grant, see Aoki 2001).
Figure 4.1 Evolution of the sources of revenues of the Japanese prefectures and 
municipalities from 1970 to 2000. Source: Jichishô (Ministry of Local Affairs) 
(1999).
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Local debt increased steadily from 1980 to 1990 but went up sharply after 
1992. During the 1980s, the debt/GDP ratio decreased from 19 percent in 1982 to 
15 percent in 1990. But the 1990s saw a major increase in the amount of local sec-
tor debt (Nomura 1999: 176). From 1990 to 2004, the growth of the debt exceeded 
204 percent. The debt/GDP ratio has followed the same pattern, increasing from 
15 percent in 1991 to more than 40 percent in 2004. The amount of the Japanese 
local debt in 2004 represented the equivalent of the entire GNP of the United 
Kingdom or France (at a rate of 1 euro per 125 yen).
Despite the fact that local communities have made an effort to reduce the issu-
ance of local bonds, the amount of local debt continues to grow. A rule of thumb 
in public finance states that, whereas only a few years are need to incur debt, it 
takes a decade for local communities to regain their financial footing. Therefore 
one could extrapolate that, in a case of a decade’s worth of debt increase, several 
decades of efforts are needed to attain financial stability.
With quickly mounting debt during the 1990s, Japanese prefectures and 
municipalities were forced to tighten bond redemption. Thus, the portion of the 
debt repayment within total expenditures increased from 8 percent in 1993 to 12 
percent in 1999. It is this expense that experienced the strongest rates of growth 
in 1996 and 1997.
Another way to estimate the debt burden on the budget of local communi-
ties is to examine the percentage of their own revenues consumed by the debt 
repayment. Table 4.2 shows the share of interest and capital redemption per year 
compared with local revenues (local taxes and the global grant) for the entire 
Japanese local public sector.
Table 4.1 Total amount of local debt and amount of local debt compared with the GNP
Year Debt in trillions of yen Debt as percentage of GNP
1990  67 15
1991  70 15
1992  79 17












Source : Sômushô (Ministry of General Affairs) (2001, 2003, and 2004).
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The increase in this ratio reveals the importance of the debt for local public 
finance. The Japanese national government indicates the limit of vigilance at 15 
percent. The statistics of the Ministry of General Affairs show that the number 
of municipalities that have gone over this limit has increased sharply during the 
last decade. There were 1,065 municipalities over the limit in 1992, jumping to 
2,005 in 1999. Out of 3,229 municipalities in 2001, 62 percent of them face a debt 
problem. The situation is even worse for the prefectures, with 85 percent of them 
in the red in 1999. The 2001 white paper on local public finance underscores what 
has become a clear tendency toward having more local communities bear the 
brunt of debt each year (Sômushô 2001: 33).
In the 1990s, Japanese local communities found themselves in an increasingly 
shaky financial position. As a result, it became more and more difficult for them 
to have available revenues with which to finance their own investments. Table 
4.3 shows the increase in the mandatory burden rate, which takes into account 
mandatory expenditures compared with local revenues. Mandatory expenditures 
include personnel expenses, social-minimum expenses, and the debt annuity. 
Local revenues are made up of local taxes and funding from the global grant. 
The higher the rate of state-mandated expenses, the fewer funds are available 
for local communities to invest in their own projects. The data in the table reveal 
a significant increase in the rate of state-mandated expenses during the 1990s, 
meaning that the financial ability of local communities to invest shrank sharply. 
At the same time, local revenues did not increase as quickly as the expenditures, 
and in some years decreased, as, for example, in 1992 and 1994.
In 1999 and 2000 the rate of the mandatory burden decreased. The explanation 
for this sudden reversal is that personnel expenses began to be a smaller percent-
age of the total budget. Many prefectures and municipalities decided to implement 
plans to reduce the number of employees and the wages of local public servants. 
Nevertheless, in 1999, the figure of 75 percent of total budget required for manda-
Table 4.2 Evolution of the ratio of annuity to local revenues 












Source: Sômushô (Ministry of General Affairs) (2001, 2003, and 2004).
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tory expenditure, generally recognized as a red flag, was still exceeded by more 
than 85 percent of Japanese local governments. Nevertheless, starting in 2001, the 
mandatory burden rate began to increase again, reaching 90.3 percent in 2002. In 
its 1999 report to the national Diet, the Ministry of Local Affairs indicated that the 
financial situation of the local public sector was becoming increasingly inflexible 
(Jichishô 1999: 28).
The particular situation of metropolitan areas and urban 
prefectures
The situation described above is much more problematic in the case of metropolitan 
areas and urban prefectures, especially Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, and Kanagawa. 
These metropolitan entities faced acute financial difficulties in the 1990s because 
of a steep loss of revenues, which derive principally from taxes, and an increase 
in their mandatory expenditures.
In 1998, a special law consisting of measures intended to strengthen the finan-
cial reconstruction of the Japanese local public sector was enacted, with the aim 
of discouraging the issuance of local bonds. Deficits were foreseen in the budgets 
of the main urban prefectures (for instance, 1 trillion yen for Tokyo, 30 billion for 
Kanagawa and Aichi, and 17 billion for Osaka).
This perilous financial situation can be explained first by the fact that these 
metropolitan areas are more dependent on business taxes than any other Japanese 
prefectures. Accordingly, the percentage of the total tax revenues of metropolitan 
prefectures derived from taxes on businesses is almost double that of any other 
prefecture (20 percent and 11 percent respectively). Consequently these metro-
politan communities have faced a tougher decrease of their own revenues after 
Table 4.3 Ratio of mandatory burden borne by Japanese local communities
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the beginning of the economic recession. Tokyo and Osaka were the most affected 
by these decreases. For instance Tokyo lost 1 trillion yen in tax revenues between 
1989 and 1998 and Osaka lost close to 600 billion during the same time period.
Primarily in the case of Osaka and Kanagawa, mandatory expenses and 
expenses for infrastructure maintenance represent the major portion of the total 
expenditures of these prefectures. In 1997, in the four main prefectures 73 percent 
of their revenues went to these two types of expenditure, compared with 59.5 
percent for all the other prefectures.
Consequently, the mandatory burden rate of the metropolitan prefectures is 
unfavorable, or even negative in the case of Osaka and Kanagawa (112 and 106 
percent, respectively, in 1997). This situation explains the necessity of the 1998 
law on financial reconstruction of Japanese local communities.
Structural causes of financial problems in the Japanese local 
public sector
There were a number of reasons for these dire financial difficulties. In the late 
1990s, the press reported frequently on the danger of local communities going 
bankrupt (Pons 1998; Satô 1998). The decrease in revenues from business taxes 
was generally viewed in the framework of the Tokyo or Osaka metropolis (Aoyama 
1998). In addition, the mass media claimed that the growth of the bond repayment 
requirements was a consequence of the huge debt of the Japanese local public 
sector, emphasizing the point that under such circumstances municipalities and 
prefectures had no ability to contribute to national plans to restore the economy 
(Shimizu, Tani, and Toyofuku 1998). For this crisis the media blamed the irrational 
behavior of the “bubble” period (1985–90), which was characterized by many 
overblown infrastructure projects (Pons 1998). Many local communities did not 
fully understand the level of financial risk involved in these projects. In order 
to fully understand the reasons that led the Japanese local public sector to the 
brink of bankruptcy, however, it is necessary to examine the underlying structural 
causes (Kanazawa 1999).
Transformation of intergovernmental relationships
During the 1980s, sweeping changes occurred in the redistribution of public 
services and activities between the national and local government levels. In 1983, 
the committee of financial adjustment, appointed by the government of Nakasone 
Yasuhiro, published a report focusing on two slogans: “from public to private 
sector” and “from national state to local public sector,” both of which were 
linked to privatization and decentralization policies. Following the findings of 
the committee report, a transfer of administrative activities from the state to local 
communities took place over the next several years. For example, under a law 
passed in 1990, municipalities were given control of social and welfare services. 
However, this shift in authority was not accompanied by an equivalent transfer 
of revenues.
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Moreover, after introducing a set of fiscal measures, including the introduction 
of value added tax (VAT) and its subsequent rate increase, as well as the aboli-
tion of tax exemptions for some categories of residents, such as pensioners, the 
national government encountered opposition from the public in the 1990s and a 
decrease in consumption in 1997–8. Consequently the government changed its 
course and decreased income-tax rates. Local communities were then obliged to 
carry out the same policies and the residents’ tax rates were thus reduced by a 
decision of the national government. Naturally, this move reduced revenues in the 
Japanese local public sector.
In addition, in the mid-1980s, the state government was focused on the reform of 
public finances on a national level and sharply reduced the funds to be transferred 
from the national budget to local ones (treasury disbursements). At that time, with 
economic growth generating a large gain in revenues, local communities could 
cope with such a decrease, but with the recession in the 1990s, as described above, 
they faced a loss of corporate tax revenues and the national government resisted 
increasing its funding to compensate for the shortfall.
In fact, beginning in the mid-1980s, the national government failed to secure 
stable financial revenues for prefectures and municipalities. Moreover, the state 
transferred to local communities the responsibility for more public services, 
which resulted in a heavier financial burden. This situation continued throughout 
the 1990s.
The impact of a national policy of economic regulation
Because they represent two-thirds of public expenditures, Japanese local 
governments are strongly affected by national economic policies. After the oil 
shock of the 1970s, during the 1980s and 1990s the national government tried to 
solve the problem of the rigidity of local public finances. To do so, it advocated 
reducing personnel expenses by cutting wages, freezing the number of civil 
servants, and contracting with private companies to realize public services more 
efficiently. On the other hand, public-works expenditures, considered flexible, 
were encouraged. Paralleling this, the question of public debt and the role of the 
public sector in the economy became an important issue. In relation to this policy 
of public-sector withdrawal accompanying privatization, and with the transfer of 
competencies following decentralization, the national government called on the 
local governments to intervene still further.
In this context, two important international events occurred. First, in 1985, 
with the Plaza Agreement, made between United States and Japan, the Japanese 
government had to accept a reevaluation of the yen. After the endaka (rise of the 
yen), the Japanese economy faced a small recession, which the national govern-
ment tried to combat with an economic-revival policy using construction of public 
works, such as roads and bridges, as a tool.
In 1989, under pressure from the American government, which sought to lower 
its trade deficit with Japan, the Japanese government agreed to invest over a 10-
year period the amount of 630 trillion yen in public works to revive the Japanese 
domestic market. In both cases, the national government asked local communities 
Financial stress in the Japanese local public sector in the 1990s 89
to implement these policies. But whereas, during the euphoric period of the bubble, 
prefectures and municipalities had the financial resources to realize infrastructure 
projects, after the collapse of the bubble and a decrease in revenues, it was much 
more difficult for these communities to meet the central government’s request.
Finally, in the early 1990s, public works became the cornerstone of the “daily 
life promotion plan” promulgated by the Miyazawa Kei-ichi government. The 
objectives of these measures were foremost to catch up with other industrialized 
nations in terms of social and cultural infrastructure, and also to serve as counter-
measures against the economic crisis. In order to achieve these goals the national 
government chose to facilitate the approval of the issuance of local public bonds 
in the beginning of the 1990s, with the above-mentioned results. In spite of the 
remarkable size of the request from the central government, every local commu-
nity was pleased to apply to the public works plan as all of them had infrastructure 
projects. It is clear that the financial costs were excessive, and this generated the 
financial crisis in the Japanese local public sector at the end of the 1990s.
The failure of financial measures
An examination of the local public sector during the last two decades reveals 
that it failed to adopt a viable policy of financial stability. Normally, during a 
growth period, local government focuses on loan repayments to reduce its debt, 
on augmenting its savings funds, and on trying to limit increasing its expenditures. 
During a recession, loan issuance should be restricted and local governments must 
use savings funds to avoid a too sharp decrease in expenditure so that the highest 
quality of public services is maintained. Obviously, the increase in public-works 
expenses did not permit the Japanese local governments to follow this course of 
action.
In addition, during 1996–7, the government of Hashimoto Ryûtarô made a 
grave error in timing in the implementation of its financial reconstruction policy. 
Expecting that economic growth would hold steady after the recovery of 1996 
and focusing on the reduction of the public debt, the national government imple-
mented a set of measures (an increase in VAT, and a strong retrenchment in public 
expenditures) that had a very negative impact on consumption, breaking the small 
wave of growth and leading the Japanese economy into its worst recession since 
World War II.
In spite of statements issued by the national government, public-works 
expenditures have not been so flexible in the medium or long term. There are 
two main reasons for this, the first being the importance of the public-works sec-
tor in the Japanese economy – accounting for 10.5 percent of employment and 
18.5 percent of GNP in 1996, compared with only 7.1 percent and 11.4 percent, 
respectively, for the other member countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development 1998). As a consequence, Japan’s national government tended 
in the 1990s to favor this sector when it wanted to implement an anti-recession 
policy and revive domestic demand, reducing the trade surplus, which was the 
primary point of contention in its relationship with the United States.
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Second, after many years of large public-works expenditures, Japan has now 
a significant stock of public infrastructure that must be kept in repair – a major 
task in a country like Japan, which is constantly subjected to earthquakes and 
typhoons. The high level of these maintenance costs obliges Japanese local com-
munities to allocate a large part of their expenses to the upkeep of public infra-
structure. It is also clear that, in preparing their plans to construct and manage 
public works, local governments competed to attract the best possible projects for 
public infrastructure (the longest bridges, for example), with the inevitable result 
of overstating their public-works expenses.
Last, a most shameful reason could be added to the two presented above, 
which is financial contributions to political parties. The public-works companies 
are, in fact, the main legal financing sources for the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) (Jimintô) which receives more than half of these subsidies and has run 
the national government since the end of World War II (Ribault, 1998) (see also 
Chapter 8).
Both the national government and private companies failed to fully appreciate 
the nature of the crisis following the collapse of the bubble. Viewing it as a tempo-
rary rather than a structural phenomenon, the government focused on Keynesian 
economic-revival policies that emphasized public works. This neglect at the out-
set to implement a deep structural reform of the Japanese economy resulted in the 
inefficacy of the revival plans.
Changes in the relationships between local governments and 
the private sector
During the 1980s and 1990s, in addition to projects dedicated to land-use planning, 
the government enacted several laws on urban development as discussed in the 
preceding chapters, which led to an evolution of the relationship between local 
governments and private companies. Each law established specific zones devoted 
to urban, coastline, or leisure development projects. Prefectures and municipalities 
had to establish basic infrastructures in order to facilitate investment by private 
companies in the zones created by these new laws.
Private companies, as a condition for participating in these projects, asked 
local governments to share the risk involved in the projects. Local governments 
have been involved extensively in the management of these projects – which were 
by and large impressive – collaborating with the private sector in the form of a 
public–private company. In these companies, capital is shared with local com-
munities and the private sector participates in the project. Relationships between 
private companies and the local public sector became deeper. The objective was 
to give more power to the private sector, which was considered a more efficient 
manager, with the local governments in the simple role of project coordinator.
During the bubble period, companies focused on the maximization of their 
profits by developing only speculative projects. Local governments participated in 
these projects through urban planning and building public infrastructures. Acting 
on indications by private companies, who expected to reap large profits in these 
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ventures, prefectures and municipalities developed inflated public-works projects, 
feeding the speculation.
As the costs of these projects were high and as local governments created them 
in partnership with the private sector, it was impossible to stop this operation. 
Only during the final days, facing major financial problems, did local govern-
ments admit that they had to bring a halt to the grand projects, which by this time 
had generated huge deficits.
The private companies had neither made reliable studies of the probability 
of the risks involved nor prepared serious cost–benefit analyses, as there was a 
public guarantor. For their estimates, they had merely selected the most optimis-
tic hypothesis based on the euphoric period that Japan had been experiencing 
since the mid-1980s. Additionally, the multiplication of many similar competing 
projects had not been taken into account. Thus, most of the golf courses or amuse-
ment parks that were built had to cope with severe competition and a steep drop 
in attendance at the end of the 1990s.
Policies for the restoration of local public finances
To succeed in putting local public finances on a sound footing, three main 
means were suggested by the Ministry of General Affairs: controlling expenses 
by decreasing wages, reducing personnel through attrition, and, last, shrinking 
bonuses. Municipalities and prefectures, which were affected by the Financial 
Reconstruction Law of 1998, received a loan in order to adjust their debt in 1999. 
As a corollary, they were audited more closely by the national government, which 
required them to decrease their operating expenses and limit their issuance of 
bonds.
Although the Ministry of General Affairs recommended that expenditures on 
public works be restricted because of the high level of debt carried by local gov-
ernments, this point of view ran counter to the national government’s desire to 
buttress the national economy at the end of the 1990s.
Since Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirô’s arrival power in 2001, a new direc-
tion aimed at limiting public-works spending has taken shape. The goal is to 
reduce by half the expenses in this field in the local budgets. This new policy faces 
resistance from the LDP, as well as from the strong construction and public-works 
lobby.
In April 2000, a new law designed to enforce decentralization was enacted as 
discussed by Ishida yorifusa in Chapter 2. Its main features were a new distribu-
tion of functions between the state and local communities and a reform of local 
finances with the goal of guaranteeing local revenues. This new law was based on 
the ideas of the Committee for the Promotion of Decentralization (chihô bunken 
suishin iinkai), which holds that it is necessary to equal relationships between 
central and local governments. The aim was to turn Japan into a decentralized 
state.
In terms of powers, the law stipulated two categories of local activities: auton-
omous activities and activities governed by law. The distribution of activities is 
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clearly defined for cities that manage public services for the local population. The 
role of the prefectures is to provide support to cities and to supervise them; this 
role was formerly the responsibility of ministries. Clearly, with an incorporation 
of the proposals by the committee, the powers of local communities increased.
Parallel to this new law, the central administration created “super ministries” 
(Nikkei 1999). Thus the Ministry of Local Affairs (Jichishô) was merged with the 
Ministry of General Affairs together with the Postal Ministry and the Ministry of 
General Affairs and Administrative Coordination. This move has been considered, 
by experts, as promoting the subordination of prefectures to the national govern-
ment rather than encouraging the initially hoped-for cooperation.
Compared with other developed countries, the share of revenues raised 
by Japanese local government taxes is very low and the rate of funding from 
national government grants is very high (Aoki 2001: 105). The Committee for 
the Promotion of Decentralization in its reports asked the state to reinforce the 
percentage of revenues coming from local communities in the total of the finan-
cial resources of local communities. The 2000 law on decentralization proposed 
several changes in local finances. Probably the most notable was the end of 
the system of authorization required for local communities to create new taxes 
(“extra-legal” taxes). According to the law, the prefectural governor must provide 
prior agreement before a city can establish a new tax. As will be discussed below, 
however, while numerous local communities seized this opportunity, new taxes 
did not offer the expected panacea. In addition, the 2000 law authorized prefec-
tures and municipalities to abolish the ceiling on the resident tax, but few city 
governments decided to increase this tax for fear of alienating their voters.
In summary, compared with the wide range of new activities assumed by local 
communities, there was a clear lack of guaranteed stable and steady revenues. 
At the beginning of the 2000s, the national government, experiencing financial 
difficulties – the public debt hovered at 150 percent of GNP with the national 
budget financed 40 percent by bonds – attempted to heavily reduce fund transfers 
to municipalities and prefectures.
Furthermore, in the early 2000s, the Ministry of General Affairs was convinced 
of the need to reform the financial organization and structure of the local public 
sector in order to stabilize financial resources, especially local taxes and the global 
grant. One of the solutions coming from the ministry was to give a part of the 
revenues deriving from VAT to local communities. Once again, other ministries, 
and especially the Ministry of Finance, did not universally favor steps of this 
kind, which did not really support the idea of local financial autonomy (Okurasho 
1999). It is clear that any changes of the local taxes can be implemented only 
when economic growth is considered sound and stable.
For the government and financial circles, the goal of decentralization has been 
to improve the efficiency of management and organization of local communities. 
The 2000 law is part of a vast movement of administrative reform that has accom-
panied the merger of municipalities and is not connected per se with a real policy 
of decentralization. This idea of a modestly supportive state existed in Japanese 
national policy as far back as the 1980s. In the early 2000s, the issue of the share 
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of the public sector versus that of local governments in the national economy still 
remains to be clearly defined.
Responses of local communities to financial problems
Local communities have reacted to these financial stresses in a number of ways. 
One is a reduction in spending. As a result of pressure by the national government 
on prefectures and municipalities to lower personnel expenses, in the early 2000s, 
several prefectures implemented plans to cut their workforce. For example, Tottori 
prefecture decided to reduce the salaries and bonuses of 11,500 staff members 
by 5 percent over three years, starting in April 2002. The Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government (TMG) reduced the salaries of its employees by 4 percent over two 
years, beginning in April 2000. Nineteen other prefectures followed the same 
model but, as demonstrated by the case of Kanagawa, this did not solve the 
financial issues.
In 1999, the national government urged the Kanagawa prefectural government 
to reduce its spending on personnel, which represented 49 percent of its budget. 
But out of the total amount accounting for employee expenses, the most important 
part is not really controlled by the prefectural government. In fact, while the local 
government is able to determine the salaries of a prefecture’s civil servants, this 
segment represents only 6.6 percent of the total amount, which, of course, limits 
the capacity to dramatically reduce operating expenses by decreasing personnel 
expenses. It is clear that the policy proposed by the national government is not a 
solution that seriously addresses the predicament of the local public sector.
Kanagawa prefecture was one of the local governments that welcomed the 
financial reconstruction plan of 1998. A contingency of receiving funds through 
this loan was that the prefecture had to reduce its personnel expenditure. Prefectural 
authorities set as a goal for the fiscal year 1998–9 a decrease in operating expenses 
to 60 billion yen. These would be achieved through a decrease of 10 percent in the 
bonuses for managers, a reduction in internal management costs, and the reduction 
of all public-service activities. Kanagawa prefecture set three main “10-percent” 
objectives: limiting the issuance of loans to 10 percent of the amount of revenues, 
reducing 10 percent of the employees working in the governor’s cabinet, and 
reducing the number of departments in the prefecture’s main office by 10 percent 
over five years. Moreover, in 1999, the independent expenditures (not under the 
control of the national government) decreased by 30 percent. Finally, by March 
2000, work and retirement bonuses were reduced to one-quarter, the personnel 
for general activities was reduced by 8 percent, and management personnel was 
reduced by 15 and 30 percent, depending on the department.
Osaka prefecture also faces a very difficult situation in terms of its local tax 
revenues. It began fiscal year 2002 with less than 1.25 billion yen in tax rev-
enues, which failed to achieve the target outlined in its administrative and finan-
cial reform plan produced under pressure from the central government. Osaka 
prefecture claimed that by implementing the reform plan, including large-scale 
restructuring of its administrative activities, it would be able to avoid incurring 
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deficits so high that it would force the central government to take charge of its 
finances. Nevertheless the revenue shortfall meant that it was much more difficult 
to implement the plan. With debts totaling about 44 billion yen, Osaka feared a 
government takeover of its finances at the end of the fiscal year 2006. It decided 
to draw up a long-term package of reforms, including laying off 3,000 employees, 
curtailing spending on construction projects by 10 percent, and conducting annual 
reviews of fiscal policy. To make matters worse, the regional economy has suf-
fered additional setbacks, with scores of firms going out of business. In the next 
few years, corporate tax revenues are expected to be even lower than in 2001.
Going beyond salary reductions, local communities decided to reduce general 
spending and especially that related to autonomous activities. The total local 
budget decreased 1.8 percent between 2001 and 2002, and autonomous spending 
by 10 percent, while a reduction in staff of 12,000 local civil servants occurred. 
Spending reductions took place mainly in the area of public works. This is a sub-
stantial reform that affects all projects (airports, Shinkansen (bullet train) lines, 
dams, and so on). A majority of people (citizens and experts) agreed that trying to 
revive the economy by increasing spending for public works, as happened during 
the 1990s, had no effect except to allow Japan to reach record levels of public debt. 
The promotion of unnecessary public works stands accused of bearing primary 
responsibility for these debts. There is a strong movement in favor of transferring 
public-works spending from rural areas to large cities where most inhabitants are 
located, running the risk of an increased population drain from those cities.
The second way local communities react to financial stress is by creating 
new local taxes. With the 2000 law on decentralization that allowed prefectures 
and municipalities to establish new taxes, several communities have followed a 
policy of guaranteeing financial resources and focused on new taxes affecting 
large industries. Local communities that avoid soliciting private companies are 
less numerous; indeed, those that create such new taxes do so with the approval 
of residents for specific purposes, such as environmental protection or health care 
(Nakanishi Harufumi 2000). The trend toward levying taxes affecting private 
companies is seen as addressing the inequities in the existing system that enables 
two-thirds of all corporations to escape paying prefectural taxes.
In any case, companies ask that corporate tax increases be followed by efforts 
from local communities to reduce their expenses. Some of these new taxes 
include Yokohama’s tax on betting (horse racing, pachinko parlors, and so on); 
Mie prefecture’s tax on industrial waste; the Tokyo district Minato-ku’s tax on 
cigarette vending machines; and Yamanashi prefecture’s road tax. Certain taxes 
have a dual goal: hence Suginami-ku obliges supermarket customers to pay 5 yen 
for every plastic shopping bag they use. In addition to an increase in revenues, this 
tax also aims to reduce the volume of environmental waste.
But no doubt the most symptomatic example of the creation of new taxes, 
and the negative reactions they arouse, has been the bank tax that Tokyo’s gov-
ernor, Ishihara Shintaro, established in April 2000. This tax applies to financial 
institutions with a capital accumulation in excess of 5 billion yen and that are 
headquartered in Tokyo. Those institutions with deficits (not uncommon because 
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the repayment of bad loans by Japanese companies has been affected by the 
economic crisis) are exempt from the corporate tax. It is clear that this new tax 
had both a financial objective (to increase revenues) and a political one (banks 
are considered responsible for the economic crisis of the 1990s). Twenty-one 
banks reacted by bringing the matter to court in October 2000, claiming that the 
tax was inequitable. The Japanese government supported the legal case, as the 
tax was considered risky for the country’s already troubled financial system. On 
March 26, 2002, judges ruled that the new tax should be abolished because it went 
against local taxation laws. The decision explained that for the creation of new 
taxes the difference between the amount of tax levied and the profit earned by the 
private companies must be significant; and for the judges in the bank case it was 
too small to be justifiable.
This ruling shows that the principle of fiscal autonomy written into the decen-
tralization law of 2000 is more a matter of theory than fact. In April 2002, the 
Ministry of General Affairs, which had partial responsibility for the management 
of decentralization along with local communities, cautioned cities against intro-
ducing taxes other than those provided for by national law. In summary, local 
communities cannot expect new taxes to be the solution to their financial prob-
lems. From a macroeconomic perspective, increasing taxes will have a purely 
negative impact on personal consumption and investment by corporations during 
times when the growth rate of the country is expected to be weak over a period 
of several years.
Recent actions support the position that, confronted with the financial crisis of 
local communities, the national government must help the local fiscal system to 
evolve. Beginning in April 2004, prefectures were permitted to increase taxes on 
corporations by 20 percent (up from 10 percent) over the rate fixed by the national 
government. The Committee for the Control of Public Finance (Jimintô zeisei 
chôsakai) of the LDP has argued that this is an opportunity to authorize prefec-
tures to establish taxes for companies with deficits, which now escape corporate 
taxation.
Recommendations by scholars
A number of economics scholars have weighed in on the 2000 decentralization 
law. The Committee for the Promotion of Decentralization has recommended that 
financial relationships between national and local governments be founded on the 
principle that expenditures must be linked to the realization of public services 
by local communities. The lack of transparency in the redistribution of powers 
between national and local levels must be addressed. Clarification of the roles 
of each should enable local governments to secure funding commensurate with 
expenses in the event that they undertake an activity (for education, police, or 
infrastructure) normally assumed at the national level. After this first step, a real 
guarantee of local fiscal resources must be established through the creation of a 
taxation system that provides stable revenues to prefectures and municipalities 
(Chihô bunken suishin iinkai 1997).
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Economists for the most part believe that the guarantee of local resources 
has not been considered by the 2000 law. For a true strategy of decentralization 
to be implemented, it must first protect independent activities and provide real 
autonomous power to local communities (Kanazawa 2000). But under the law as 
it stands, there are still 275 functions that remain delegated. Judicial rulings that 
inhibit the levying of new taxes, as seen above, demonstrate clearly that local 
financial autonomy continues to be an illusion.
Experts recommend stabilizing local revenues and transfers of funds from the 
state. As was seen during the 1980s and 1990s, and with the 2000 law on decen-
tralization, the national government transferred to local governments a part of its 
area of responsibility, particularly in the domain of social welfare, but this was not 
accompanied by an increase in local financial resources, leading to a too-heavy 
local expense burden in recent years. This problem must be resolved by enlarging 
the local tax base. To do so, it will be necessary to completely reform the structure 
whereby national and local tax revenues – which often have the same base – are 
distributed. Presently, as noted earlier in this essay, revenues are distributed two-
thirds at the national level and one-third at the local level. To guarantee stable 
financial resources for prefectures and municipalities, the consumption and resi-
dential tax base must be enlarged, with the aim of increasing the share received 
by local governments (Jinno 1998). If the resident tax rate were to be increased by 
10 percent, for example, local communities would raise 11 trillion additional yen 
and would receive nearly 61 percent of the income tax. Meanwhile, the national 
resident tax must be reduced in the same proportion, as the objective is not to 
increase the level of taxation, but to transfer resources from the national budget 
to local budgets by strengthening the financial autonomy of local governments. 
The goal, in fact, is to increase local resources from local taxes and reduce funds 
transferred from the national budget, especially Treasury disbursements and the 
global grant, thereby reinforcing local autonomy.
The creation of extra-legal taxes is intended to give independent revenues 
to local communities. Four main reasons favor reforming the tax system. The 
first is that fluctuations in the economy generate instability in terms of financial 
resources. The creation of new taxes based on more appropriate standards would 
provide a more stable income to cities and prefectures. A second reason is that 
prefectures provide public services that are used by some corporations that do not 
pay a local tax. A new tax could establish greater parity between the taxes paid 
by corporations and the benefits they receive. This could lead to a more equal 
distribution of costs, and will avoid limiting the development of new areas that 
benefit the economy in general. A final reason is that the delay in reviving the 
economy increases the unequal development among local communities.
Economists do not conceal the fact that these taxes (outside the standards) are 
not without problems. Among the concerns are the disparity among the number 
and amount of taxes paid, which vary according to the type of corporation or activ-
ity; the dissatisfaction of corporations that have not previously paid such taxes; 
and the impediment to start-ups that are not financially sound enough to pay taxes 
quickly. According to Jinno Naohiko of Tokyo University, these new taxes need 
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to have a clear objective in order to be accepted by the population. After the initial 
boom, local communities understood that new taxes should be approved by the 
Ministry of General Affairs and by local residents. While residents are typically 
reluctant to permit prefectures and municipalities to raise taxes during an economic 
crisis, as seen previously, the creation of new taxes is ultimately accepted by local 
communities. For example, in the late 1990s, Kanagawa prefecture proposed an 
environmental tax as well as a tax for the treatment of wastewater.
Experts in local public finance believe that it is actually the lack of financial 
autonomy that has led to local financial problems. Under the influence of the 
national government, during the 1990s municipalities and prefectures have con-
ducted activities that generated a huge amount of debt, and they are now obliged 
to reduce their personnel and curtail some public services under pressure by vari-
ous ministries. It is thus necessary to strengthen the independent decision-making 
powers of the local governments to truly resolve this crisis (Kanazawa 1998). 
Financial experts also believe that, with fiscal autonomy, local governments could 
have more responsibility and meet the demands of their residents (Nakanishi 
Hiroyuki 2000). Each prefecture and municipality would be able to respect more 
closely the needs of its population and develop its own particular public services. 
In so doing, local governments would no longer be able to shift responsibility for 
their actions onto the national government, but would have to assume the manage-
ment of their own affairs, resulting in their avoiding collaboration on projects 
deemed too high a financial risk.
The question of financial relations between the state and local communities 
is the one that currently generates the most discussion. The existing system of 
funding should be reformed by basing it on a clear distribution of activities and 
a respect for local autonomy. The volume of installments by the Treasury has 
in fact decreased with the new distribution of areas of competencies according 
to the 2000 decentralization law. The goal is to eliminate funding that is tied 
to subordinate relationships between national ministries and local communities. 
But this reduction in subvention should be accompanied by an equivalent rise in 
independent financial resources, which is not the case under the new 2000 law.
The main function of the second main fund transfer, the global grant, is to 
adjust the gap in revenue between the state and prefectures and municipalities 
mentioned above. The mode of calculation and the split of transfer of funds 
among local communities are extremely complex and subject to criticism. This 
system of adjustment aims to provide all local communities with a “national mini-
mum” (a minimum administrative standard that is applied throughout the entire 
country), funded by the national government (Aoki 2001). Because of the national 
government’s precarious financial situation, however, it chose to fund this trans-
fer not through the global grant but by loans, part of which must be repaid by 
local communities. This in turn contributes to an increase in local debt, as seen 
in the first section of this essay. In the 1990s the Ministry of Finance attempted 
by all possible means to reduce the amount of the global grant. According to 
the mass media and public opinion local cities have wasted public monies with 
ill-conceived public works. Faced with budget deficits (in the early 2000s, the 
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national budget was financed 40 percent by public bonds and the budget deficit 
reached 7.4 percent of GNP in 2003), the Ministry of Finance started a publicity 
campaign linking the increase in the deficit to this irresponsible behavior, which 
necessitated a reduction in funding from the national government. One of the 
proposed solutions has been to encourage the merging of villages and small cit-
ies, which would permit a more efficient management of rural areas, as well as 
reduce the number of local communities receiving a transfer of national funds. 
However, the disbursement of the global grant, which is controlled by the national 
government, appears to be trapped in a power play between different ministries. 
Transparency in the process of deciding who gets what part of the funding needs 
to be improved so that all local communities are able to understand the process 
and approve of it. In short, Japanese local public finances, and more particularly 
their coordination, are poised for change.
Conclusion
The dire financial situation of the Japanese local public sector necessitates 
important structural changes. These changes imply that the relationship of 
subordination between central government and local levels disappears in 
favor of intergovernmental relationships based on equity between the partners. 
Policies that reinforce an overly strong dependency of local communities on 
the national government carry serious risks of precipitating a financial crisis. 
The implementation of structural reforms will allow for the creation of equal 
partnerships between central and local levels.
While it is clear that it is a principal means of financial restoration at a national 
as well as local level, the most recent decentralization law, of 2000, seems not 
to follow this direction, and financial autonomy of the local public sector is 
still lacking. This is a missed opportunity to establish a new system of relations 
between the state and local communities. The private commercial sector and the 
government are attempting to move Japan toward only modest state support and 
encourage local communities to follow this example of offering a minimum of 
public services. Municipalities and prefectures must manage this governmental 
pressure in parallel with a broadening of their powers but must also address an 
aging population, which increases the need for social spending. The most suc-
cessful solution to this crisis might be to increase popular involvement in local 
financial management. A local referendum should be used to decide whether or not 
new services or new taxes should be accepted. Residents should have the right to 
decide for themselves the conditions under which public services should operate, 
as they are the main beneficiaries of these services. Such a move would enhance 
the legitimacy of actions taken by local communities and allow a better adaptation 
of local public services to the evolution of the future needs of the society.
Note
 1 In 2004, the Japanese local public sector included 47 prefectures and 2,927 
municipalities, which were broken down into 712 cities (shi) 1,734 towns (chô), and 
Financial stress in the Japanese local public sector in the 1990s 99
481 villages (son) (see Schebath 2000: 117–28 for a discussion of the structure of the 
Japanese local public sector).
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5 Centralization, urban planning 
governance, and citizen 
participation in Japan
André Sorensen
Many observers agree that Japanese society at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century is at a major turning point. During the 1990s, economic stagnation 
combined with apparent political gridlock to produce what is widely described as 
the collapse of the “1955 system” of developmental state collusion between the 
long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the national bureaucracy, and big 
business, which built the Japanese economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s and 
transformed Japan into a high-technology and manufacturing-based economic 
superpower in the 1970s and 1980s (Garon and Mochizuki 1993; Iida 1994; 
Pempel 1998) (see also Chapters 1 and 8 by Hein and Pelletier in this volume). 
Unfortunately, during the 1990s, solutions were found neither for the political 
impasse this created nor for the economic doldrums stemming from the collapse 
of the late 1980s asset-inflation bubble, giving rise to the common description of 
the 1990s as a “lost decade” for Japan with regard to failed efforts at economic 
reconstruction and political reform.
For urban governance, city planning, and community development, however, 
the 1990s are just as widely seen as a time of dramatic transformation in Japan, 
with a veritable paradigm shift in planning practice and the development of local 
democracy (Watanabe 2000). A key aspect of this transformation is the emer-
gence of new patterns of citizen engagement in local environmental governance, 
of which machizukuri movements are a prominent and widespread example (see 
Chapter 6 by Watanabe Shun-ichi in this volume). While a wide variety of local 
community-development related activities are now referred to as machizukuri, 
the term is used here to refer to participatory community-based efforts to improve 
local environments. The decentralization of central government functions to local 
governments, including responsibility for city planning, is seen as an important 
part of that process (Chihô bunken suishin iinkai 1997; Kobayashi 1999).
Decentralization and the shift to greater citizen engagement in local environ-
mental governance in Japan parallel similar changes in many other countries 
around the world. The worldwide trend toward the decentralization of powers from 
national to provincial and local governments, the international wave of democrati-
zation since the 1970s, and increased aspirations of civil society organizations for 
environmental policy roles have all led to increased interest in local governance 
(Stren 2002). Some have argued that these shifts are also closely associated with 
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globalization, as increased mobility of investment and greater international trade 
flows weaken the policy autonomy of individual nation-states at the same time as 
increased competition for mobile investment heightens the competition between 
cities (Castells 1997; Low et al. 2000: 281–307). With the global spread of the 
idea of urban sustainability as a dominant conceptual framework for urban policy, 
one of the major areas of concern is urban planning and local environmental gov-
ernance. This is reflected in the Local Agenda 21 program, initiated at the 1992 
Rio Earth Summit, which envisions local governments, communities, and citizens 
as the key actors in efforts to achieve greater environmental sustainability (Sitarz 
1993; United Nations Department of Public Information 1993; Low et al. 2000). 
City planning and local environmental management are thus a key focus of chang-
ing governance structures, lying as they do at the intersection of national economic 
interests with the hopes and aspirations of local communities for healthy, safe, and 
congenial living environments. As the famous Spanish theorists Jordi Borja and 
Manuell Castells (1997) put it, the major question facing us at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century is: How do cities, citizens, and local governments become the 
primary actors in shaping their destiny in the new world economy?
It is clear that the division of responsibilities and powers between local and 
national and between state and citizens is undergoing a period of change, renego-
tiation, and reconceptualization. Such changes are occurring in countries around 
the world, not least in Japan. These changes present opportunities for understand-
ing relationships old and new, as old certainties are questioned and new formula-
tions required. The intent of the following discussion is to take advantage of this 
moment, when many of the old arrangements are being questioned, to examine 
Japanese planning culture – defined here as the set of institutional arrangements 
and shared understandings about the appropriate roles and meanings of state, 
market, and society in urban management. Japan’s particular trajectory of urban 
governance, its highly centralized system of urban planning, and its distinctive 
relationships between state, market, and society provide a valuable opportunity to 
explore some of the implications of the nation’s twentieth-century history of cen-
tralized urban governance. The main issues to consider are the important long-term 
consequences of the high degree of centralization in Japanese urban governance; 
the role and contribution of civil society actors in relation to urban governance in 
the context of that centralization; the ways in which governance structures have 
worked to shape civil society; and, finally, the relationships between urban plan-
ning governance, civil society, and urban change in Japan.
The first section outlines the main characteristics of Japan’s centralized gov-
ernance system through an analysis of the local government and urban planning 
systems. Japan succeeded in creating one of the most highly centralized urban 
planning governance systems among the developed countries (see also Chapters 
1 and 2 by Hein and Pelletier, and Ishida respectively). As an extreme form of 
top-down, centralized control over urban management, the Japanese case pro-
vides useful insights into the advantages and disadvantages of the centralization 
of spatial management powers. The top-down view is only one side of the story, 
however, and without also examining the bottom-up perspective of the efforts 
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of communities to work together to enhance local environments, the picture of 
Japanese urban management would be incomplete. The second section examines 
the roles of communities in bottom-up management of urban space. In many 
respects local communities have shown continuing strength in Japan, while in 
other ways their autonomy and ability to effectively protect their local environ-
ment have been limited consistently by the policies of the central government. 
The resulting contradictory character of Japanese urban governance, with a weak 
role for civil society, but strong neighborhoods and social capital resources, is a 
central feature of Japanese urban life that this discussion tries to elucidate. The 
third section explores some of the consequences of Japan’s distinctive urban plan-
ning culture in order to gain perspective on recent moves to decentralize planning 
authority.
Centralized governance and planning
To understand the significance of recent attempts to decentralize Japanese urban 
governance, it is important first to understand the extraordinarily centralized 
system established when the modern Japanese state was created a century ago, 
and the enduring impacts that has had on governance structures. The origins of 
the centralized government system lie in the Meiji period (1868–1912); during 
the previous Tokugawa period (1600–1867), despite the fact that the shogun and 
his vassals controlled about one-third of the country directly, and the remaining 
feudal lords indirectly through a combination of alliances and coercion, the 
roughly 300 feudal domains were relatively independent, with their own taxes, 
laws, and military forces.
In the early to mid-1800s, the growing military threat of the Western pow-
ers led increasing numbers of the samurai ruling class to conclude that the old 
decentralized system of feudal governance under the shogun was insufficient to 
protect Japan from colonization. This combined with the resentment of Tokugawa 
power by the large domains of southwestern Japan to provide fuel for a successful 
rebellion, which overthrew the old system and created a new national government 
in Tokyo under Emperor Meiji. Established in the interest of national strength, 
the reforms of the first half of the Meiji period were virtually all geared toward 
the consolidation of power in the national government and weakening the inde-
pendence of local administrations. The need for a stronger national state, modern 
military technology, and national unity was clear enough that thoroughgoing 
reforms, undoing much of the former order and consolidating central power, 
were implemented rather swiftly and with relatively little opposition (Jansen and 
Rozman 1986).
The first decades of the Meiji period were thus a time of concentration of 
power in Tokyo, which saw the creation of new national institutions of gover-
nance based on central ministries, a national tax system, and a modern national 
army and navy composed of conscripts rather than the old samurai military class 
(Gluck 1987; Westney 1987; Hunter 1989). While a two-tier system of local 
government was established throughout the country, consisting of an upper level 
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of 47 prefectures (ken), and a lower level of municipalities (shi chô son), these 
had little legal, financial, or policy-making independence (see Chapters 1 and 2). 
Prefectural governors were appointed by the Home Ministry (Naimushô), usually 
from high-ranking ministry bureaucrats. Despite the fact that elected prefectural 
and municipal assemblies were established, the appointed governors retained the 
power to pass laws and set budgets, overriding the wishes of the local assembly if 
necessary. The local governance system created during the Meiji period was thus 
primarily a means of extending central government power over local areas, rather 
than an attempt to build democratic local governments.
Two aspects of the governance system established in the Meiji period, which 
continued in force until the establishment of a new constitution under the post-
World War II occupation, are particularly relevant to urban planning. The first 
is the extraordinary concentration of power in the Home Ministry, which was 
responsible for local government, the police, city planning, public health, and 
civil engineering, among other policy areas. Kurt Steiner suggests that during the 
Meiji period the Home Ministry “became an efficient bureaucracy, fulfilling their 
task with a jealous enthusiasm that prohibited the delegation of power to decide 
even the smallest details. It has justly been said that the establishment of the Home 
Ministry helps to account for the peculiarly centralized nature of Japanese govern-
ment and that local government in Japan cannot be understood without reference 
to this bureaucracy” (Steiner 1965: 26). While, as the prominent Japanese politi-
cal scientist Muramatsu Michio points out, there was considerable variation in 
actual practice, with some prefectural governors able to create a greater or lesser 
degree of maneuvering room for alternative policy approaches, the overall picture 
is one of effective central constraints on local autonomy (Muramatsu 1997; see 
also Reed 1986).
The second significant feature of the Meiji system concerned the legal arrange-
ments that permitted continued central influence over local governments even 
after governors had become directly elected officers under the postwar constitu-
tion. For example, the central government retained the exclusive authority to pass 
laws and regulations and to set tax rates. While local governments could enforce 
regulations set by the central government, they were given no authority to pass 
and enforce their own rules on even trivial matters (Steiner 1965: 50). Transfers 
of personnel from central ministries to top positions in prefectural and local 
governments are still routine and widespread today, allowing effective central 
supervision and quick dissemination of new policy approaches (Samuels 1983). 
Probably even more important in the long run was the system of “agency-del-
egated functions” (kikan inin jimu), which allowed central ministries to delegate 
specific tasks, such as public health measures, policing, and city planning, to pre-
fectural and municipal governments, while retaining exclusive authority to make 
policy decisions. When such functions were delegated to local governments, the 
governor, in the case of prefectures, and the mayor, in the case of municipalities, 
became the agent of the central ministry, and had no choice but to carry out min-
istry orders even if doing so directly countered the wishes of their own electorate. 
This system ensured central ministry constraints over local government planning 
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policy, and remained a powerful determinant of planning outcomes until city 
planning responsibility became officially a local government function (no longer 
a delegated function) in May 2000.
The highly centralized system of governance had an important impact on city 
planning. The first attempt by the national government to create a modern city 
planning system was the 1919 City Planning Law (toshi keikaku hô) and its accom-
panying Urban Building Law (shigaichi kenchiku butsu hô) discussed by Ishida 
yorifusa in Chapter 2. The only prior central government city planning legislation, 
the Tokyo Urban Area Improvement Ordinance (Tôkyô shiku kaisei jôrei) of 1889, 
had been concerned primarily with the improvement of the existing built-up area 
of Tokyo, and had been applied mainly to specific development or redevelopment 
projects. The 1919 legislation introduced land-use zoning, building controls, and 
a system for planning entire urban areas larger than individual municipalities. 
The fragmented nature of these municipalities was a strong argument in favor of 
planning at the national level to coordinate the creation of major infrastructure. 
The 1919 law remained the basic planning legislation for a half century, until it 
was replaced by the New City Planning Law of 1968 (shin toshi keikaku hô). The 
1919 law thus provided the planning framework for urban growth in the critical 
post-World War II period of rapid economic growth.
Ishida has argued that a further serious problem of the 1919 law was its strong 
centralization of planning authority (Ishida 1987: 114–15, and Chapter 2 in this 
volume). Whereas before 1919 there had been no national city planning legisla-
tion, and local governments had been free to carry out whatever local planning 
they could manage, with the passage of the new laws in 1919 national legisla-
tion took precedence. As with the Tokyo Urban Area Improvement Ordinance, 
all plans had to be approved by the Home Ministry, and annual city planning 
budgets were required to be authorized by the ministry in order to be eligible for 
central subsidies. The 1919 system in this way significantly extended the powers 
of central government bureaucrats over local city planning efforts. Furthermore, 
the national legislation imposed a single set of land-use zones and building 
regulations on the whole country, even though cities had quite different urban 
patterns and urban problems. Local governments were not permitted to modify 
the zoning system to make it more relevant to diverse local conditions (Sorensen 
2002: 118). The Japanese urban planning system before the major reforms of 
1968 was characterized by its high degree of centralization of power in national 
ministries, a weak financial base, and an orientation toward project planning and 
implementation rather than regulation of private development activity. The prewar 
planning system was well suited to the pursuit of national industrial and military 
growth, allowing effective central planning and development of the national ter-
ritory (Johnson 1986). Unfortunately, central government policies also led during 
World War II to national destruction as well as to an enormous loss of life, both of 
Japanese citizens and those of the countries Japan invaded.
There is no doubt that Japan was changed greatly by its defeat in 1945 and 
by the reforms carried out by the American-led occupation authorities who were 
determined to eliminate those aspects of the Japanese political system that had 
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allowed the development of totalitarianism and wartime aggression. Abolition of 
the military, the passage of a new constitution that declared the people sovereign 
and demoted the emperor to symbolic status without real power, the introduc-
tion of universal adult suffrage, and a sweeping land reform that redistributed 
farmland from landlords to their tenants were all major changes. Many of the 
reforms were adopted readily and willingly by the Japanese, who had seen their 
country impoverished, defeated, and stripped of its independence as a result of 
the government’s wartime policies (Dower 1999). As the American historian Gary 
Allinson has argued, however, there were significant continuities in Japanese gov-
ernance structures before and after the war. Those occupation reforms that had 
strong Japanese support both inside and outside government had lasting impact, 
while other reforms that lacked such support were either difficult to implement or 
reversed when the occupation ended (Allinson 1997).
In order to create a stronger, more independent level of local governments, the 
occupation insisted on directly elected prefectural and municipal chief executives 
and legislatures and abolished the formerly powerful Home Ministry. As shown by 
Ishida (see Chapter 2), the establishment of more independent local governments 
and a stronger local role in city planning was not a high priority for the Japanese 
government. This is perhaps understandable given the scale of reconstruction nec-
essary, and the extent of economic problems facing the country, but in practice, 
despite opposition reforms, local governments and the system of city planning 
remained tightly constrained by central government officials who worked hard to 
maintain their old dominance over local affairs. As Allinson explains:
Allied reformers underestimated the determination of former officials from 
the old Home Ministry who staffed the new (Local Autonomy) agency – men 
who never abandoned their desire to preserve every ounce of control over 
local affairs. Central officials sought control through three avenues: finance, 
duties, and personnel. They tried to keep local governments dependent by 
forcing them to rely on central government grants, rather than local resources, 
for their operating revenues. They subordinated local governments by requir-
ing them to carry out a wide range of duties mandated by the national govern-
ment, and they tried to subvert local autonomy by appointing incumbent and 
retired central government officials to the best administrative positions in 
cities and prefectures.
(Allinson 1997: 72)
Local government taxation powers were closely controlled by the central 
Ministry of Finance, and the central government continued to mandate a wide 
range of programs with what many local governments saw as inadequate financial 
compensation (see Chapter 4 by Alain Schebath in this volume). This issue is 
commonly referred to as the problem of “excess burdens” placed on local govern-
ments without sufficient compensation (Shindô 1984: 119). Financial constraints 
sharply limited local policy options. As local governments could only operate 
within the limits of nationally set legal frameworks, it was extremely difficult for 
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local governments to set their own agendas, particularly in the area of creating 
better planning regulations. These constraints became especially apparent during 
the 1970s when numerous progressive-controlled local administrations found that 
planning laws meant that they were unable to fulfill many of the election promises 
that had put them in office (Sorensen 2002: 230–43). Furthermore, many areas of 
activity, including policing, education, social welfare services, and city planning, 
were in fact merely delegated to local governments by the central government, 
which retained all policy-making authority. The “agency-delegated functions” 
system continued in effect, with responsibility for carrying out the delegated func-
tion consigned to a governor, in the case of a prefecture, or a mayor, in the case of 
a city. As before, the governor or mayor then automatically became responsible 
to the central ministry, not to his own electorate, in carrying out the delegated 
function.
After the war the main priority of the central government was industrial devel-
opment. Because there was such a clear necessity to recover from the destruction 
wrought by the conflict, the alliance of central government bureaucrats, the ruling 
LDP, and big business was given a free rein to pursue its development strategy. 
MIT political scientist Richard Samuels has called the period from the end of 
the war to the middle of the 1960s a “conservative’s paradise” in which there 
was an “unassailable consensus” on economic reconstruction and rapid growth 
(Samuels 1983: 168). During this period the Japanese government spent little 
on social overhead capital, instead devoting all available resources to facilitating 
rapid industrial growth. The emphasis on industrial growth meant that little effort 
was made to provide planning, infrastructure, housing, or even regulation of pri-
vately developed residential areas. Instead, the state built infrastructure essential 
for industrial development, such as an industrial water supply, ports and railways, 
highways, electrical generating capacity, and large-scale low-cost public hous-
ing projects (Morimura 1994). Most of the housing supply was left to market 
forces, constrained only by the weak zoning system and the building standards 
act first passed in 1919. For example, prior to major revisions made to the City 
Planning Law in 1968, landowners could subdivide lots and build as-of-right if 
they were in conformity with the land’s zoning and the building code, even if 
there were no sewers, local roads, schools, or parks. Since buildings could be 
constructed almost anywhere within commuting range of urban areas, there was 
a strong tendency toward scattered development wherever land was available, 
and the creation of unplanned urban districts which were severely deficient in 
basic infrastructure. Most urban areas developed as dense mixtures of industrial, 
commercial, and housing uses. This pattern of urban growth, combined with very 
weak pollution control laws, greatly contributed to the environmental crisis of 
the 1960s, as toxic pollution was concentrated near residential areas (see discus-
sion below). It is important to note that increasing protests against environmental 
destruction had a great impact on urban planning policy, including the passage of 
a new City Planning Law in 1968 (Calder 1988; Ishida 1987).
The 1968 law transferred the responsibility for preparing and enforcing urban 
land-use plans to local governments. The new system raised the hopes of local 
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governments and planners that they would now be able to catch up with infra-
structure shortfalls, control the location and standards of new development, and 
generally provide a better quality urban environment. Also, in the early 1970s 
those reform-minded local governments that had placed the improvement of the 
urban environment and respect for the needs of citizens at the top of their political 
agenda were still growing in strength and electoral success. Many progressive 
candidates won municipal elections on promises to improve local environments 
and provide the investment in social overhead capital that had been so lacking 
(Samuels 1983: 190; Krauss and Simcock 1980: 196).
There is no doubt that the 1968 City Planning Law represented a major change 
in terms of Japanese planning, and that local governments gained many more 
tools for local environmental management, and a much greater range of respon-
sibilities. In retrospect, however, the continuing domination of planning policy 
by central government ministries made it extremely difficult for the progressives 
to carry out their promises. Central control – through finances, the agency-del-
egated-functions system, and national planning law – continued. Local govern-
ments had no legal authority to create enforceable local bylaws that went beyond 
the national planning law. They still had no authority to regulate minimum plot 
sizes, restrict the subdivision of land into smaller pieces, or create locally specific 
zoning ordinances or development standards. When local ordinances did impose 
more stringent requirements on land developers, compliance could only be nego-
tiated on a voluntary basis (Sorensen 2002: 310–25). While the 1968 law did 
create the nation’s first system of development permits (kaihatsu kyoka), which 
imposed minimum infrastructure requirements for large-scale land development, 
projects smaller than 1,000 square meters were exempt, with the result that more 
and more development was carried out in small bits to avoid the regulations (Mori 
1998; Hebbert 1994). The tight control over planning regulations by the central 
government meant that local options were extremely limited, and urban sprawl 
continued to worsen (Hanayama 1986).
In response, many local governments created non-statutory “development 
manuals” (kaihatsu shidô yôkô) that provided for higher levels of infrastructure 
associated with land development than those mandated by law. These had no legal 
standing, but local governments used their control over the water supply and other 
municipal services to gain some leverage in persuading developers to provide 
greater infrastructure investments than required by the national law. The effective-
ness of these development manuals in preventing unserviced sprawl is unclear, 
but the vigorous efforts of the pro-development government headed by Nakasone 
Yasuhiro in the mid-1980s to abolish their use suggests that they were effective 
in some measure in increasing the power of local governments to regulate land-
development activity (Hebbert and Nakai 1988). It is also noteworthy that the 
priority given by the Nakasone government to abolishing the development manu-
als is a powerful indication of the importance of land development in the Japanese 
political economy. In his exhaustive examination of prefectural policy-making, 
Steven Reed finds no such attempts to revoke the many prefectural ordinances 
that imposed more stringent pollution control standards than those provided for 
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by national law (Reed 1986: 85). This episode suggests both that local govern-
ments were actively attempting to expand their range of planning tools and that 
the central government was equally determined to maintain its restrictions on 
local planning autonomy.
The evolution of urban planning policy since the wave of progressive local 
governments in the late 1960s that emerged in response to environmental con-
cerns can be told as a recurrent struggle between central and local government, 
with localities constantly pressing for more authority and central government 
consistently resisting significant decentralization of power (see Sorensen 2003). 
Whereas the increasing strength of opposition politicians in municipal and prefec-
tural politics combined with the growing power of anti-pollution movements to 
push central government toward the decentralization of planning power in 1968, 
and toward the passage of improved environmental regulations in the early 1970s, 
by the 1980s the LDP had regained a strong majority in the central government 
and worked hard to weaken local powers of development control. The catastrophic 
inflation in land prices of the 1980s, and the subsequent collapse of the investment 
bubble in the early 1990s, signaled the end of attempts to deregulate land develop-
ment and weaken local planning restrictions on it (Otake 1993). In 1989 a new 
Basic Land Law was passed and in 1992 a major revision of the City Planning Law 
granted greater municipal planning powers, and established a mandatory system 
of public consultation with local residents in preparing municipal master plans 
(Sorensen 2002: 300). During the first years of the twenty-first century the tide 
again seems to have turned against these moves toward decentralization of plan-
ning authority to municipal governments, with significant attempts by Koizumi 
Junichirô’s government to deregulate property development in order to encourage 
a land-development-led economic recovery (see Sorensen 2003).
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that the old patterns of governance 
continued in force is provided by the enormous increase in public-works 
spending during the 1990s. Justified as a measure designed to boost economic 
growth during a prolonged recession and expand domestic demand in response 
to foreign pressure over high trade surpluses, especially from the United States, 
economic stimulus took the form primarily of large-scale public-works projects. 
This, conveniently, was to the benefit of the LDP, which ensured that credit for 
public-works spending in its electoral districts was garnered by LDP members 
as evidence of their “pipeline” to the center. It also benefited the construction 
companies, who consistently were able to inflate profits through collusive bidding 
practices (Woodall 1992, 1996; MacCormack 1996). The enormous expenditure 
on these pork-barrel projects tended strongly to reinforce the old patterns of local 
subservience to central decision-making, as municipal governments scurried to 
Tokyo to gain their share of the spoils (Fukui and Fukai 1996). As shown by Alain 
Schebath (see Chapter 4), the huge public-works spending further reduced local 
autonomy by putting local governments ever deeper into debt, as most of the 
money spent on such pump-priming projects was provided by increased borrow-
ing by municipal governments, and only a small share came from grants.
One important consequence of centralization in Japan, therefore, has been the 
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creation and perpetuation of an unhealthy system of local political dependence 
on the center, accompanied by pervasive corruption in public-works contracting. 
This system is widely associated with Japan’s current political gridlock and the 
economic stagnation that has continued since the early 1990s. The long-standing 
dominance of the center also has had a profound influence on local governance 
and associational life, both positive and negative.
Social capital, civil society, and neighborhood associations
It is clear from the preceding discussion that Japan has long had a highly centralized 
system, particularly with regard to local governance, land-development control, 
public works, and city planning issues. It is worth considering what the role 
of citizens, communities, and grassroots organizations in local environmental 
management has been in this context. While Japan is described by some scholars 
as having had a very weak civil society at least until the 1990s (Yoshida 1999; 
Yamamoto 1999; Vosse 1999), others have argued that the nation is the epitome 
of a high-trust, high social-capital society in which citizen associations are both 
numerous and significant (Vogel 1979; Fukuyama 1995). The case of local 
environmental management helps to clarify this apparent contradiction, as it 
makes the conflicts between top-down governance and bottom-up aspirations 
particularly apparent. The traditions and structures of local associational activity 
also provide an essential key to understanding contemporary processes and 
potentials for decentralization and local governance. This section examines the 
roles of communities in bottom-up urban-space management during the twentieth 
century, with particular attention to the roles of local groups such as neighborhood 
associations.
There is no doubt that the concepts of community, neighborhood, and village 
are central to understanding Japan. Many prominent Japanese sociologists have 
argued that the village community has been a crucial generative factor in the for-
mation of Japanese society (Satô 1990; Fukutake 1982, 1967; Nakane 1990). A 
major reason, it is suggested, is that during the Tokugawa period about 80 percent 
of the population consisted of peasants living in rural villages (Satô 1990: 37), 
and even at the beginning of the 1920s only about 16 percent of the country was 
urbanized. The large-scale rural to urban migration that occurred during the twen-
tieth century resulted in a majority of “urban” residents who, in fact, had grown 
up in rural villages. In 1940, when the share of urban population was approaching 
40 percent, eight out of ten city residents had grown up in a village (Fukutake 
1982: 33). Village traditions of self-governance and mutual aid, it is argued, in 
this way continued to inform urban social mores until well after the end of World 
War II. As discussed below, however, other scholars suggest that state policies 
also played an important role in mediating the specific forms that self-governance 
and cooperation took during the twentieth century.
Several features of the social and governing structure in villages are com-
monly held to have had important and lasting effects on Japanese society. First, 
villages in the feudal period were largely self-managing and self-policing, and 
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were mostly left to their own devices as long as they paid their taxes and did 
not challenge the authority of those above. Villages were responsible for their 
own local infrastructure, such as roads, paths, irrigation systems, and maintenance 
of common forestlands. Paddy irrigation systems in particular required close 
cooperation of the village as a group, as the water supply normally had to be 
used sequentially by different areas, and coordinated carefully with tilling and 
planting cycles. These conditions undoubtedly fostered strong traditions of vil-
lage social organization and cooperation. Second, the main taxation unit was the 
village, which was responsible collectively to pay its taxes, usually in rice. This 
tended to encourage both cooperation and mutual surveillance, as the failure of 
one family’s crop for whatever reason would result in greater burdens for other 
families (Nakane 1990: 224).
These traditions of village self-governance and mutual support acquired an 
increasingly heavy patina of ideological significance during the process of mod-
ernization at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth. 
There had long been a degree of idealization of agriculture inherent in the neo-
Confucianism promoted by the Tokugawa ruling class during the Edo period; the 
tillers of the soil were the bedrock of the nation, creating both food and wealth, 
and maintaining the ancestral connection to nature and the eternal values of honest 
work and cultivation of the land. A popular movement promoting those values had 
flourished during the Edo period, inspired by the writings of Ninomiya Sontoku 
(1787–1856), and manifested in the formation of agricultural improvement societ-
ies (called hotokusha) in villages throughout the country in the nineteenth century. 
During modern times, as in the Edo period, the state tolerated and even encouraged 
such associations because of their contribution to the goals of stabilizing village 
life and strengthening the foundations of the state. National support of traditional 
agrarian values gained a new salience during the early decades of the twentieth 
century, as rapid urban industrialization and growing social conflict contributed 
to concerns that traditional attitudes of deference to authority and self-sufficiency 
might be yielding to increased individualism and tendencies toward materialism 
or, worse, socialism. By promoting the idea that rural villages were bastions of 
communal spirit and purity compared with the cities, Japanese authorities were 
endorsing Japan’s “beautiful traditions” of village cooperation and mutual support 
(Gluck 1987: 178). Village solidarity, self-reliance, and mutual support were also 
seen as forming a key bulwark in the struggle against the social fragmentation 
and anomie believed inevitably to accompany modernization and urbanization, a 
change associated by the Japanese oligarchy with political unrest and radicalism 
(Smith 1978). Similarly, Japanese social theorists embraced German sociolo-
gist Ferdinand Tönnies’ distinction between the traditional Gemeinschaft of the 
organic village and the Gesellschaft of the anonymous city, and sought ways to 
protect the former from the latter. Indeed, the idealization of the organic village 
persists today throughout Japanese culture, from the widespread promotion of 
furusato (literally, “my home town”) (Robertson 1991) to the romanticization of 
traditional village life in the animated films of Miyazaki Hayao.
Village self-government did not necessarily imply internal village democracy 
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and equality, however, and, in fact, status divisions within villages became increas-
ingly wide as a consequence of population growth during the Tokugawa period 
(Nakane 1990: 216). Whereas the ideal was that villages were composed of farm-
ers who were equal in status, in practice the families resident in the village longest 
tended to have preferential access to the limited resources of irrigation water and 
common property. The later nineteenth century in particular saw a steady concen-
tration of landholdings as poor farmers were forced to mortgage or sell land to 
more prosperous landowners, and this in turn led to increasing conflicts between 
tenants and landlords in the early twentieth century (Francks 1984; Waswo 1977; 
Smethurst 1986). The wealthier owner-farmers controlled the village administra-
tion, chose the holders of village office, and exercised authority over precious 
water resources (Nakane 1990: 223), while tenant farmers contributed to taxes 
and the corvée through their rent (which tended to be about half of their crop) but 
had little influence in village affairs. Village meetings were attended by household 
heads, rather than by assemblies of all adults in the community. Today, this is 
still the most common practice in rural villages as well as in urban neighborhood 
associations. According to Nakane Chie, it
has been a factor hindering the wife from playing a more significant role in 
society. Japanese society does not resist the active participation of women 
in its activities so much as it has difficulty seeing any need for women to 
become involved when the husbands are already taking part.
(Nakane 1990: 226)
In practice, most villages tended to become highly stratified, with the wealthier 
members at the top of a well-understood hierarchy, able to wield considerable power 
over village affairs and expected to provide paternalistic support for the poorer 
members of the village in hard times. Such support was not always forthcoming, 
however, and high taxes, lack of land, and periodic crop failures meant that the 
lot of the rural poor was often one of grinding poverty. The desperation of small 
farmers was a prominent cause of the frequent peasant uprisings and riots during 
the Tokugawa period, which often targeted wealthy landlords and rice merchants 
as objects of their protests (Walthall 1991; Koschmann 1978).
In urban areas associational activity developed along similar lines. During the 
feudal period urban neighborhoods were responsible for their own self-governance, 
maintenance of streets, drainage ditches and canals, wells, garbage disposal, man-
ning of neighborhood watch houses, fire patrol, local relief for the poor, and the 
organization of local festivals. These also had a clear status hierarchy with a small 
number of landowners at the top and large numbers of tenants at the bottom. Each 
neighborhood had its chief (nanushi), a position that was generally inherited, who 
was responsible for ensuring that laws were obeyed, taxes collected, firefighting 
squads organized, property transfers recorded, and guardhouses staffed. The chiefs 
relied on the further subdivision of the neighborhoods into five-family groups 
(goningumi), which consisted only of property owners and landlords’ agents, not 
the tenants, who were represented by the agents. Order was maintained primarily 
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by a mutual responsibility system for taxes and misdemeanors in which all mem-
bers of the group were responsible for the transgressions of the others. As in rural 
areas, self-governance was more a matter of being left to take care of virtually 
all public services at the level of the individual neighborhood than a question of 
political autonomy, of which there was none. Nor did the payment of taxes imply 
any claim on the government apart from defense and the administration of justice 
(Sorensen 2002: 20).
The necessity of neighborhood self-organization to provide almost all neces-
sary public services during two centuries of internal peace and urban economic 
growth did, however, have some positive outcomes: it reinforced the habit of 
self-sufficiency and contributed significantly to the development of social capital 
through traditions of self-organization and self-responsibility. The Japanese people 
thus entered the modern period with ample reserves of social capital and a flair 
for associational life. Carol Gluck details the long list of associations commonly 
found in rural villages, including agricultural, youth, army reserve, veterans’, 
school, women’s, and self-government associations (Gluck 1987: 198). Many of 
these had come together voluntarily on the basis of local needs and desires. Others 
were organized from above, as described below.
In the cities, with the transition to a modern national government at the end of 
the nineteenth century, the traditional urban governance structure of city elders, 
chiefs, and goningumi was abolished, and municipal governments were estab-
lished to take over a number of the essential functions they had performed, such as 
tax collection, population registers, firefighting, and policing (Dore 1968: 187). At 
the same time, local governments had negligible funds, few taxation powers, and 
little ability or inclination to take over the many services that neighborhoods were 
already effectively providing for themselves. On the contrary, with moderniza-
tion, the range of responsibilities delegated to local neighborhoods to undertake 
on a voluntary basis continued to grow, often as a result of directives by higher 
levels of government. For example, in 1900 Tokyo prefecture passed a law that 
required each neighborhood to set up a sanitation committee to prevent the spread 
of disease by ensuring that water and wastewater were adequately treated and by 
carrying out vaccination campaigns and a semiannual spraying of insecticides 
(Hastings 1995).
Certainly the most important examples of urban groups are the various neigh-
borhood associations (referred to as chôkai, chônaikai, or jichikai). Although 
these came to fulfill many of the functions of the neighborhood organizations of 
the feudal era, there is little evidence of any direct connection with them, and in 
fact a survey conducted in 1925 by the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research 
showed that 94 percent of the groups had been established since 1898, 30 years 
after the end of the feudal period (Narumi 1986: 63; Hastings 1995: 73). The 
formation of neighborhood associations increased rapidly after the Great Tokyo 
Earthquake of 1923 when local government services had virtually collapsed, so 
that by the time of the 1925 survey over 80 percent of households in Tokyo were 
claimed by associations to be members. It is also generally agreed that they were 
not initially directly a creation of government, but were voluntarily established 
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by local residents in response to a need for local public services that were not 
routinely provided by municipal governments in the prewar period (Smith 1978; 
Hastings 1995). The associations were seen as necessary and useful by citizens, 
and they spread rapidly throughout Tokyo and the other large cities.
The general form of the associations followed the arrangements and territories 
set out for the sanitation committees in 1900. Notably, the membership automati-
cally included all household heads within each neighborhood – another way the 
groups differed from the feudal neighborhood associations, which did not include 
tenants as members. As they became established, these neighborhood associations 
gradually absorbed the responsibilities of other local groups, such as the sanita-
tion committees and local shrine associations. By the 1930s they had spread to 
cities throughout the country, with virtually every urban area divided into neigh-
borhoods of 100 to 200 families. Their main activities were to organize local 
garbage-collection points and recycling activities, sanitation and insecticide cam-
paigns, street cleaning, installation and maintenance of streetlights, night watches 
against fire and crime, local information dissemination through circulating notice 
boards, shrine support and local festival organization, and providing small gifts 
to local families celebrating a wedding or mourning a death. The majority of the 
leadership of neighborhood associations was drawn from the old urban middle 
class, especially the local landowners and shopkeepers, who most desired and 
benefited from the activities of the association, which improved the attractiveness 
of their area (Hastings 1995: 80).
During the period between the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and 
the beginning of the war in China in the early 1930s, the growth of the economy 
and the strengthening of Japanese democracy were accompanied by a significant 
expansion of civil society and the number and variety of independent organizations 
started to grow. The spread of popular protest movements, increasing labor and 
social activism, and a growing professional and middle class each contributed to 
the development of civil society. The Taisho period (1912–26) has been described 
as a time of rapid growth of civil society, coming between the authoritarianism 
of the Meiji period and the militarism of World War II (Iokibe 1999: 75). To a 
certain extent, urban neighborhood associations contributed to this growth of civil 
society. For example, even though they were closely allied to local governments, 
they not infrequently opposed specific planning policies.
The neighborhood associations were clearly useful to the state and, even 
though they may have initially formed voluntarily, over time the state increas-
ingly co-opted them. Such efforts intensified after the Russo-Japanese war ended 
in 1905, as Japanese leaders grew increasingly worried about the adverse social 
impacts of industrialization and urban growth, particularly as with success in war 
the national project shifted from the widely supported goal of national preserva-
tion in the face of foreign expansion to one of imperial expansion on the Asian 
mainland (Harootunian 1974; Oka 1982). After this period the state became 
increasingly involved in efforts to mobilize the Japanese population in support of 
imperial policies of military expansion and economic growth. This was essentially 
an ideological project, which consisted of attempts to bring local areas within 
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the ideological influence of the center (Gluck 1987: 191). As Kenneth Pyle has 
shown, the first major campaign was the “local improvement movement” of the 
first two decades of the twentieth century, which sought to organize existing rural 
grassroots associations, such as the army reservist clubs, women’s associations, 
community credit societies, young men’s groups, and agricultural-improvement 
associations into national hierarchical structures designed to disseminate govern-
ment messages encouraging local self-help and mutual support groups in rural 
areas (Pyle 1973). Gluck argues that it was precisely because of the strong capacity 
of Japanese communities to establish flourishing voluntary associations that the 
government was able to create national hierarchical organizations with such ease 
(Gluck 1987: 198). Many of the associations enrolled by the Home Ministry, the 
army, and the Ministry of Agriculture in national leagues had already formed their 
basic units at the village level. It was then a relatively easy task to persuade the 
leadership of existing associations to join national structures, as these promised 
significant rewards of legitimacy, official recognition, and networking opportuni-
ties in larger political structures. National ministries in this way created national 
organizations and an effective means of disseminating information to villages 
throughout the country, although, as Princeton historian Sheldon Garon points 
out, they did not necessarily gain complete control over local groups, which often 
had their own ideas (Garon 2003).
The national ministries attempted to promote three main messages: first, that 
Japan’s main resource was its people, and it could not hope to compete with 
the Western powers unless it developed a unity of spirit in support of national 
goals; second, that each citizen’s responsibility was to work hard, live frugally, 
pay taxes, and save money to support national development; and third, that local 
governments and villages were to administer their own affairs efficiently to elimi-
nate waste and duplication and reduce the burden on central government. A major 
element of such improved efficiency was to be the merging of small villages and 
hamlets into larger administrative units, along with the amalgamation of Shinto 
shrines and the reduction of wasteful spending on festivals, alcohol, and tobacco 
(Pyle 1973; Gluck 1987; Garon 1997).
It is likely that the initial intent of many local bureaucrats was merely to sup-
port such beneficial organizations. As Sally Anne Hastings argues,
the municipal government strongly endorsed the concept of neighborhood 
associations. It used the associations to carry out certain of its own polities. 
The associations did not, however, become arms of either the municipal or 
national government until after the outbreak of war with China . . . the gov-
ernment was becoming involved in the concerns of the associations, which 
is quite different from the associations becoming the creatures of the govern-
ment.
(Hastings 1995: 85)
Many local and national government bureaucrats made sincere efforts to work with 
local communities to alleviate poverty, ameliorate living and housing conditions, 
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provide better community services, and mobilize the voluntary activities of 
local citizens to improve the health and welfare of urban citizens (Garon 1997; 
Hastings 1995; Hanes 2002). An important example of this strategy was the 
system of voluntary “welfare commissioners” (minsei-iin) that was established 
by the Home Ministry throughout the country during the 1920s. Following the 
pattern of the German “Elberfeld System,” affluent and prominent members of 
each neighborhood were enlisted to provide advice, encouragement, employment 
contacts, and introductions to appropriate municipal services to help poorer 
residents get back on their feet (Ikeda 1986). This system cost the government 
little and reinforced the importance of self-reliance. The commissioners were 
often also active in the leadership of the neighborhood associations, as both drew 
primarily from the local middle class (Steiner 1965: 221).
State-directed efforts to shape the development of national associational activ-
ity did, however, steadily increase the links between national ministries and local 
actors, and helped to blur the separation between civil society and the state. A 
first step was to form them into ward (ku)-level leagues with space in the ward 
office and led by the ward head. By 1935, 15 of the 35 wards in the city of Tokyo 
had established such networks of associations (Hastings 1995: 84). During the 
1930s the neighborhood associations were gradually transformed into an effective 
link from central government ministries to every community and virtually every 
home in the country, providing an impressive means of social control. In 1940 
the Home Ministry made neighborhood associations compulsory for the whole 
country and formally incorporated them into the local government system, giving 
them the additional responsibilities of civil defense, distribution of rations, and 
the promotion of savings, creating an efficient system for gathering information 
on deviant behavior and political dissent. This system was extremely effective at 
exerting pressure on families and individuals, and was exploited to the full during 
wartime (Dore 1958: 272).
It is clear that as Japan slipped deeper into total war during the 1930s and 
early 1940s the space for autonomous civil society grew progressively smaller. 
Garon cautions, however, that the standard division of the interwar period into the 
“Taisho Democracy” period, marked by a rapid expansion of civil society until 
the early 1930s, and a wartime period from 1931 to 1945 in which civil society 
was progressively eliminated, although perhaps a useful shorthand, exaggerates 
on both counts. The period of the blossoming of civil society was also one in 
which the state increasingly incorporated formerly independent associations into 
its networks and broadened its capacity to shape the development of associational 
activity. In the wartime period also, while the state was effective in disbanding 
almost every autonomous grouping, or reorganizing them into state-run organiza-
tions, the momentum and societal knowledge gained during the Taisho period was 
not lost entirely, and many of the individuals and organizations thus co-opted into 
the state still had an influence on its policies (Garon 2003: 51–6).
Undeniably, there was considerable movement toward democratization in 
postwar Japan. Although it is true that the American-led occupation imposed 
democracy from above, many Japanese seized the opportunity with great energy 
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and determination, unleashing an outpouring of energies directed both at rebuild-
ing the country and at creating new political institutions (see Dower 1999). At 
the national level the legalization of leftist political parties allowed the Japanese 
Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) to win a major share of 
the vote, and even form a coalition government under Socialist Prime Minister 
Katayama Tetsu for nine months during 1947–8. There was also clearly a signifi-
cant reemergence of civil society, with the legalization of labor organizing, the 
rapid growth of union membership, and the rise of interest groups of all sorts. It 
is true that the “reverse course” of the occupation, which reinvigorated Japanese 
conservatism’s traditional anticommunism with American Cold War convictions, 
had a powerful impact on the political balance of power, especially with the 
purges of alleged communists in the labor movement and the media in the early 
1950s. But many of the gains were permanent, and contributed to the gradual 
development of democracy and civil society in postwar Japan.
Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the expansion of political freedom and 
civil society consisted of the opposition movements against the remilitarization of 
Japan during the 1950s, which culminated in massive demonstrations against the 
revision of the security treaty with the United States (the so-called ANPO treaty) 
during the spring of 1960, in which thousands protested the renewal of the treaty 
and the conservative government’s “undemocratic” tactics used to push it through 
the legislature. This was an unprecedented expression of political independence. 
As Berkeley historian Andrew Barshay puts it:
The galvanized and convergent energies of a range of quite disparate social 
groups, the huge scale and variety of the protests, the sense that individual 
commitment and engagement need not come at the price of ideological sub-
ordination to any party – all this was new. This was civil society.
(Barshay 2003: 71)
In another sense, however, ANPO demonstrated the great weakness of Japanese 
civil society, as after the storm of protest had melted away few enduring organiza-
tional structures remained. The Left backed away from direct confrontation with 
the state, and the conservative government shifted its tactics toward an increased 
emphasis on rapid economic growth. At the local level virtually all prefectural and 
municipal governments were controlled by conservatives, who used their political 
dominance and the consensus on economic growth to pursue the developmen-
tal state project. The neighborhood associations, which had been banned by the 
occupation as a manifestation of the intrusive and antidemocratic reach of the 
state into everyday life, gradually reestablished themselves, often with slightly 
different names but mostly with the same boundaries and structure and frequently 
under the same leadership (Dore 1958).
The role of the neighborhood associations in local political development dur-
ing the postwar period has been much debated. On the one hand, many saw them 
simply as a manifestation of the old domination of local conservative elites, as 
stable electoral bases used by local bosses to deliver safe blocks of votes at elec-
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tion time in return for political connections (Steiner 1965: 227). For others the 
neighborhood associations were a reflection of strong community social capital, 
which when needed could be mobilized for other than conservative purposes 
(Nakamura 1968; Munger 1976; White 1976). In fact, these contradictory views 
of neighborhood associations are probably both true, as there is considerable 
variation between places and different times.
Probably most revealing of the contradictory faces of neighborhood associa-
tions were their varied responses to the environmental crisis of the 1960s. As is 
well known, rapid economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s in a context of 
weak to nonexistent pollution control regulations, and high-density urban areas 
where industry was tightly interwoven with residential and commercial areas, 
resulted in a pollution disaster. Hundreds died and thousands were crippled and 
made ill, with official status as pollution victims (entitling citizens to relief and 
medical aid) granted to more than 73,000 people by 1979 (McKean 1981: 20). 
One of the most shocking aspects of the pollution crisis was that for years the state 
sided with the corporations against the pollution victims, concealing evidence 
that linked particular polluters to clusters of illness, shutting down university 
research projects, and blocking attempts to make polluters accept responsibility 
(Ui 1992; Reich 1983; Upham 1987). Initially, conservative control over local 
politics continued to dominate, with many of those most affected being shunned 
for their attempts to make their problems public through protests (Iijima 1992). As 
problems worsened, however, many communities whose members were sick or 
dying became more militant; traditional constraints were thrust aside and a variety 
of direct-action protest techniques were employed. Eventually, as the extent of the 
problems became better known, and in particular as the anti-pollution movements 
grew and began to experience some success in proving the damage to human 
health that industrial pollution was causing, the tide of public opinion began to 
turn. Thousands of anti-pollution movements were formed throughout the country 
in what Ellis Krauss and Bradford Simcock (1980: 196) describe as a “veritable 
explosion of protest in urban and suburban areas.” In 1971 alone local govern-
ments received 75,000 pollution-related complaints, and there were as many as 
10,000 local disputes in 1973 (Krauss and Simcock 1980).
Here the most important aspects of the anti-pollution movements are the con-
tradictory roles of neighborhood associations, and the fact that most of the citizen 
movements remained small and tended to have a short lifespan, either collapsing 
after defeat or disbanding after victory. While it might have been expected that 
the neighborhood associations would have been in the forefront of organizing to 
prevent pollution disasters, most research shows that the exact opposite was the 
case. In the vast majority of instances neighborhood associations were dominated 
by conservative leaders, and were much more likely to block efforts to oppose 
pollution problems than they were to support them. Political scientist Margaret 
McKean, who has produced some of the most authoritative research on anti- 
pollution citizen movements, put it this way:
For the most part, attempts to use the formal institutions or networks which 
monopolized communal activity in Japan . . . failed. Political parties had no 
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mass base. Agricultural cooperatives, neighborhood associations, candidate 
support organizations, and similar groups that ordinarily served as interme-
diaries between citizens and political institutions were unresponsive or even 
hostile to the pollution issue. Only in the rare situation where pollution threat-
ened all members of a preexisting group equally . . . did these organizations 
perform the function of political intermediary.
(McKean 1981: 225)
Not only did most neighborhood associations fail to support local efforts to 
protest pollution problems but they also helped to block the development of alter-
native groups, at least temporarily, as they had a monopoly on local connections 
and legitimacy. Only the most determined activists were able to get around their 
neighborhood association and establish a separate group. As a result, a majority of 
new citizen movements of the 1960s were formed outside and often in opposition 
to their neighborhood association. In newly built areas where the conservative 
elite was not so entrenched, neighborhood associations were much more likely 
to serve as a vehicle for protest (McKean 1981: 226; Nakamura 1968). An excel-
lent example of such a case is provided by anthropologist Eyal Ben-Ari (1991) 
whose study of a new suburban development outside Kyoto demonstrates that a 
neighborhood association can be an effective model for civic activism when it is 
not dominated by entrenched elites.
Certainly the most profound study of the contradictory roles of neighborhood 
associations in local political conflicts is sociologist Jeffrey Broadbent’s detailed 
examination (1998) of the clash over the New Industrial City project in Oita pre-
fecture during the 1970s and 1980s. The prefectural government had initiated 
and promoted a large-scale industrial development, and many local groups were 
strongly opposed to a project that they felt would destroy their communities and 
fishing grounds. Broadbent shows in detail how central government ministries, 
the prefectural government, municipal governments, LDP politicians, and local 
bosses worked together to overcome that opposition. Where a strong leader 
emerged who was opposed to the development project, he was usually able to 
mobilize the psychological and material resources of the community to create a 
strong and determined opposition movement. On the other hand, the role of the 
leader was decisive, and where the leader faltered, or was co-opted or bought out, 
the movement usually collapsed. In some cases neighborhood associations cre-
ated avenues to mobilize opposition, and in other cases they helped to block the 
formation of opposition citizen movements, and also served as useful channels of 
influence for those hoping to defeat or co-opt the movement (Broadbent 1998).
The question remains: Why did most of the citizen movements remain so 
small and short-lived? As McKean and others have noted, Japanese anti-pollution 
movements of the 1970s, although as large in numbers of participants as their con-
temporaries in the United States, did not produce a single national organization on 
the scale of the Sierra Club or the National Wildlife Federation (Broadbent 1998: 
286). These large, well-resourced, and professionalized American organizations 
have been able to exert political pressure on governments, generate their own 
research and publicity, and keep environmental issues alive in the public debate. 
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In Japan, on the other hand, the environmental movement almost disappeared 
during the 1980s, with only sporadic flare-ups over specific local issues since that 
time. That was only partly due to the success of the pollution-prevention laws of 
the early 1970s.
University of Washington political scientist Robert Pekkanen has persuasively 
argued that the state has had a powerful impact on the patterns of civil society 
development in Japan during the postwar period by promoting some types of 
groups and hindering others. According to his analysis, “small, local groups such 
as neighborhood associations have been promoted by the state; large, indepen-
dent professionalized groups such as Greenpeace have faced a much more hostile 
legal environment” (Pekkanen 2003: 116). Pekkanen does not suggest that large 
professional groups are either better or more important than small neighborhood 
groups, but that they perform quite different roles and have different capacities 
to influence politics and policies. Whereas “small, local groups can contribute to 
stocks of social capital and perhaps to the performance of local governments . . . 
professionalized groups that have a large core of full-time employees can develop 
expertise, institutionalize movements, and influence policies and other outcomes 
down the road; they change the political landscape” (Pekkanen 2003: 117).
The state influenced the development of postwar Japanese civil society in 
three main ways. First, the state actively worked to establish semi-independent 
nonprofit organizations in particular sectors. In fact, a majority of Japanese non-
profit organizations (NPOs) were created by the government to carry out various 
state-delegated functions. Thus, although the established NPO sector in Japan is 
actually very large in comparative terms, being second only to that of the United 
States in total spending, this is primarily because most universities, hospitals, and 
welfare centers are registered as NPOs. As Wilhelm Vosse has shown:
To a large degree, the private nonprofit sector has taken over responsibili-
ties formerly covered by the state, and the vast majority of these nonprofit 
institutions have no relationship to grassroots civic groups. Subsectors con-
cerned with the natural environment, civil advocacy, philanthropy, as well as 
international exchange and cooperation had an almost negligible share of the 
nonprofit sector.
(Vosse 1999: 37)
Whether these state-sponsored NPOs qualify as part of civil society or not is open 
to debate (see Salamon and Anheier 1997), but it seems very likely that because 
of their size and dominant position they would have a major impact within their 
sphere.
Second, the postwar state provided smaller organizations, especially the neigh-
borhood associations, with significant benefits in terms of legitimation, de facto 
legal recognition, and a monopoly over certain functions within each neighbor-
hood. Third, it tightly regulated the granting of legal status to larger organizations 
(Pekkanen 2003: 125). The support for neighborhood associations, discussed 
above, contrasted with the obstacles that hindered the development of large, 
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professionalized civil society organizations. Until the NPO Law was passed in 
1998, it was difficult for NPOs to gain legal status, the granting of which was the 
responsibility of the various national ministries within their area of jurisdiction. 
Without legal status, it is very difficult to operate in Japan; space cannot be rented, 
bank accounts cannot be established, and staff cannot be hired, so organizations 
unable to attain legal nonprofit status must either remain small and informal or 
register as for-profit corporations. Not only did the ministries have quite a wide 
degree of discretion in whether to grant legal status to NPOs, they also commonly 
required that groups have a minimum of $3 million in assets before being given 
such status. This almost certainly prevented many potential groups from gaining 
legal status. Furthermore, many groups interested in environmental advocacy, for 
example, found that they did not fit neatly within the jurisdiction of one ministry, 
and had great difficulty gaining legal recognition. Those groups that did manage 
to raise sufficient funds and fit within the jurisdiction of a ministry still found that 
because of the wide discretion of the ministries to refuse their application, they 
commonly had to accept the placement of retiring ministry bureaucrats on their 
board of directors, and could not easily ignore ministry guidance (Pekkanen 2003; 
Kawashima 2001; Yamamoto 1999). Ministries also tended to define the permit-
ted range of activities of organizations quite narrowly, and activities outside those 
permitted could result in dissolution. In short, the powers of the central bureau-
cracy over NPOs were broad, and it is no coincidence that so few large-scale 
NPOs developed. Even today, although Japan clearly has a vibrant civil society, 
most civil society organizations are small, without significant financial resources, 
and have few paid staff members.
These restrictions on the legal status of civil society organizations are appar-
ent in the machizukuri movements advocating local environmental manage-
ment, which spread throughout Japan during the 1990s. Most of these groups 
are extremely small, and operate without staff or legal status. As with the earlier 
anti-pollution citizen movements, in many cases lack of support from neighbor-
hood associations has meant that machizukuri movements (further discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7 by Watanabe Shun-ichi and Christoph Brumann respectively) 
have organized independently, although in some cases machizukuri groups have 
grown out of neighborhood associations as subcommittees (Tominaga 2001).
Conclusions
There are four main points that can be drawn from this history. First, the Japanese 
case makes abundantly clear that a distinction must be made between social 
capital and civil society, two concepts that are often poorly differentiated in recent 
literature. The long and vital tradition of local self-help and strong neighborhoods 
clearly fostered strong stocks of local social capital. This was partly a grassroots 
response to local needs and priorities, but was also actively promoted by the state 
as a way of unifying and mobilizing the population. Japanese communities clearly 
demonstrate very high levels of associational activity and an ability to organize 
and maintain large numbers of local voluntary institutions. Many, though by no 
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means all, of these are still based in communities of place – urban neighborhoods 
that often still have the same boundaries that were established in the early part of 
the twentieth century. Participation rates are high, neighbors know one another, 
and the eyes-on-the-street approach to local security is still effective. This high 
level of social capital has not been associated with a strong civil society, however, 
which is still in the process of developing today. Not only did strong social capital 
not result in an effective civil society that could serve to balance the power of 
the state, but in the prewar period neighborhood associations were incorporated 
into the totalitarian apparatus of the state, and in the postwar period they often 
helped to block the development of movements in opposition to state policies. 
Janet Abu-Lughod and others have argued that, despite its recent popularity 
as a solution to all sorts of urban problems, civil society is not necessarily a 
progressive force (Abu-Lughod 1998). The same must be said of social capital: 
while it may aid community organizing, such mobilization can lead in a variety 
of directions, depending on the circumstances. The Japanese case clearly shows 
that it is possible to have rich social-capital resources at the same time as a weakly 
developed civil society.
This observation gives rise directly to the second point: the state can have a 
powerful role in shaping the patterns of development of civil society organiza-
tions. Japan’s highly centralized system has worked to shape the organizational 
structures as well as the resources available to and the opportunities for civil 
society organizations in Japan. Legal restrictions on nonprofit organizations have 
limited the growth of associations into large-scale professionalized organizations 
while encouraging small-scale neighborhood groups. This seems to have had a 
significant impact on both the longevity of organizations and the kinds of activity 
in which they can effectively engage. To influence national government policies 
takes significant resources and a long-term view. In the case of Japan, as most 
civil society groups have been relatively small, and the planning system highly 
centralized, these associations have had great difficulties in influencing planning 
policy.
Third, civil society organizations have had an important but highly structured 
role in Japanese urban governance. In the prewar period neighborhood associa-
tions were arguably the main civil society actors engaged in urban governance. 
They contributed primarily by fostering the development of strong stocks of social 
capital and by relieving local governments of responsibility for a wide range 
of public services, which were provided by local people on a voluntary basis. 
Neighborhood associations appear to have achieved little input into policy, and 
were incorporated into the state during the war. In the postwar period their roles 
became more complex. On the one hand, they were commonly used by conserva-
tive elites as a base of local political influence, and they often had the effect of 
blocking at least temporarily the development of groups with other priorities. For 
example, in most cases the neighborhood associations opposed the anti-pollution 
movements, which had to form their own independent groups. The pollution cri-
sis was so severe, however, that large numbers of new local citizen movements 
developed, helping to change the political balance of power and forcing both local 
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and national governments to make major policy changes. They did not, however, 
then grow into the kinds of large-scale professional organizations, such as the 
Sierra Club or Greenpeace, that took hold in other developed countries, appar-
ently because of a restrictive legal framework. The role of civil society actors in 
urban governance during the postwar period appears to have been much more 
limited than in most of the other developed countries. Instead, the recent wave 
of citizen activism around local environmental issues in the 1990s, referred to as 
machizukuri, once again started at the scale of small, local neighborhood-based 
citizen movements. While the rapid proliferation of local machizukuri groups is 
yet another sign of vitality at the local level, the real question may be whether 
organizations will materialize that have the scale, resources, technical compe-
tence, and political weight needed to effect a real impact on policy-making at the 
national level. It remains to be seen whether the changes to the NPO Law will 
allow some machizukuri movements to grow and contribute to the emergence of a 
more institutionally developed and politically powerful civil society.
Finally, the small scale and lack of resources of civil society organizations 
seems certain to make the process of decentralization slower, more difficult, and 
less effective than might have been the case if a broad range of such organiza-
tions already existed. There is considerable evidence that since the passage of 
the NPO Law in 1998 there has been real growth in the sector, but it will take 
years to develop the wide range of sophisticated organizations seen in most other 
developed countries. This is important, because the process of decentralization 
elsewhere has often been not simply from central to local governments but also 
from central and local government to the volunteer and nonprofit sector. For this 
to be a real decentralization of governance structures, and not merely the old style 
of task delegation to junior entities without the opportunity for input into policy 
formation or decision-making, a strong, well-resourced, professionally staffed 
civil society sector will be invaluable.
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6 Machizukuri in Japan
 A historical perspective on participatory 
community-building initiatives
Watanabe Shun-ichi J.
In local communities throughout Japan today, machizukuri, or community-
building, is prevalent. Literally, machi means “community” and zukuri, 
“building,” or “making,” and this term is used to apply to a wide variety of 
activities. Government-sponsored road construction, citizen-led monitoring of 
municipal governance, the erection of apartment buildings by private developers, 
and even karaoke parties held by communities all often fall under the heading of 
machizukuri.
Although the theoretical study of machizukuri is only in its early stages, with a 
major shift of planning powers away from the Japanese national government to the 
local municipality in the context of political decentralization likely to occur in the 
twenty-first century, the impact of both the concept and the method of machizu-
kuri on the future of every aspect of the urban planning system will be significant. 
As indicated, however, the concept of machizukuri is multifold, frequently made 
intentionally ambiguous, and continues to develop in different directions on a 
daily basis. Therefore, in order to understand the fundamental nature of machizu-
kuri, it is imperative to trace its history. The following discussion first will look 
briefly at the history of this phenomenon, and will then examine the basic nature 
of, and crucial problems related to, machizukuri from an urban planning point of 
view. The examples that will be introduced are among the most progressive ones 
at the national level; the overwhelming majority of communities and municipali-
ties, however, are still bound by a traditional system that is often removed from 
the essence of machizukuri.
The birth of machizukuri: 1950s and 1960s
Although urban planners adopted the term machizukuri around the 1960s, it 
actually originated in the field of social studies (Watanabe et al. 1997). In 1952, 
the noted social historian Masuda Shirô, in the context of promoting local 
autonomy during the postwar democratization process in Japan, portrayed the 
ideal governance of the future municipality as “new machizukuri,” or building the 
new local community, referring heavily to the urban history of medieval northern 
Europe (Masuda 1952). Masuda, however, did not precisely describe machizukuri, 
using the term simply as a slogan.
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Since that time, machizukuri has been used as a catchword in various fields. 
Because it implies a kind of reform movement at the local level in the postwar 
democracy, machizukuri can be defined broadly as the process whereby entities 
engage in activities or movements in a local community. Such a loose concept was 
convenient in that many ideas and desires could be associated with the word and 
this became a prototype for the usage of the term thereafter.
A notable early example of the wide application of the term is the Council 
of Social Welfare (CSW) movement (Shakai Fukushi Kyôgikai) (Nihon Chiiki 
Fukushi Gakkai 1993). In 1949, the Ministry of Welfare created this associa-
tion for the purpose of importing methods of community organization from the 
United States. Local branches of the group were subsequently established in every 
municipality and prefecture under the aegis of the national headquarters, and these 
continue to function into the present day. During the 1950s, those involved in the 
CSW movement often referred to their work as machizukuri. The basic charter of 
the CSW defines the group as “a private voluntary organization . . . by people in 
the community involved in social welfare in a broad spectrum of both the public 
and private sectors, in order to promote welfare in its own local community.” It 
was obviously impossible, however, for an organization established by a national 
ministry with representatives from the private sector to act as a “private voluntary 
organization” at this time in Japan, where there was little tradition of citizen input 
independent of the government. Rather, the CSW functioned as a quasi-govern-
mental body, or private means for providing government welfare services at the 
local level. While machizukuri in this case indeed could be seen as a citizens’ 
movement at the municipal level, there was a clear lack of autonomous decision-
making by the citizenry.
In the field of urban planning, there were roughly two attitudes toward 
machizukuri. One view, held by many planners, equated machizukuri with tradi-
tional statutory urban planning, using the term to include the land-readjustment 
projects of the postwar reconstruction program as well as any road construction. 
In this view, machizukuri was simply a label, and as such gave rise to no innova-
tive perspective.
Another view was held by a smaller number of planners, who approached 
urban design at the local district level. The rapid economic growth in the 1960s 
was accompanied by an increased interest in urban redevelopment and improve-
ment of residential environs, which led to the involvement of local residents in 
city planning and design (see also Chapter 2 by Ishida Yorifusa in this volume). 
The best-known example can be found in the Sakae-Higashi district of the city 
of Nagoya (Hattori 1973). A resident merchant turned activist, who together with 
volunteer professionals had organized a small informal study group in the late 
1950s, eventually proposed a redevelopment plan for the district in 1964. The 
plan was based on the complete clearance and redevelopment method (razing 
the area and rebuilding from the ground up) and, following the modern plan-
ning paradigm of the day, strove for an urban image that featured super-blocks of 
high-rise buildings in open green space. This was, in fact, the first instance in the 
history of urban planning in Japan of a full-scale, well-developed plan proposed 
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and created by a citizens’ group. The plan was not implemented, however, both 
because residents resisted completely rebuilding their homes and businesses to 
accord with a modern lifestyle, and because there was no legal framework for 
carrying out such a large-scale redevelopment project. But the real problem, in the 
end, was that there was no substantial organized segment of the local population 
participating in the plan-making process.
From opposition to partnership in machizukuri:  
1960s and 1970s
As a result of the brisk economic growth that took place in Japan during the 1960s, 
with people and industry rushing in to concentrate in existing large urban areas, 
serious problems such as housing shortages, traffic congestion, and environmental 
pollution arose. These problems threatened the residential life of local citizens in 
many ways. Some resident groups organized opposition movements to protect their 
quality of life and property, proudly calling the popular movements machizukuri. 
For the first time, independent participation by city inhabitants began to emerge.
In 1963–5, for example, the residents of Mishima, a coastal city at the foot of 
Mount Fuji, successfully contested the government’s plan to build an industrial 
complex on landfill there. Also, in 1967–8, the inhabitants of the Tsujidô district 
in Fujisawa, a suburban center in the southwestern greater Tokyo area, fought to 
overturn the city’s land-readjustment project for residential development. These 
incidents revealed another side of traditional urban planning – which heretofore 
had been perceived as an unmitigated good – that at times it could be used to 
destroy established residential life. Machizukuri became a rallying cry, represent-
ing the antithesis of statutory urban planning.
Although the above two cases were symbolically important as opposition 
movements, they disintegrated once their goals were attained. However, other 
movements instigated by local residents that had a variety of goals did materialize 
and were more long-lasting; these formed the wellspring of the main stream of 
machizukuri. In 1963, dump trucks rolled into the quiet residential Maruyama dis-
trict on the city of Kobe’s mountainside, for the purpose of constructing a housing 
development. This triggered an opposition movement by residents of the district 
under the banner of machizukuri to protect the quality of their pastoral living 
environment from dense urban development (Hirohara 1974). Capable district 
leaders took the initiative in organizing residents, instigated and developed inno-
vative programs for community networking and self-education, and persistently 
engaged in negotiations with city officials. This movement, which grew to include 
a full-time staff and central secretariat responsible for organizing a large number 
of residents, became known as the “Fighting Maruyama.” In terms of its style and 
spirit, it resembled a community version of a labor union movement. Although 
Maruyama started out as a simple opposition movement, its scope expanded to 
address such issues as traffic problems and the local environment overall. Residents 
achieved enough political clout to voice demands and to acquire various public 
services from the municipality of which it was part. City officials, who were for 
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the first time forced to produce a counter-offer to the demands, learned valuable 
skills in negotiating with the residents through this process. As a result, the rela-
tionship between the local community and the greater municipality began to shift 
from opposition to partnership in the second half of the 1960s. Importantly, this 
partnership was never imposed by the municipality, but instead knitted together 
by the residents themselves from their evolving experiences.
At about the same time, in the heavily inhabited Mano district, situated along 
the coastline of the city of Kobe, where industry and housing were heavily mixed, 
local residents began a machizukuri movement to protect inhabitants, particularly 
small children, from air pollution caused by the factories in the area. The move-
ment did not develop as immediately and distinctly as the Fighting Maruyama, 
but gradually enlarged its purview to include the protection of the overall local 
residential environment. In the late 1970s, in cooperation with the city of Kobe, 
the group began environmental improvement projects such as building public 
housing and upgrading pedestrian streets. The movement continues to have posi-
tive results even today, in contrast to that in Maruyama, which virtually dissolved 
toward the end of the 1970s.
According to the traditional paradigm subscribed to by professionals and gov-
ernment officials, urban planning applies specifically to the planning and construc-
tion of physical facilities. From this standpoint, neither Maruyama nor Mano had 
much to do with “urban planning.” Some planning researchers, however, began 
to study the process through which local residents, through their own organized 
activities, improved both built aspects of their community as well as those relat-
ing to quality of life, as in these two districts (Hirohara 1974). The study found 
that gradual improvement in the physical living environment that accorded with 
current local needs was a realistic approach, in contrast to submission to a pre-
conceived plan for complete clearance and redevelopment. In terms of how these 
changes were implemented, it also found present a public–private partnership 
with intensive participation by residents. The results of the study were reported 
to the public as well as to the academic community, and the basic principles it 
uncovered have become the foundation for the majority of machizukuri activities 
ever since. This “postmodern” approach to urban planning clearly differs from the 
“modern” one that characterized Sakae-Higashi.
In the 1960s, especially in urbanized areas, elections for the heads of local 
governments were won by candidates who were supported by the socialist and 
communist parties, defeating the conservatives. Emphasizing social welfare 
programs rather than economic development projects, they presided over what 
were called “progressive local governments,” beginning with that of Yokohama’s 
mayor, Asukata Ichio, in 1963, followed in 1967 by Tokyo’s governor, Minobe 
Ryôkichi, and Kobe’s mayor, Miyazaki Tatsuo. These leaders made efforts to turn 
the municipality – historically a subsidiary branch of the national government 
– into a base for providing public services to the local community. Noteworthy 
here is the fact that progressive leaders directly elected by the people promoted 
citizen participation in their policy-making in order to bypass the local assembly, 
which was still dominated by the conservatives. At the same time, they encour-
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aged municipal officials to act from the citizen’s point of view rather than from 
that of the traditional bureaucrat. As a result, an increasing number of government 
officials began to be open to the idea of machizukuri (Tamura 1987).
During the 1960s through the 1970s, the main concern of urban planning 
shifted from regional-scale infrastructure building to local-scale environmen-
tal improvement in existing urban areas. The national Urban Redevelopment 
Program, which began in 1969, introduced into the field of planning the new issue 
of how to resolve the myriad interests of the large number of people involved. 
District planning legislation, passed in 1980, called for the essential participation 
of residents, particularly landowners, in creating the details of a District Plan and 
in implementing it at the neighborhood level (see Chapter 2).
In the 1970s, several examples occurred of a municipality actively initiating 
machizukuri. A pioneer in this regard, the city of Toyonaka, just north of and 
adjacent to Osaka, launched a unique experiment to improve the residential envi-
ronment in the Shônai district, where a concentration of wood-framed apartment 
buildings and houses had emerged during the economic boom. After conducting 
a detailed study, the city created machizukuri plans to improve the residential 
environment that incorporated large-scale participation by residents, and began to 
implement a rehabilitation project. In this project, the idea of complete clearance 
and redevelopment, as seen in the example of Sakae-Higashi, was rejected and 
the much more achievable goal of rehabilitation was adopted. This approach later 
influenced the national housing policy, which had emphasized the building of 
individual residential units in order to combat the acute housing shortage. The 
Shônai case, on the contrary, began to draw attention to the gradual improvement 
of the residential environment as a whole. In 1978, the Residential Environment 
Improvement Program (jûkankyô seibi jigyô) was added to the national agenda. 
In the field of architecture, this area of environmental improvement often came to 
be referred to, narrowly, as machizukuri.
It is clear from the above discussion that machizukuri movements in Sakae-
Higashi, Maruyama, Mano, and Shônai all raised unique issues and viewpoints 
in urban planning that previously had barely existed. It is interesting to note that 
these cases seem to underscore a general tendency in which municipalities in 
the Kansai region centered around Osaka are more realistic and innovative in 
approach than those in the Kanto region centered around Tokyo. It is also striking 
that their ideas were all carried out independently at the local level without the 
backing of national legislation, and that they influenced the direction of statutory 
urban planning in the succeeding generation.
The emergence of participatory machizukuri:  
1980s and 1990s
In the 1980s, various statutory measures began to be developed in order to promote 
machizukuri activities at the national and municipal levels. As noted above, 
national law established district planning. In forward-thinking municipalities 
throughout Japan, ordinances related to machizukuri activities were enacted; 
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and independent citizen groups were engaged in various activities to promote 
municipality-wide participation.
In 1981, Kobe was the first city to pass a machizukuri ordinance (jôrei) in Japan 
and developed an innovative system incorporating three important planning tools 
that would facilitate participatory machizukuri. The first tool was the machizukuri 
council (kyôgikai), which represented local residents at the neighborhood level. 
The second was a system that made professional services, paid for by the city, 
available to the machizukuri council for machizukuri activities, especially for 
plan-making activities. The third tool was a procedural structure through which 
the city would officially accept a machizukuri proposal (teian) from any machizu-
kuri council and would develop a machizukuri agreement (kyôtei) with it that 
would be eventually implemented. This sort of intensive participatory provision 
did not exist in the national system of statutory urban planning at that time – nor 
does it today. It proved to be an extremely effective system in the reconstruc-
tion process later on, after the Kobe Earthquake of 1995, as the challenge of the 
huge amount of reconstruction planning was fairly successfully met by efficient 
collaboration between the city and local residents who had been familiar with 
participatory machizukuri.
Following Kobe, the Setagaya ward in Tokyo was the next to establish a 
machizukuri ordinance, in 1982. After 1990, many innovative municipalities cre-
ated their own machizukuri ordinances to supplement the national City Planning 
Law of 1968 (shin toshi keikaku hô) and conducted various trials to support 
machizukuri activities on a broader scale than the nation’s statutory urban plan-
ning allowed (Kobayashi 1999).
Also, beginning with the Nara Machizukuri Center, which opened in 1984, 
similar “machizukuri centers” were established in many localities throughout 
Japan in order to provide citizens with professional support for machizukuri 
activities. Many of them evolved into nonprofit organizations (NPOs) after the 
Nonprofit Organizations Law (NPO hô) was passed in 1998. Hence, by this time 
all the major machizukuri organizations – those of municipalities, citizen groups 
composed of residents, and NPOs – were in place.
The main characteristic of machizukuri during the 1990s was that citizens 
began to participate in plan-making, spurred by the 1992 amendment to the City 
Planning Law, which called for mandatory citizen participation in the creation of 
a municipal master plan. In an effort to incorporate new approaches to creating a 
master plan, many municipalities began to experiment with new methods, such 
as workshops for citizens with little knowledge or experience in urban planning 
(Watanabe 1999). The 1992 amendment thus marked the beginning of genuine 
citizen participation and master planning in Japan (see also Chapter 2).
In this context there arose one remarkable type of citizen activity, a phenom-
enon whereby citizen groups, unsatisfied with the participation opportunities 
offered by the municipality, created their own “master plan” and offered it to the 
municipality and to the public. This kind of plan was called the “citizen-made” 
(shimin-ban) master plan. The first example occurred in 1994 with a plan report 
titled “Community where Residents Play in Harmony” (Sumu hito no kyômei suru 
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machi) that was created by a citizen group from Komae, a suburban municipality 
just south of Tokyo’s Setagaya ward (Komae no Machi wo Kangaeru Kai 1994). 
Seven such master plans were made in the following three and a half years. In 
most cases, these reports were prepared by citizen groups of 20 to 40 members 
who worked for about two years. Ranging from 14 to 150 pages in length, these 
reports used far fewer sophisticated technical terms and incorporated livelier 
charts and illustrations than the documents created by municipal officials, thus 
being much easier to read and understand for the average citizen (Watanabe 1998, 
1999). However, although these reports were published, they had little impact on 
the plan-making process of the municipalities.
The basic principles of participatory machizukuri
The global history of urban planning shows that progress in planning in terms of 
vision and skills was made often through citizen-initiated proposals. Important 
examples include the garden city concept (1898), propounded by Ebenezer 
Howard, a British reformer, and the Chicago Plan (1909) by the American 
architect Daniel H. Burnham, which was supported by a Chicago citizens’ group. 
However, as urban planning later became part of government services that were 
administered by professionals, it became disconnected from the ideas and wishes 
of citizens and amateurs. In Japan as well as the United States, criticism of and 
rebellion against this tendency began in the 1960s. Notably, while such opposition 
was targeted primarily at bureaucrats in Japan, in the United States it was directed 
toward professional planners.
In the Japanese example, the citizen-made plan seems to be an important key to 
the continuing development of participatory machizukuri and even statutory urban 
planning in the early twenty-first century. In order to discuss what this phenom-
enon implies, it is important to first examine what is meant by “participation.”
Often misunderstood, “participation” in machizukuri does not mean simply 
involvement in the “process” of public policy-making – attending group meetings 
and workshops, answering questionnaires, speaking out at a place set up by the 
municipality. The essence of participatory machizukuri is and should be effecting 
the “product” – the involvement of citizens at the municipal government level and 
the resulting reflection of their opinions in the making of public policies.
Generally speaking, municipal policies are first set by the legislature in various 
forms, which include ordinances, plans, and programs, and are then carried out 
by the administration. These policies go through three stages – proposal, official-
ization, and implementation – before affecting the lives of citizens. Within this 
framework, citizen-made plans can be defined as participation in plan-making at 
the proposal stage. This suggests the possibilities for participation in other forms 
and at other stages. Citizens should have a chance to participate in ordinances and 
programs at each stage. At the stage of plan implementation, citizens should have 
the right to participate in the carrying out of the plan by the municipality or on 
their own directly, and by monitoring the process.
In the context of local autonomy and individual responsibility, citizen propos-
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als in the form of ordinances, plans, and programs should be widely welcomed 
although it remains the decision of the municipality whether these proposals are 
adopted or rejected. Ideally, citizens should be able to come up with ideas, expand 
them, and make them into well thought-out proposals, as well as have the ability 
to read, understand, and evaluate proposals made by others, including the munici-
pal administration. Thus, participation in municipal governance needs citizens 
with a high level of skills.
Crucial problems for participatory machizukuri
This kind of all-inclusive participation in municipal governance is yet to be 
seen in Japan, but a growing number of citizens demonstrate a desire to become 
actively involved through machizukuri activities. However, two crucial problems 
first need to be addressed.
The first problem is the lack of a legal system that provides procedures to guar-
antee a citizen’s right to participate. The decision-making power at the munici-
pality level has been traditionally held by the administration rather than by the 
legislature; the former has also had a strong tendency to deny citizen participation 
in the government. Recent demand by citizens for participation has increased to 
such a degree that many municipalities do attempt to respond to it. In many cases, 
however, the participation provided for is superficial, and does not extend beyond 
what Sherry R. Arnstein calls “tokenism” (Arnstein 1969). In fact, except for a 
few innovative municipalities, there is no established system that allows true citi-
zen participation. There is rarely a procedure, for example – as in Kobe – whereby 
residents can propose a plan at the neighborhood level and the municipality, after 
careful consideration, rules officially whether or not to include it as part of its 
master plan for the city as a whole. In short, there are in practice few rights and 
obligations in regard to participation that are clearly guaranteed by national law 
or by local ordinance.
The second problem is a lack of skills on the part of the citizens for participat-
ing in municipal governance. Most citizens are laypeople in the field of urban 
planning, and so it is often difficult for them to even read and understand policy 
proposals, let alone to make plans without outside help. Certain technical support 
is essential, and an important question is who should provide such support – the 
municipality itself or consultants paid for by the municipality, or perhaps consul-
tants chosen by the citizens. All these issues are yet to be resolved.
In order to overcome these two problems, it is necessary to establish some con-
crete measures and a basic guiding principle that will facilitate citizen participa-
tion. An effective basic principle might be summarized as follows: Any citizens’ 
group has the right to initiate, create, and publicize a policy proposal and the right 
to receive necessary technical support in order to make such a proposal. Given 
that such a principle is not yet established in Japan, a concrete step would be to 
codify the following rights and obligations.
The first principle to establish is the citizen’s right to make a policy proposal. 
Under this principle, anyone has the right to suggest a policy proposal to the 
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municipality regarding any issue at any time in the form of an ordinance, plan, or 
program. In the case of a plan, citizens can make a proposal regardless of its scale 
of application whether at the city, community or neighborhood level and regard-
less of its area of services. The specification of “any time” establishes a principle 
that would guarantee a citizen’s right to submit proposals without taking into 
account the municipality’s schedule for reviewing, creating, and revising plans, 
which occurs only once every several years. By stating “anyone,” this principle 
applies not only to residents who own property or live and work in the area but 
also those who have a special interest in it. This principle should not be limited 
to individuals but should be applied also to corporate bodies. Upon receiving a 
policy proposal, the municipality should have the obligation to carefully examine 
it and to decide either to accept or reject it. In case of rejection, the municipality 
should be obligated to specify its reason.
Establishing this system alone, however, is insufficient. How the citizens can 
utilize the system and make it bear the fruit of participation is also important. 
This will require citizens to have certain skills to engage in discussions on a par 
with bureaucrats and local assembly members. To do so, it is most important 
that citizens possess independent initiative, the ability to generate ideas, and 
overall technical and social skills. To strengthen these skills, citizens must study 
and grow. In this sense, community-building is human resource building. If an 
independent-minded citizen wishes to obtain the above skills but does not know 
how, the municipality would be well-advised to help that individual, as this would 
be in the public interest in the long run.
The second necessary principle is the municipality’s obligation to provide 
support. Under this principle the municipality must provide assistance to those 
citizens, upon their request, who want to start machizukuri activities but who do 
not have the necessary skills. In the case of citizens who are working toward a 
policy proposal, the municipality should help citizens to formulate a proposal that 
is satisfactory for public debate. This assistance can take the form of helping with 
logistics (for example, offering office space), providing technical information, 
giving financial assistance, and/or sharing professional expertise. The machizu-
kuri ordinance passed in 1992 by the city of Toyonaka facilitated a citizens’ group 
in the process of setting up a “machizukuri study group,” guaranteeing it financial 
support until it can develop into a “machizukuri council.”
Of course, whether this support system is fundamentally the function of the 
municipality is highly questionable. Ideally it should be the function of a nonprofit 
organization. In many places today, “machizukuri centers” established as NPOs 
to support machizukuri activities are being created by the private sector alone or 
jointly by the private and public sectors. It seems more desirable for the support 
system to be a municipal function, but one in which the municipality serves as 
a background facilitator to encourage citizens to act freely from the bottom up, 
rather than control their activities from the top down.
Clearly, it is necessary to establish the right of citizens to make proposals 
and the obligation of the municipality to provide support. For this to occur, the 
machizukuri ordinance – which comprehensively spells out the framework for 
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supporting citizen participation in the municipality – is essential. An innovative 
example can be seen in the machizukuri ordinance of the city of Minoo (1997), 
which points toward this direction.
Machizukuri and the future
It can be assumed that in twenty-first-century Japan urban planning powers will 
be put entirely into the hands of the municipality, which will make all planning 
decisions regarding matters within its purview. The master plan will be the center 
of the municipality’s planning policy. Whenever necessary, the municipality 
will create not only a master plan for the entire territory but also such plans for 
specific functions or areas. They will be proposed first as policy alternatives and 
subsequently enacted into regulation by the local assembly, becoming official 
policies to be eventually implemented. Consequently, the master plan will 
be amended continually in a flexible and dynamic way. It will be significantly 
different from the rigid and static concept of traditional statutory planning.
The process of creating and revising a master plan requires the establishment 
of a principle of disclosure and open participation whereby committee meetings 
are open to the public and the committee members are selected from among the 
public. In order to ensure transparency in the policy decision-making process, 
all information should be made available, and decisions should be reached, not 
behind closed doors, but through an open discussion with public input. Only then 
should the final official decision be made by the assembly members or mayor, 
who are strictly accountable to the public by the fact that they are elected.
The participation opportunities should be widened to include not just the stage 
of preparing a plan but even the evaluation of its implementation. Citizens should 
have the right to observe and evaluate the implementation of the plan that was pre-
pared by virtue of their participation. They should also have the right to propose, 
if necessary, any amendments or an entire remaking of a plan at any time.
By such constant feedback, municipal officials, assembly members, profes-
sionals, and citizens will improve their planning skills and will gain increased 
confidence in participation as well. This process will also alter the style of various 
kinds of official planning. Being more vulnerable to strict evaluation at the imple-
mentation stage, plans created in the future will become clearer expressions of 
municipal policies, responding more sensitively to local political issues concern-
ing the residents. Plans will become more concrete, realistic, and readily compre-
hensible, in contrast to the present style, which can be characterized as abstract 
and unrealistic, and often conceals core issues from the local inhabitants.
The principles discussed above should apply not only to the master plan but 
also to other official plans, such as a municipality’s Comprehensive Plan and the 
Housing Master Plan. The impetus for such change lies with the citizens, who 
possess ever more sophisticated skills and who are growing in number in each 
area of various machizukuri activities. In this way, traditional statutory urban 
planning will be challenged by the machizukuri initiatives advanced by citizens 
and will undoubtedly be forced out of its stranglehold. Participatory machizukuri, 
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therefore, will be responsible for no less than changing the face of urban planning 
in the twenty-first century.
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7 Whose Kyoto?
 Competing models of local autonomy 
and the townscape in the old imperial 
capital
Christoph Brumann
While it may appear obvious to regard Kyoto, Japan’s imperial capital from 794 
to 1868, as the quintessential old city (koto) of the nation, not everything in the 
city is as old as it seems. Nara, Kyoto’s predecessor as the emperor’s seat, has 
a longer history and arguably has changed less in recent years. Its buildings are 
definitively older than those in central Kyoto, where very little remains from that 
city’s first four centuries when it was known as Heian-kyô, the shining capital, and 
witnessed the first great flourishing of an indigenous high culture. Subsequently, 
there have in fact been many Kyotos, reborn like phoenixes from what were 
literally the ashes of the previous city, destroyed in fire or battle. The image of 
the “old city,” therefore, is comparatively new, coming into full bloom only after 
World War II, which spared Kyoto almost entirely. Today, Kyoto appears indeed 
more ancient than the other, rebuilt Japanese metropolises and can live on its 
history to a considerable extent. Alongside the ongoing traditions of Buddhist 
monastic centers, tea-ceremony schools, handicraft workshops, and geisha 
quarters, the unmatched collection of historical temples and shrines, palaces, and 
gardens is the most impressive component of Kyoto’s cultural heritage. Almost 
40 million tourists visit these sites every year, often paying significant entrance 
fees to do so. yet it is not only these icons of high culture that survive but also 
traditional wooden buildings intended for everyday use. After the war, all of 
Kyoto consisted almost exclusively of traditional architecture and it was very 
likely the largest wooden settlement in the world. What remains of the historical 
townscape today contributes toward imparting to visitors the feeling of having 
entered the “heartland of Japan” (Nihon no kokoro no furusato). With everything 
else changing so quickly in postwar Japan, Kyoto’s role for a nation on the move 
has been to stand still, as much as possible.
Change, however, could not be kept at bay forever: since the 1970s primarily, 
the built environment in Kyoto has been greatly transformed. Particularly during 
the “bubble period” of the years leading up to 1991, rampant real-estate specula-
tion and skyrocketing land prices hastened the demolition of ever larger numbers 
of traditional wooden town houses (machiya) and their replacement with high-rise 
condominiums (manshon), office buildings, prefabricated single-family houses 
(purehabu), and parking lots. The new structures introduced a hodgepodge of 
almost always non-local styles, and often also overshadowed adjacent houses and 
140 Brumann
blocked the view of the surrounding mountains, a celebrated feature of Kyoto’s 
townscape. Widespread dissatisfaction with this state of affairs has repeatedly led 
to heated controversies, most intensely around 1990 when, in defiance of former 
limitations, both the new railway station complex and the rebuilt Kyoto Hotel 
were permitted heights of 60 meters. The economic crisis following the burst 
of the “bubble” reduced the demand for monumental buildings and therefore 
also the occasions for further grand-scale “landscape disputes” (keikan ronsô), 
as such conflicts have come to be known (Iida and Nanbu 1992; Noda 1998; 
Peternolli 1996; Takamichi 1993; Ueda 1991; Watanabe 1994). In addition, the 
remaining machiya have become the object of a strong revitalization movement: 
many hundreds of these structures have been remodeled into restaurants, cafés, 
shops, or fashionable residences, and modern buildings also incorporate elements 
of machiya style (Brumann 2001a). To a lesser extent, prewar western-style archi-
tecture is being reappraised as well.
After a lull in the immediate post-bubble years, however, manshon construc-
tion in central Kyoto attained record levels in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
greatly encouraged by a sharp decrease in land prices and construction costs and 
by relaxed building regulations. Among the buyers of the apartments in these high-
rises is a growing number of older inner-city returnees, for whom – in a somewhat 
perverse feedback loop – revitalized machiya and the remaining scenic streets 
form part of the lure of urban life. Almost every manshon project is disapproved 
of by its neighbors, however, and many encounter organized resistance so that, 
if anything, keikan ronsô are today an even greater part of the Kyotoites’ urban 
experience than during the bubble years. Many citizens agree that the townscape 
is in crisis, and some see it as irremediably damaged. As a consequence, the future 
of Kyoto’s built environment is now a widely acknowledged concern, as attested 
to by the multitude of related proposals, projects, publications, groups, institu-
tions, and organized activities, with hardly a week going by without a related 
meeting, symposium, public lecture, or other event.
More than is immediately apparent, the problems affecting central Kyoto’s 
townscape are influenced by aspects of local autonomy and self-rule, and the 
question of whose Kyoto it is after all – that is, who exactly has a right to make 
decisions affecting the city – is crucial for the way they unfold. The following 
is a social-anthropological analysis of these connections, building on my own 
ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Kyoto over 17 months in 1998–9 and two 
months in 2001.1 Three models of local autonomy can be distinguished, repre-
sented in turn by the traditional neighborhood associations, the numerous citizen 
groups, and the municipal administration’s new dialogic approach. I will attempt 
to demonstrate their respective strengths and weaknesses and to show how they 
all find their limits in another, ultra-local kind of autonomy, that of the individual 
real-estate proprietor.
Neighborhood associations
It is often said that Kyoto has no tradition of self-rule. Rather, with their ever-
changing overlords, the citizens learned to fare best by keeping a low profile. This 
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historical lesson supposedly has sedimented into a collective mentality, prompting 
Kyoto’s inhabitants to passively accept whatever is imposed on them (although 
they are prone to retaliate by merciless backbiting). Indeed, the townspeople have 
been under the authority of feudal lords and shogunate (bakufu) officials for most 
of the city’s history. yet contrary to stereotype and in spite of the city’s saturation 
with nobility, warriors, clergy, and, above all, the imperial court, the ordinary 
merchants and craftsmen of Kyoto wielded a significant amount of power at times 
and were left to regulate their own internal affairs almost continuously.
Neighborhood associations in Kyoto have a particularly long history. 
Throughout the modern era, the basic unit of organization has been the so-called 
ryôgawa-chô (“two-sided block”): in Kyoto’s characteristic rectangular grid of 
streets, a typical block (chô) includes the houses on both sides of a street from 
one corner to the next. The origins of chô organization are believed to lie in the 
late fourteenth or early fifteenth century (Ôzuka 1994: 39; Wakita 1999: 174–5). 
In 1419, legal documents mention chônin (“people of the chô”), apparently as the 
representatives of particular neighborhoods, testifying and making pledges for 
them (Wakita 1999: 182–4). The earliest recorded name of a chô is from 1455, and 
by the first three decades of the sixteenth century such names had become com-
mon (Berry 1994: 212). Many of these names persist today also as part of official 
mailing addresses. Noblemen’s diaries from the first half of the sixteenth century 
include entries for defensive or punitive action by large numbers of chônin, and 
the chô begin to be addressed as corporate entities in government bulletins and 
legal documents. The latter were often provoked by resistance to tax payments or 
corvée labor, which in itself attests to a growing self-confidence on the part of the 
chô. In addition, the chô and their representatives came to be relied on by military 
rulers for tax collection, internal policing, and the mediation of disputes, being 
granted tax exemptions in return (Berry 1994: 214–15, 218–20, 225–9, 235–6). 
Mary Elizabeth Berry argues that, between the start of the Ônin war (1467–77) 
and Oda Nobunaga’s taking of Kyoto in 1568, this pattern of urban organiza-
tion arose when – or even because – the alternatives failed: feudal attachments 
lost their importance for urbanites who began to rent, buy, and sell land rather 
than receive it for vassalage; guilds and commercial associations no longer man-
aged to control an increasingly unfettered market; and the possibility of religious 
organization based on the temples of the Nichiren sect was shattered by the 
brutal suppression of the Hokke uprising in 1536 (Berry 1994: 210–41). What 
remained was organization based on spatial proximity, since “a politics of place 
is . . . a politics that arises from divided interest and contention” (Berry 1994: 
232). There is, however, an important positive incentive too: as demonstrated by 
emakimono picture scrolls of the period, commoner houses had begun to stand in 
rows without intervening spaces already by the twelfth century (Löfgren 2003: 
68–70). This, although advantageous in other respects, encouraged the almost 
instantaneous spread of fires. Organizing with one’s neighbors, rather than with 
people living elsewhere, therefore, offered the chance to control the very people 
whose potential carelessness might affect one’s livelihood most catastrophically. 
The forced unification and pacification of Japan by the successive military dicta-
tors Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu ended the short 
142 Brumann
spring of citizen self-assertion. It deprived urbanites of the military potential they 
had tapped in the Hokke uprising (Berry 1994: 143–53) and relegated craftsmen 
and merchants to the bottom rungs of the new status order. As in other cities, 
however, the chô of Kyoto remained little republics unto themselves throughout 
the Tokugawa period: they had gates (kido) that were closed at night, settled their 
own disputes, acted as legal entities with the power to enter into contracts, borrow 
money, or file lawsuits, and paid government taxes collectively while charging 
their own, separate fees (Itô 1994: 171; Wakita 1999: 185). The chô also selected 
residents by consensus, often demanding an initial investment that could amount 
to no less than one-tenth of the price of the plot of land and house acquired. 
Invariably, the chô had an assembly house (chôkaisho, chôie, or chôseki) and 
employed a guard (bannin) who was responsible for closing the gates and patrol-
ling the neighborhood.
Kyoto’s chô also established detailed written rules, the so-called chôshikimoku 
or chôsadame, which had a direct bearing on the townscape. A good part of these 
rules consisted of instructions for building, fire precautions, and firefighting, and 
stipulated, for example, whether or not a warehouse (kura or dozô) could be located 
on the streetfront, or, in the event of a fire, how many houses next to a burning 
house could be torn down to prevent the spread of flames, with the proviso that 
they be rebuilt jointly afterward (Itô 1993: 311, 314). The fact that Kyoto’s urban 
landscape became much more uniform after the mid-seventeenth century, moving 
away from the earlier individualistic, even extravagant buildings (Salastie 1999: 
52), must certainly be attributed in part to these self-imposed building codes in 
addition to the shogunate’s sumptuary laws. Citizen self-rule worked so well that 
firefighting remained neighborhood-based in Kyoto, in marked contrast to the 
socially more volatile Edo (present-day Tokyo) where anything short of profes-
sional firefighting brigades failed (Brumann 2001b; Ikegami 1988; Kelly 1994: 
315, 320, 321–22, 330).
The chô of Kyoto banded together in larger, discrete chôgumi (groups of chô), 
first mentioned in 1537 (Itô 1994: 161–2), and these were again united into the 
two units of Kamigyô (the “upper city”) and Shimogyô (the “lower city”). Both 
of these levels apparently were less important than the chô, as they had no written 
rules, and Kamigyô and Shimogyô were mainly convenient points of liaison from 
which to forward communications from shogunal authorities (Itô 1994: 165, 170). 
Nonetheless, the chôgumi provided the framework for the rapid expansion of 
Kyoto in the seventeenth century: newly settled chô territories were incorporated 
into the existing units, resulting in a pattern in which the initially separate core 
territories of Kamigyô and Shimogyô – the first parts of Kyoto to be resurrected 
after the Ônin war – were increasingly surrounded and connected by outlying 
“colonies” (Itô 1994: 168). This pattern of local organization did not challenge 
military rule and the general status order of Tokugawa society. Nor did it bring 
about internal democracy, as status differences persisted both between the older 
and newer chô in the same chôgumi (Itô 1994: 172) and within the chô, with 
property owners ranking above tenants, and streetfront residents above back-lane 
dwellers. Nevertheless, commoners were used to managing their own affairs, and 
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as long as they did so quietly, this served both their interests and the shogunate’s 
idea of social order.
After the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the abolition of fixed social status, 
the prefectural government rationalized the chôgumi territories, creating roughly 
rectangular shapes and similar sizes. Known as bangumi, these units collectively 
managed to raise the funds for opening Japan’s first elementary schools only a 
year later, thus accomplishing one of the most celebrated feats of the machishû 
(“townsfolk”), or Kyoto commoners. The new buildings were not only used for 
education but they also served as a police station (kôban), fire watchtower, health 
insurance bureau, population registry, stamp vendor, and assembly hall. With 
the end of World War II, all remaining administrative tasks were taken over by 
municipal government offices (Yoneyama 1986: 13–14) whose lowest level of 
subdivision are the 11 wards (ku) that each contain hundreds of chô. In addition, 
neighborhood associations – further discussed by André Sorensen in Chapter 5 
– were banned by the Allied occupation, given that they had been used as instru-
ments for totalitarian control during wartime; to this day, the revived associations’ 
legal status remains weak at best.
With the closure of most schools in the 1990s (the dwindling numbers of stu-
dents were concentrated in the remaining schools), the bangumi territories lost 
their last official rationale. Nonetheless, the jichi rengôkai, as the neighborhood 
associations are now called, continue to base their territories on the old school 
districts. It is on the jichi rengôkai level that most neighborhood activities, such 
as undôkai (athletic field days), day trips, activities for children and the elderly, 
the training of voluntary fire brigades, hi no yôjin (fire awareness) patrols, and 
town revitalization workshops, occur today. Jichi rengôkai leaders also expect to 
be taken as the mouthpiece of local sentiment by the municipal administration, 
which also supports their work with moderate subsidies. On a subordinate level, 
the chô or (o-)chônai (as they are most commonly called in everyday speech) 
assume responsibility for such tasks as distributing information brochures and 
posters issued by the municipality. They also retain their own recreational activi-
ties, such as the Jizôbon summer festival, and participate in larger shrine festivals 
such as the Gion matsuri. Neighborhood self-organization in Kyoto’s center is 
clearly livelier than in other Japanese cities. A smaller, aging population is a com-
mon concern, however, and the jichi rengôkai in particular are also often seen 
as conservative institutions, dominated by elderly men and often ruled single-
handedly by one strong and outspoken personality. Although membership in the 
chônai is open to any household within their boundaries, those in single-family 
houses are much more likely to join – or have already done so generations ago 
– whereas the residents of multifamily apartment houses are often not interested 
in joining or have not been asked to join in the first place.
In 1999, I had the opportunity to observe a particularly impressive instance of 
neighborhood cooperation in Miyabiyama-chô,2 a chônai of about 20 households 
distributed over not quite 120 meters (Figure 7.1). Since 1500, this centrally 
located neighborhood has contributed a yama (float) to the Gion matsuri, the most 
famous traditional festival in the city and arguably also in the nation (Tani and 
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Masui 1994; Wakita 1999; Yoneyama 1974, 1986; Yoshii 1994). During the week 
leading up to the July 17 Yamaboko junkô parade, consisting of 32 floats accom-
panied by the chônai men dressed in samurai clothing, every household works 
feverishly on the construction and decoration of the yama and a large number of 
other preparations. While funding comes primarily from state, prefectural, and 
municipal subsidies, the workload and the expenses for the traditional garments 
or the entertainment of the many guests, for example, are borne by the residents. 
A remarkable amount of coordination and cooperation is required but, despite the 
manifold tasks and the burden of responsibility, a joyous atmosphere prevails, 
with participants emphasizing the ways in which contributing to this event bol-
sters neighborhood solidarity to a level unknown in those chônai that do not have 
a float.
The general management of festival participation falls to the Miyabiyama 
Foundation, of which, as in the chônaikai, each household is a member. Other 
than the post of chônai head (chônai kaichô), which rotates annually, foundation 
Figure 7.1 Territories of chô (indicated by dotted lines) and jichi rengôkai (indicated by 
solid lines). MY-C, Miyabiyama-chô.
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offices are attained only through long years of committed service, and tenures are 
also long. The foundation is said to have democratized considerably under the 
current chairman, a retired company director who has made a point of consulting 
the other office-holders over important issues. This contrasts with his predeces-
sors, who used to decide everything by themselves, down to their deputies who 
would customarily follow them in office. Deference to age and experience is still 
evident, but discussions have become quite open, with younger people unafraid to 
speak their minds. Clearly, the neighborhood has come a long way from prewar 
conditions – under which festival participation was financed by a few wealthy 
landowner households, with all other residents, particularly tenants, following 
their dictates, and with status differences continuously on display.
The self-imposed building codes of the chôshikimoku are long gone, but the 
social closeness created by the festival has worked to preserve Miyabiyama-chô’s 
townscape on at least one occasion: in the 1980s, one resident planned to tear down 
his small house and build a five-floor manshon with studio rental apartments, thus 
raising the problem of introducing a transient population that most likely would 
have little intent of contributing to neighborhood life. His Miyabiyama neighbors 
objected, however, and in the end the resident built a smaller structure with rental 
offices rather than apartments. Presumably, this also discouraged whatever plans 
other residents had for high-rise development and, indeed, the chônai was one of 
the last three among the 32 Yamaboko junkô neighborhoods that still had no high-
rises. In 2001, however, peer pressure was powerless against a further manshon 
incursion: the only remaining wholesale kimono-trading company went bankrupt, 
and its building and plot of land were auctioned off to a condominium developer. 
A 12-story manshon was completed and the apartments in it sold by the end of 
2003.
Because the structure of the condominium conforms to current zoning regula-
tions, residents decided early on that it was futile to put up a fight. Rather, they 
pressed for compensations by the developer, whose business would be harmed 
by open protest activities. The chônai residents’ demands did not concentrate 
on the townscape aspect; a height reduction by one floor and some influence on 
the facade design was all that was achieved in this regard. Rather, the residents 
pushed to obtain facilities that would benefit neighborhood life. As a result, the 
new manshon contains a storeroom for festival accessories, chônai assemblies 
can be held in the manshon’s meeting room, and the entrance area will be used 
for the display of chônai valuables and festival accessories during the Gion mat-
suri period. In addition, a hokora (small shrine) built on the manshon premises 
houses the neighborhood’s statue of the bodhisattva Jizô worshiped in the popular 
jizôbon summer festival, which previously had no adequate home. All of this will 
be provided at nominal charges, and the neighbors feel that, in return for their 
compliance, they have gained maximum concessions even though greatly modi-
fying the building or entirely preventing it was impossible. They also have invited 
the manshon residents to participate in the Gion matsuri, hoping thus to secure its 
future. It is generally agreed that this relatively successful deal owes considerably 
to the solidarity achieved through cooperation on the festival, as well as to the 
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fact that the Miyabiyama Foundation officeholders were proven leaders, making 
it easier to find chief negotiators acceptable to all.
Citizen groups
In addition to neighborhood associations, Kyoto is also recognized for its large 
and lively array of citizen groups (shimin dantai or shimin undô), as befits a major 
academic and intellectual center and the most important stronghold of the Japan 
Communist Party (JCP), whose candidates have served as mayor and prefectural 
governor in the past (Krauss 1980; see also Chapter 6 by Watanabe Shun-ichi in 
this volume). A large number of these groups – probably more than 100 – focus on 
townscape issues. Some work for the preservation of historical buildings, others 
concentrate on revitalizing particular parts of the city, and still others coordinate 
anti-manshon activities or attempt to address Kyoto’s enormous traffic problems, 
the protection of the surrounding hillside (Hoffman 1996: 558–673), or other 
environmental concerns. More than the neighborhood associations, which tend 
to keep to themselves, these groups engage the municipal administration and 
the various experts that sit on the numerous discussion panels that debate the 
future of Kyoto. The more politically minded among these groups compensate for 
unsatisfactory party politics in the city council as well as on the prefectural level, 
where for more than 20 years a conservative and big-business-friendly coalition 
led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has had the communists as the sole 
opposition, leaving little choice for the considerable number of citizens who feel 
alienated by both parties. The citizen groups appeal to grassroots democratic 
principles and often take European and American achievements in political 
culture, citizen participation, and environmental protection as a model for their 
own society, whose democratic potential they see as far from exhausted.
One such group is the Mokuzôkai (Wooden Building Association), which 
for some 10 years has dedicated itself to the preservation and revival of Kyoto’s 
machiya. Membership stands at about 100 and, along with machiya owners and 
residents, encompasses architects, craftsmen, researchers, and other interested 
individuals; probably a majority of members have some professional stake 
in these houses. The main activity is a monthly meeting dedicated to visiting 
machiya or machiya renovations, hearing lectures on all aspects of preservation, 
and holding panel discussions, which are sometimes also open to the general pub-
lic. A newsletter – formerly annual and now bimonthly – is sent to all members. 
Member architects have been associated with several widely publicized machiya 
renovations. In 1999, a separate builders’ association formed with the purpose of 
reestablishing the broken bonds between machiya residents and machiya builders. 
This branch admits only architects, carpenters, and other craftspeople, of whom 
there were about 30 in 2001. By that time, these members had consulted on almost 
200 houses and renovated close to 30; importantly, they had also published a 
renovation manual. Simultaneous with the builders’ branch, the Mokuzôkai also 
founded a “friends’ society” for the approximately 150 laypeople – often machiya 
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citizen groups both worked to bring down the plan. In particular, the restaurants 
and chaya (“tea houses”, the location of geisha parties) on Pontochô, a famous 
geisha quarter (Dalby 1983), feared that the intimacy of this narrow lane would 
suffer from the proposed approach to the bridge that was to cut right through 
it. Neighborhood resistance, however, easily succumbed to city government 
pressure put on the leaders of the chaya associations and other business groups, 
given that they had a vital interest in ensuring smooth relations with the police 
and the political and business leaders who were the most likely chaya customers. 
Although jichi rengôkai office-holders were incensed when municipal officials 
called a meeting to explain the construction plan, presenting it as a fait accompli, 
most of them – including the chairman – felt that continued resistance against the 
municipal government could damage their interests. Not only did they oblige, 
they also turned against the two office-holders who did not want to give in.
When the locals gave up their fight at the end of 1997, the citizen groups that 
had formed to oppose the bridge plan stepped in. Since these groups lacked a 
circumscribed territorial base and were also rather diverse in their social composi-
tion – including primarily those with flexible schedules, such as people working 
in the professions, priests, scholars, retirees, or recent victims of risutora (com-
pany downsizing), rather than salaried employees – they could not be suppressed 
easily. Differing attitudes toward cooperation with the JCP, which was considered 
a ready supporter of citizen groups but also interested in using the groups for its 
own agenda, led to the formation of two separate coalitions. One of these became 
allied with the JCP and concentrated on swaying the city council, while the other 
chose to maintain its distance from the party, creating a membership association 
that grew to approximately 250 and used the extraparliamentary strategy of orga-
nizing a referendum on the bridge issue. Greatly aided by the media, as well as 
by many of the mayor’s usual allies who also voiced concern over a plan they did 
not like, these groups brought about the impossible: in August 1998, the mayor 
withdrew what was an already fully approved and budgeted public-works project 
(kôkyô jigyô). The end of the Pont des Arts replica project made nationwide head-
lines (Kimura 1999). To the JCP-related coalition’s great dismay, the nonaligned 
wing received most of the media credit; certainly, its prominence had made it 
easier for the mayor to give in than if only JCP-affiliated groups had been active.
The groups opposed to the Pont des Arts formed around veterans from previ-
ous disputes who as a result had both experience and useful contacts. Although in 
the past citizen groups have been rather successful in fighting a number of contro-
versial development projects in the Kyoto hillsides, halting dams or golf courses, 
resistance to the new railway station building and the rebuilding of Kyoto Hotel 
achieved little, other than perhaps discouraging further large-scale ventures. The 
Pont des Arts case marked the first time citizen groups triumphed in a city-center 
keikan ronsô. It should not be overlooked, however, that, with the sheer number of 
problems associated with the bridge plan, its perceived environmental and “cul-
tural” – that is, nonpolitical – aspects, and the significant fact that the planned site 
was unmistakably public ground, the groups had been blessed with exceptionally 
favorable circumstances unlikely to be replicated in the future (Brumann 2002).
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As these examples have shown, citizen groups in Kyoto do have an impact, 
but they face a number of serious obstacles. The most important impediment is 
their shaky legal status: contrary to the practices of other countries, there are no 
tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations (NPOs) and for contributions to them 
under Japanese law, and the favorable legal form of a foundation (zaidan hôjin) 
is exceedingly difficult to attain since it is tightly controlled by central govern-
ment agencies. In the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake, which pointed up the 
value of self-help efforts by citizen groups when state agencies fail, the so-called 
Nonprofit Organizations Law (NPO hô) was passed in 1998 to facilitate the work-
ings of these groups. Since that time, nonprofit organizations have been permitted 
to incorporate, enabling them to execute contracts, open bank accounts, and the 
like. Obviously, this is a big step forward from the earlier situation in which these 
responsibilities fell to individual group members, with all the attending legal and 
financial risks. At the same time, however, these organizations continue to be 
taxed at the same rates as business corporations, and donations to them are still 
not tax-deductible. Also, while it has become highly popular to invoke borantia 
(volunteer) efforts as a remedy for a wide range of problems, there is still no culture 
of charitable donations that would allow for the kind of fundraising activities that, 
in turn, might put NPOs on a more stable footing, with adequate organizational 
infrastructure. As a consequence, none of the citizen groups I observed in Kyoto 
employs more than perhaps one part-time paid staff member, in marked contrast 
to their counterparts in Europe and America.
Probably because they are already fully absorbed by overcoming these struc-
tural problems, citizen groups in Kyoto also find it difficult to cooperate with 
one another. While the relatively successful environmental groups have formed 
several permanent coalitions, networking among townscape-related NPOs has 
never really taken hold even among those working on the same issue, such as 
machiya preservation. The bifurcation of the movement battling the Pont des Arts 
on political grounds therefore is not at all atypical and, while it may have helped 
to make the movement appear larger in this special case, it reduces the possible 
impact of citizen opposition in most others.
Municipal administration
During the press conference at which he announced the withdrawal of the Pont des 
Arts replica project, the mayor of Kyoto justified his decision by citing the harm 
that might be done to the spirit of pâtonashippu (from the English “partnership”) 
between citizens and local government. With this loanword, he invoked one of 
the master terms of recent Japanese political discourse that has largely replaced 
previous expressions such as “citizen participation” (shimin sanka or jûmin 
sanka). Although the mayor’s handling of the Pont des Arts conflict fell short of 
the ideal of citizen empowerment that pâtonashippu is referring to, it is indeed 
taken seriously by considerable segments of the municipal administration.
The best-known recent attempt to promote the new ideal is the Kyoto Workshop, 
a nominally independent foundation (zaidan hôjin) that is financed, however, by 
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the city of Kyoto and staffed almost exclusively with its bureaucrats, who are 
delegated for three- to five-year terms. Established in 1997, the workshop strives 
to take part in the new wave in Japanese urban planning based on cases such 
as Taishido in Setagaya ward, Tokyo, or Mano in Kobe (see also Chapter 6). In 
this model, townscape disputes and urban planning in general are understood as 
predominantly interpersonal tasks for which establishing communication between 
all parties concerned – neighborhood associations, citizen groups, companies, 
experts, and, of course, the municipal administration itself – is considered crucial. 
The Kyoto Workshop engages in what is known as machizukuri, literally “town-
making” (also referred to by other authors as “community-building”), the “softer” 
counter-concept to the more technical term, toshi keikaku, which is usually used to 
designate urban planning in Japanese (Hein 2001; Hohn 2000: 367–492, 515–23; 
Sorensen 2002: 269–72, 308–25; Vogt 2001).
To this end, the workshop provides seminars and lectures, information, media-
tion, research and counseling services, and a bimonthly newsletter. In addition, 
its staff are skilled at organizing public events and in presentation techniques. In 
most of these activities, a congenial atmosphere prevails, with participants feeling 
free to voice their – often skillfully argued – opinions. Participants tend to play 
their accustomed roles, however; the university professor will not be asked to 
leave the expert’s high ground and the neighborhood leader will not be challenged 
to adopt a translocal perspective. In addition, workshop staff carefully orchestrate 
all interactions between the participating groups and always remain in charge of 
the proceedings. Moreover, the implementation of the results of the communi-
cation processes is often only a secondary goal. When, for example, the Kyoto 
Workshop held a machizukuri contest for university students in 1998, inviting 
them to submit concrete projects for several neighborhoods to be coordinated 
with the residents, the resulting proposals were publicly displayed, duly admired, 
and published in lavish brochures. How realistic the proposals were, from a finan-
cial as well as an implementation point of view, however, never became a serious 
concern, either for the participating neighborhood residents and workshop staff or 
for a number of the students who freely dreamed up underground footpaths and 
other extravagant fantasies.
Encouraging and cooperating with citizen volunteer activities is a main goal 
of the Kyoto Workshop, and the foundation collaborates on a regular basis with 
both neighborhood associations and citizen groups – an attempt to integrate the 
two other models of local autonomy. One of the groups with which the workshop 
undertakes cooperative efforts is the Mokuzôkai; joint projects include a complete 
survey of all machiya within the boundaries of the historical city, conducted with 
the help of some 600 volunteers in 1998–9, and a number of public events such 
as symposiums, machiya visits with talks given by the residents, and a machiya 
craft fair. Cooperation fails to fully satisfy both sides, however. Mokuzôkai mem-
bers have at times felt taken advantage of by the Kyoto Workshop, perceiving a 
reluctance to grant them an equal say in joint ventures. They also complain that 
the Kyoto Workshop unnecessarily doubles up their own projects, such as the 
machiya mediation service or the renovation manual, a lament echoed by other 
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groups. In the eyes of the Mokuzôkai, public funds would be better spent on 
commissioning the citizen groups with such tasks. Kyoto Workshop personnel, 
however, claim that there are limits to the degree that, as a publicly funded entity 
staffed by public servants, it can entrust private initiatives with public tasks or 
share data with them. They are also of the opinion that the Mokuzôkai and other 
citizen groups focus too narrowly on particular interests and lack a larger perspec-
tive. Thus, after realizing that an ambitious home visit program for machiya resi-
dents interested in renovation exceeded the joint resources, the Kyoto Workshop 
aborted the program and refused to allow Mokuzôkai members to continue the 
visits on their own. This was a great blow to the Mokuzôkai, who saw the move 
as failing those machiya residents who had expressed an interest in such a visit. 
Despite the disenchantment voiced by both sides, however, cooperation contin-
ues, and Mokuzôkai leaders as well as members of other citizen groups see the 
Kyoto Workshop’s existence as beneficial overall, especially since it gives them 
access to foundation resources such as its lecture hall. Full pâtonashippu, how-
ever, would require a greater readiness on the part of the bureaucrats to relinquish 
control. For the same reason, other citizen groups like those that fought the Pont 
des Arts replica are thoroughly suspicious of anything that comes under the name 
of pâtonashippu.
In any case, most of the public planning of the townscape preceded the advent 
of pâtonashippu, or remains little influenced by it, following instead what could 
be termed the “old model” of top-down planning in local government. Kyoto 
City pioneered a number of townscape protection schemes in the 1970s. One of 
these was the extension of inner-city “aesthetic zones” (bikan chiku) – originally 
a tool to bring about orderly modern townscapes (Sorensen 2002) – to encompass 
the preservation of the traditional urban landscape; another was the establish-
ment of special preservation districts for historic architecture that later were also 
introduced into national law. Additionally, absolute height limits were retained 
despite national pressure to control the volume of individual buildings only 
by their floor–area ratio (FAR, or yôsekiritsu, defined as the total floor area of 
a building divided by the plot size). For most of the 1980s, however, govern-
ment planning in Kyoto followed the national course of increasing deregulation, 
actively encouraging both the new railway station building and the rebuilt Kyoto 
Hotel and treating manshon disputes as private matters between developers and 
neighbors. Also, financial subsidies for the preservation of machiya and other 
historical architecture remained limited at best. The result is that, while the pro-
claimed goal of urban development since the 1990s has been “conservation for 
the north, revitalization for the center, and imagination for the south” (hokubu 
hozon, toshin saisei, nanbu sôzô), the local government has done very little to 
create the regulations and incentives that would realize this aim. Many citizen 
activists therefore see an essential lack of sincerity in such ventures as the Kyoto 
Workshop, convinced that, despite the honest intentions of its staff, their hands 
are tied: collusion between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians now 
in power, top-level bureaucrats, and the construction and real-estate industry – the 
notorious “iron triangle” (Kerr 2001; McCormack 1996: 25–77; Woodall 1996) 
– will find ways to block restrictive planning, according to this belief.
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The three models intertwined: the aftermath of the Pont des 
Arts dispute
The aftermath of the Pont des Arts project offers an instructive illustration of how 
unintended consequences can result when the three models of local autonomy 
interact. Despite his withdrawal of the proposed bridge replica in 1998, Kyoto’s 
mayor confirmed his intention of building a – no longer French – footbridge in 
the same location, thereby implementing a long-standing city planning decision 
(toshi keikaku kettei) and responding to the demands of a vociferous group of 
east bank residents who had been pressing for a bridge connection all along. 
Nothing happened initially but, after the LDP victory in the following city council 
election, an advisory council (shingikai) was set up, meeting for the first time 
in July 2000. In Kyoto as well as elsewhere and at other government levels, 
shingikai are routinely summoned for developing recommendations on a myriad 
of questions, typically including academic experts, representatives of concerned 
industries and organizations, and nonspecialized intellectual and creative 
luminaries (bunkajin), typically about a dozen in all. Bureaucrats are considered 
the beneficiaries of the proceedings, listening in silence and responding to any 
questions directed to them. Some advisory councils in Kyoto, including the city 
planning shingikai, are permanent, although the majority are created as needed 
for a specific task, in this case discussing the future of the Kamogawa bridges. 
Although the council was supposed to consider all 38 bridges, developing ideas 
for the planned footbridge was an explicit part of the agenda and clearly became 
the main point of debate. Members of advisory councils in Kyoto are handpicked 
by the municipal administration and, depending also on the extent to which the 
often pre-agreed chair relies on the usually middle-level bureaucrats who act as a 
kind of secretariat, the council’s nominal independence can become questionable. 
Still, the self-imposed standard of pâtonashippu has brought about a notable 
degree of change since the late 1990s. Today, shingikai are increasingly open to 
public audiences and, in most cases, two councilors – one male, one female – are 
selected from among ordinary citizens who apply for participation. Evidence of 
this trend was reflected in the shingikai established to address the Kamogawa 
bridges, with the minutes of the meetings published on the Internet.3 In addition, a 
leader of the Pont des Arts opposition movement’s non-party wing was also made 
a councilor.
The purpose of the bridge shingikai was solely to debate the kind of footbridge 
that would be built, not construction as such. In addition, the chair, known as 
having endorsed the Pont des Arts replica, proposed a relatively short schedule to 
begin with, of only five meetings. This encouraged several councilors to enthusi-
astically dream up their own concepts for the design of the bridge. Maybe it had 
been believed by the city government that the single dissenting voice of the Pont 
des Arts opposition movement leader could be suppressed. This did not happen, 
however, given that another councilor – a university professor of urban planning 
and gifted public speaker – tenaciously pursued his creed of deepening the involve-
ment of ordinary citizens in town planning matters. Since these citizens and the 
Whose Kyoto? 153
press were present at the sessions, there were few arguments the other members 
could make against his unprecedented idea of meeting representatives from the 
bridge site’s vicinity and including them as panelists in a public symposium. Once 
legitimacy had been accorded to so many voices, however, it became very dif-
ficult to privilege those of the shingikai’s members: in the sessions following the 
symposium, several members admitted to having underestimated how serious and 
emotionally charged an issue the bridge was for its neighbors.
It may be that the locals had also been counted on to remain docile but, if so, 
this did not prove true either: Pontochô business associations and the west bank 
jichi rengôkai now openly opposed the bridge plan. For one, resistance had shown 
its potential in the protest movement’s victory against all odds and, with politi-
cal, administrative, and economic leaders’ expense accounts melting away in the 
economic crisis, their importance for local subsistence had decreased. Moreover, 
leadership within the associations had changed: the chairman of the jichi rengôkai, 
for instance, could neither be demoted nor overruled without embarrassing every-
one when he opted against resisting the Pont des Arts replica project. When his 
tenure was up for renewal, however, none of the other office-holders proposed 
the customary extension; instead, a new chair opposed to the bridge plan was 
elected. As a result, when the expert commission held separate meetings with a 
number of local business and neighborhood associations whose domain bordered 
on the bridge site, a predictable picture emerged: associations on the east bank 
unwaveringly supported the bridge while the major associations on the west bank 
opposed it.
Thus, the advisory council dragged on over an unprecedented nine meetings 
and more than two years before, in 2002, it finally failed to muster the cour-
age to recommend a particular course of action. Largely because of the Pont des 
Arts opposition activist’s demands, the council’s proposal (teigen) continued to 
be redrafted until the final version submitted to the mayor4 simply threw the ball 
back in his court: while enumerating the merits of a footbridge, it acknowledged 
the opponents’ arguments and stressed local discord and the necessity of further 
discussion. It also pinned high hopes on the direct talks between west bank and 
east bank representatives that had been taken up after the symposium. The mayor 
announced that the proposal would have to be examined carefully before tak-
ing any action. Opponents were greatly relieved; some of them, however, also 
pointed out that building a bridge would have been very difficult in any case, since 
municipal budgets were already strained to breaking point. Seen in this light, the 
council may even have done the mayor a favor by not recommending immediate 
construction, thus allowing him to save face among the east bank residents who 
would hold him to his promise of erecting a bridge.
In considering the ways in which the three models of local autonomy and a 
fourth – the delegitimated but still persistent model of autocratic rule by “those 
above” (o-kami) – interacted in this case, a curious picture emerges: the old model 
of local government, which did as it pleased without consulting residents, had 
provoked the ire of the new model of civil society, the citizen groups that, to 
universal surprise, brought down the Pont des Arts project. Subsequently, pâtona-
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shippu, as the new model of local government, returned the footbridge matter to 
the old model of citizen self-organization, the neighborhood associations. Both 
moves were certainly unplanned but, as they led to a predictable stalemate, the 
citizen groups did little to stop this development. However, they thus also helped 
to cede the footbridge question to local residents as a private matter, disregard-
ing the larger citizenry’s say over the destiny of this prominent piece of public 
space. In the advisory council, the voice of the public was only sought through a 
rather biased opinion survey, and the idea of holding a referendum was not even 
mentioned by the opposition representative who had actually worked for it during 
the Pont des Arts phase.
Ultra-local autonomy: public and private control of land
An observation made independently by a Pont des Arts opposition activist and a 
journalist for a JCP-related weekly provides another clue why citizen groups so 
readily relinquished their voice on this important issue: all their acquaintances 
whom they had asked for an opinion on the bridge plan felt urged to state that they 
did not live close to the bridge site before giving their answer. Even if unwittingly, 
they thus relativized their own views, giving precedence to those of the direct 
neighbors. Although the number of people who pass by, and no doubt appreciate, 
the bridge site every day is probably in six figures, citizens still deferred to an 
“owner” of the site, so to speak. It thus appears questionable whether there can 
really be such a thing as public space in Kyoto.
The view that land and the buildings standing on it are the private domain of 
the legal owner is deeply entrenched in Japanese legislation (Sorensen 2002: 156, 
332, 342) as well as in the popular consciousness, and there is nothing to indicate 
that this belief is any less strong in Kyoto. It also reaches well into the ranks 
of townscape-related citizen groups. When I interviewed her, a leading activist 
against the Pont des Arts replica and owner of a nearby restaurant censured the 
Bukkyôkai, an organization representing many temples important for tourism, for 
resisting the high-rise rebuilding of Kyoto Hotel. Given the value of the land on 
which it was standing, neither the proprietors in this case nor in that of the new 
railway station building could be expected to forgo an adequate return on their 
enormous investment. In another example, during the mid-1990s a controversy 
arose when it became known that one of the most famous machiya of Kyoto 
was to be torn down for constructing a manshon. Immediately, citizen activists 
started to collect signatures and organize an international appeal against the plan. 
Although leading Mokuzôkai members were divided in their opinion, several of 
them defended the right of the family of the owner to dispose of its property as it 
saw fit, and one of them even mediated the sale. The fact that one of the owners 
was a central figure in the management of a famous traditional festival and might 
thus be expected to defend cultural heritage did nothing to change this assess-
ment. The city of Kyoto reacted similarly: when pressured by concerned activists 
to purchase the property and preserve it as public patrimony, the mayor objected, 
insisting that this could not be justified before other owners who might want their 
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own property to be treated in the same privileged way. The building eventually 
was demolished. One urban planning professor involved in the issue suggested 
to me that making a public cause of the machiya was precisely what destroyed 
it. According to him, this only strengthened the owners’ determination whereas, 
through more discreet negotiations, ways to save the house might still have been 
found. These are only a few examples of a surprisingly individualistic stance, 
running counter to what might be expected from a stereotypically “collectivist” 
society. It is the lack of consent from individual owners and the danger of heated 
protests that city officials invariably give as a reason for their being careful about 
imposing stricter regulations.
When considering the level of land prices that continue to be among the high-
est in the world, even after having dropped to less than a tenth of bubble-period 
peak values in central Kyoto, the defensiveness of real-estate owners against 
public interference becomes understandable. The value of the land often exceeds 
that of the building by far and despite falling prices is also more constant, given 
the inferior quality and short lifespan of much new construction and the small 
demand for resales. Much more than on the actual building standing on it, the 
value of a plot of land depends on the building potential, and this is reduced 
by any restrictions. Owners who simply want to continue living in their house 
and pass it on to their children will profit from declining land prices by saving 
on property and inheritance taxes. When there is an interest in the capital value 
of the house, however, such a decline is unwelcome. Often, owners only derive 
a vague sense of security from a sales potential that is not used, yet given that 
land remains the most important collateral for bank loans – banks first ask for 
real-estate, not income, when issuing credit cards – land prices become a concrete 
and vital concern for the many companies in central Kyoto that are deeply in debt. 
Creditor banks are not interested in a price slump either. In addition, the city of 
Kyoto profits since property taxes are one of the revenues it may pocket directly, 
and the national government as the recipient of inheritance taxes does not look 
kindly on any measure that cuts into its own resources.
This explains a great deal of the laxity of local and national building controls. 
The fact that buildings can only be designated as cultural property (bunkazai) with 
the consent of their owner, zoning regulations for central Kyoto that far exceed 
the actual average height and bulk of buildings, and a jurisdiction that treats the 
countless zoning infringements as trivial offenses and almost never orders the 
demolition of illegal structures all betray the shared interest of many citizens and 
both national and local governments in high land prices. Stricter limitations could 
also be expected to increase the attractiveness of an urban area so that prices 
recover and even rise in the long run, as exemplified by the gentrification of pic-
turesque historic quarters all over the world. Still, this is as yet undemonstrated in 
Kyoto, and when it is the threats of impending bankruptcy or the actual depletion 
of municipal coffers that count, time horizons necessarily shrink. Also when inter-
acting among themselves, ordinary citizens avoid interfering with one another’s 
real-estate. The voluntary covenants (kenchiku kyôtei) over building rules that 
owners of contiguous lots may impose on themselves according to the Building 
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Standards Law (kenchiku kijun hô) are an underutilized tool in central Kyoto. 
In informal interaction as well, there are virtues in keeping silent about one’s 
neighbors’ construction activities. At the very least, one thus retains a moral right 
to build without inhibition, as was confirmed by two informants and city-center 
home owners who, despite being Pont des Arts opposition activists, had remained 
passive when their direct neighbors rebuilt their homes higher than they had 
wanted. The cumulative aspect of such deregulation and self-restraint, however, 
is the widely deplored townscape crisis.
In order to assess more precisely how the representatives of the different mod-
els of local autonomy view the property question, I distributed a questionnaire 
on townscape issues before the end of my first field stay, receiving it back from 
210 informants. Table 7.1 juxtaposes the responses of four groups of respondents 
– Miyabiyama-chô residents, Kyoto Workshop staff, Mokuzôkai members, and 
anti-Pont des Arts citizen activists – to a number of questions touching on the con-
trol over real-estate and its value. Mokuzôkai members and Pont des Arts opposi-
tion activists are most alike in their opinions and lean most to those answers that 
imply greater public interference and control in such matters as height limitations, 
mutually binding building covenants, building designs adapted to the surroundings, 
or financial support for historic architecture. By contrast, among Miyabiyama-chô 
residents, such public-control views never achieve an absolute majority. Kyoto 
Workshop staff opinions in most cases fall in between. Miyabiyama-chô residents 
and Workshop staff, however, are most alike and at the same time most removed 
from the citizen groups on the one question that mentions enforcement, namely, 
the preservation of historic or scenic properties against their owners’ will (legal in 
Germany, for instance). Japan’s constitution gives the public the right to expropri-
ate real-estate, and this is also put in practice, for example, in the construction of 
roads or airports. Extending the practice to historic townscapes, however, has not 
occurred thus far and would be likely to divide Kyoto’s residents.
More surprising than the differences between groups, however, was the fact 
that, even among Miyabiyama-chô residents, views entailing the priority of private 
over public control achieve an absolute majority only once, over the question of 
public interference in machiya preservation. This is a matter that directly touches 
on these residents’ interests since most of them actually own and live in such a 
house over which they claim free disposal. On other issues, however, those who 
favor public control of land and buildings are certainly more numerous than might 
be expected from the interviews and overheard remarks in Miyabiyama-chô and 
from city officials’ warnings that citizen consensus had to be built before stricter 
regulations could be imposed. It may be that the private-control supporters are 
more outspoken, but it also could indicate a sign of change, with residents recon-
sidering their former views. The deepening crisis of the townscape, the construc-
tion of ever larger manshon, the growing prestige of traditional architecture, and, 
to a considerable extent, the plummeting land prices that reduce the importance 
of land as a capital asset cannot fail to have an impact on those residents who are 
continually exposed to these developments. If the city of Kyoto were to regulate 
zoning and construction more strictly, the public outcry would probably turn out 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In fact, strengthening public control is what the city of Kyoto has embarked 
on, however carefully. After a number of manshon projects regarded as particu-
larly appalling, unlikely candidates such as the standing city planning shingikai 
or major business leaders publicly voiced concern and demanded action. As a 
consequence, an advisory council was established to debate the future of the city-
center area, and worked more speedily than the council on the Kamogawa bridges. 
Based on the council’s recommendations, municipal officials drafted several new 
ordinances, which were then adopted by the city council in 2002,5 creating the first 
deviation from the course of deregulation pursued through the last three decades. 
In addition, fire prevention ordinances were eased for a number of areas densely 
packed with machiya so that rebuilding wooden houses and facades without pre-
tending to merely repair a continuous building has become possible. In this latter 
move, the city made use of the amended Local Autonomy Law (chihô jichi hô), 
which allows municipalities wider discretion in modifying building regulations 
and other national laws. On the citizens’ side, 2002 also saw the conclusion of the 
largest building covenant to date, involving approximately 100 plots on an area of 
two hectares, far exceeding the scope of any predecessor. This was brought about 
by the efforts of a machizukuri group that, while still having a local focus, makes 
a point of not sticking to the established territories and strategies of neighborhood 
associations.
These are clearly only tentative steps whose weaknesses are easily identified. 
The area in which height limitations have been tightened in 2002 is one from 
which the hub of the manshon rush has already retreated, and the height limits of 
the building covenant stand at 18 or 21 meters so that buildings of significant size 
are still possible. Even so, a trend long considered unstoppable is being reversed. 
What will follow is difficult to predict, especially since the rise and fall of land 
prices and of the economy in general depend on so many non-local factors. As 
one such non-local factor, a recent decision of the Tokyo District Court (Tôkyô 
chisai) could prove momentous: in the city of Kunitachi in the Tokyo agglom-
eration, citizen groups sued a developer whose newly built condominium they 
saw as destroying the scenic appeal of the tree-lined Daigaku dôri (“University 
Street”). In 2002, the court ruled that construction of the 44-meter-high manshon, 
even though conforming to the zoning regulations in effect when construction 
was started, exceeded a bearable limit for people living nearby. The court ordered 
the developer to remove everything above a height of 20 meters. The ruling has 
been repealed by the Tokyo High Court (Tôkyô kôsai) in 2004 but is likely to be 
appealed to the Supreme Court. Other courts too have upheld the public right on 
the townscape, and legislators have reacted swiftly: in 2004, the Diet passed a 
“Townscape Law” (keikan hô). With this law, not only is the townscape/landscape 
(keikan) appreciated as the “common property of the people” (kokumin kôkyô no 
zaisan) but “townscape districts” (keikan chiku) are also introduced in which, 
contrary to previous practice, building colors and forms may be prescribed in 
detail. Single structures important for the townscape can also be protected. In 
addition, the new law talks of incentives such as subsidies, tax breaks, and the 
transfer of floor–area ratio entitlements between plots of land, and it also allows 
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residents to apply for “townscape district” status with the consent of two-thirds of 
the landowners within a given area.6 Much will depend on how these measures are 
put into practice and how they are applied to mixed zones such as Kyoto’s center; 
radical change is certainly unlikely to occur. Nonetheless, the townscape and its 
protection now have a recognized legal existence – a fact whose importance can 
hardly be overestimated.
Whether these developments will help to save central Kyoto from further 
unplanned development, and when, is an open question; decreasing profitability 
of even the tallest manshon in a fiercely competitive market could have a faster 
effect. How the three models of local autonomy evolve in the future, however, is 
also decisive. Kyoto City will continue its course of pâtonashippu, even if only 
because, with exhausted finances, there is no way around delegating public tasks 
to the citizens. Neighborhood associations and the residents they represent will 
have to wean themselves from the private-property view, realizing how doing so 
can protect their interests rather than harm them, and how self-made regulations 
can improve the quality of life. Citizen groups working on the townscape will 
probably also have to increase their commitment. Typically, many of their leaders 
are people who come from outside Kyoto, often living in the suburbs. One Pont 
des Arts opposition leader told me how his having grown up elsewhere simplified 
his activism, giving him far less long-standing or fewer inherited social ties and 
obligations to consider. In order to have a voice in the development of central 
Kyoto that will be considered legitimate even by longtime residents, however, 
citizen groups must reach out to these residents and probably also acquire prop-
erty in the city center themselves, perhaps by exploring novel models of joint or 
trust ownership. Only then would their claim that it is their Kyoto as well become 
irrefutable.
Notes
 1 Funding by the Japan Foundation for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) during 
1998–9 and by the German Research Association (DFG) during 2001–3 is gratefully 
acknowledged. I also wish to thank my academic hosts, Professor Nakamaki Hirochika 
and the National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka (Minpaku).
 2 Following standard anthropological practice, the names of organizations in which 
personal informants participate have been changed, and details about personal 
informants have been left vague in order to ensure confidentiality.
 3 See http://www.city.kyoto.jp/kensetu/gairo/gairoken/hashi/ (last accessed January 
2005).
 4 See http://www.city.kyoto.jp/kensetu/gairo/gairoken/hashi/teigen/index.html (last 
accessed January 2005).
 5 See http://www.city.kyoto.jp/tokei/todu/matinami/newrule_new.pdf (last accessed 
January 2005).
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8 Conclusion
 Decentralization policies – questioning 
the Japanese model
Carola Hein and Philippe Pelletier
In the course of the many centuries during which Japan’s highly centralized 
governance structure has existed, multiple ties have formed between national and 
local institutions, providing each actor with a precise role and inherent security. 
The relationship between the various levels of Japanese government is not as 
hierarchical and top-down as it appears at first glance, and recent scholars have 
focused on its nuances.1 Senior Japanese political analyst and professor of law 
Muramatsu Michio points out the interdependence of all parties in regard to a 
common national objective, that of economic mobilization, and stresses the 
systematic exchange of information between different levels of government and 
the search for consensus (Muramatsu 1997; Ishimaru 2000). The mobility of 
agents of the Ministry of Local Affairs (Jichishô), who go during the span of 
their career from the office of one local government to another and back to the 
central ministry, is recognized as a practice that allows for coordination between 
all partners. Public administration scholar and professor of law Akizuki Kengo 
goes even further when he proposes that the financial relationship is in fact 
based on a conscious bargaining between the two, with the national government 
being stronger, but also having to foot the bill for local governments if necessary 
(Akizuki 1995).
Given the complex connections between the national and local levels, the 
meaning of decentralization (chihô bunken) and the socio-political and economic 
processes it encompasses merit analysis. Decentralization is a multifaceted issue, 
intimately linked to a variety of aspects of Japanese society. It is thus necessary 
to break up this entrenched system to effectively transfer more political deci-
sion-making functions to local entities – a subject discussed by Ishida yorifusa in 
Chapter 2 of this volume. Equally important is a reorganization of the financial 
relationship between the center and the periphery, the structure of which is ana-
lyzed by Alain Schebath in Chapter 4, as well as a citizenry knowledgeable about 
planning and related issues in order to allow them to contribute more substantially 
to local planning as André Sorensen, Watanabe Shun-ichi, and Christoph Brumann 
point out in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, respectively.
So far, it appears that attempts at decentralization have reflected national inter-
ests and needs more than those of the localities – including, to some extent, Tokyo. 
The national government has made attempts to decentralize in times of crisis: for 
example during World War II when it built new towns and relocated some military 
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facilities and other institutions in preparation for aerial attacks; in attempts to grant 
favors to localities important in political and election campaigns, for example dur-
ing the so-called “rapid growth” period, when tax revenues were funneled back 
to particular areas in the form of public-works projects; or as a means to promote 
industrial growth and the agenda of major industries, for example through the 
Technopolis Plan during the 1980s as has been seen in Chapter 1.
Decentralization attempts at the national level and pressures from below, 
while having a long history, have not led to effective results, and the multitude 
of local organizations (chônaikai) has largely been co-opted into a strict national 
hierarchy, as Ishida, Schebath, and Sorensen point out. Citizen initiatives address 
movements and aspirations emanating from the grassroots level (Evans 2002). 
These, however, are generally small, with only local input, as demonstrated by 
Sorensen and Brumann; and the education of citizens is inadequate to the task, as 
Watanabe suggests. The government appears to oppose the formation of national 
movements that are local in origin (such as the Green Party in Germany). All 
these factors seem to indicate that decentralization is first of all an idea and a 
function of national government interests. The position of the capital city, Tokyo, 
is particularly relevant in this context. The deconcentration policies in Tokyo are 
not primarily the outcome of attempts to restructure the city itself and improve the 
quality of life for its citizens, but reflect the results of national spatial redistribu-
tion schemes and a recentralization that has in fact accompanied decentralization 
policies since the 1960s, as well as the discussions of a multi-core structure for 
Tokyo, a topic that is analyzed by Nakabayashi Itsuki in Chapter 3.
The following sections examine the theme of decentralization and the recent 
growth of local initiatives, and how they play out between the national govern-
ment and Japanese urban space, most importantly in regard to the capital city of 
Tokyo. An investigation of decentralization projects, and the discussion surround-
ing them, which have flourished since the 1990s, highlights the complex issues 
involved. An examination of recent large public-works projects in Japan demon-
strates how financing of local infrastructures strengthens the center, a long-term 
strategy that is recently running into conflict as local initiatives oppose large-scale 
national interventions. Special attention is given to the particularities of Tokyo as 
a municipality, as the tensions between the national government and cities appear 
most clearly there. All of these themes come together in the debates around a 
possible move of the capital city function, which can be seen not only as a major 
decentralization initiative but also as a public-works project led by the national 
government. The construction of a new capital would mean a major disruption 
for the Japanese system, one in which various governmental levels are intimately 
intertwined and enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship with private entities. The 
difficulties inherent in implementing decentralization in Japan illustrate the singu-
larities of the structure of the Japanese system.
Decentralization as catchphrase
The theme of decentralization took on renewed significance during the 1990s with 
the implosion of the 1955 system, based upon the Jimintô Liberal Democratic 
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Party (LDP), which dominated Japanese politics for most of the second half of the 
twentieth century. The end of this long-lived system was symbolized by Hosokawa 
Morihiro’s arrival in power in August 1993. Hosokawa, a former governor of the 
Kumamoto prefecture (Kyûshû), was a longtime advocate of decentralization and 
as prime minister from August 1993 to April 1994 he promoted this measure. The 
new Law for the Promotion of Decentralization (chihô bunken suishinhô), passed 
in May 1995, and the attendant creation of the Committee for the Promotion of 
Decentralization (chihô bunken suishin iinkai), demonstrated the growing interest 
in the issue.
A large gap exists, however, between the official language and the concrete 
functioning of decentralization. In the 1990s, “decentralization” devolved into 
a catchphrase seemingly intended to resolve a variety of problems, including 
excessive centralization in the face of the persistent call for decentralization, 
administrative heavy-handedness, the feudal behavior of ministries, insufficient 
autonomy of local governments, the crisis situation of local finances, and prob-
lems of distribution of taxes and other resources. While these criticisms were 
widely shared, opponents had differing agendas. Partisans of deregulation within 
conservative political parties, the so-called Neo-Liberals who attacked the central 
government, saw decentralization as going hand-in-hand with a reduction of taxes 
and the transfer of funding for social programs to citizens, and thus to local gov-
ernments. The desire for local participation as expressed by the left-wing Social 
Democrats and by members of the Japan Communist Party (JCP), the former 
Socialist Party and the new Democratic Party, may have corresponded – as it may 
for the current Liberal Democrats within the LDP – with the wish to preserve a 
protectionist system based on the compromise of state capitalism.
The dichotomy between the views of Neo-Liberals and Social Democrats in 
terms of decentralization has been discussed by the scholar Brendan F. Barrett of 
the United Nations University/Institute of Advanced Studies, following Japanese 
authors such as Shigemori Akira, who see it essentially as responding to the politi-
cal forces of the right and left (Barrett 2000; Shigemori 1998). Their analysis is 
based on the commonly held belief that political discourse reflects ideological 
opinion rather than the material reality of power or the concrete interests of those 
in power. The techno-bureaucracy that holds power, and which includes politi-
cal parties of all persuasions, administration, and consultants, survives on public 
monies and has as its goal self-perpetuation. Therefore, it is not clear that the 
divergent views can be clearly attributed to a division between right- and left-
leaning political beliefs.
Encouraged by Hosokawa’s appearance on the political scene, a new party 
called Sakigake – an offshoot of the LDP, established in 1993 by Takemura 
Masayoshi (former governor of Shiga) with Hatoyama Yukio (then representative 
of Hokkaidô) – had the potential to establish a center-right national government 
with a strong decentralization policy, building on non-Tokyo leaders. Hosokawa’s 
downfall after a brief tenure, however, led to a reinvigoration of the traditional par-
ties. The Democratic Party (Minshûtô) spearheaded by Kan Naoto and Hatoyama 
Yukio in 1996, which absorbed the Sakigake before integrating the Liberal Party 
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(Jiyûtô) of Ozawa Ichirô in 2003, could have best represented decentralization 
tendencies, but was too focused on the party’s interior struggles. Simultaneously, 
supporters of Hosokawa and Takemura, who had been eliminated from the politi-
cal scene, integrated citizen movements and tried to become influential on the 
local level.
According to sociologists Richard Child Hill and Kuniko Fujita, despite 
deregulation and privatization trends following globalization since the 1990s, the 
public sector in Japan continues to play a major role in the economy. The gross 
fixed capital formation is three to four times higher than in other industrialized 
countries, and the role of local governments in social investments combined with 
that of the central government remains high (Hill and Fujita 2000). The already 
high ratio of public investment to GNP in Japan even increased, from 4.5 percent 
in 1965 to 7.5 percent in 1995, during the so-called neo-liberal period, while it 
decreased in other industrialized countries. Similarly, the financial support given 
to social protection (health, retirement, social programs, unemployment, and so 
on) increased by 90 percent between 1980 and 1990, and by 65 percent from 1990 
to 2000 (Hill and Fujita 2000). Furthermore, the mounting debt carried by local 
governments has become a way for the central government to shift its enormous 
debt burden to the local level. In the 1990s, Japanese local governments experi-
enced a difficult financial period during which they saw their debt grow from 15 
percent of GNP in 1991 to more than 35 percent in 1999 (see Alain Schebath, 
Chapter 4). Borrowing, which accounted for 8 percent of total local budgets in 
1990, increased to 15 percent in 1998. The main cause of the rising local debt bur-
den was a paucity of resources that accompanied the economic downturn during 
this time, coupled with the maintenance of the level of expenditures established 
during the “bubble” period (1985–90). Decentralization is thus first and foremost 
a function of national government needs, underscored by government’s heavy 
investment in public works in the provinces.
Strengths and weaknesses of the “state-as-builder” concept
Local governments since the bubble period have spent large amounts on 
the construction of buildings and public works. The central government has 
encouraged this behavior through a series of plans, such as the 1989 economic 
revitalization project aimed at investing 630 billion yen over a period of 10 years 
in infrastructure works. These endeavors were based on the conception of the 
“state as builder” (doken kokka) or the “civil engineering state” (doboku kokka), 
as the Ministry of Construction, which was in charge of urban planning after 
1945, brought national policy decisions to the local governments. According to 
Kajita Shin, a Japanese economic geographer, in fiscal year 1995, 80 percent of 
the total public investment went to civil engineering works, with 75 percent of 
the total investment in the civil engineering industry deriving from government 
agencies (Kajita 2001). According to Gavan MacCormack, a specialist in Pacific 
and Asian studies, the construction and public-work sectors employed some 7 
million people, or 10 percent of the Japanese workforce (MacCormack 2002). 
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They account for the equivalent of 8 percent of the GNP annually, which is 
two to three times more than that of other countries in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), of which Japan is a member. 
The functioning of the public-works sector is often opaque as construction 
arrangements are often established before an official bid (dango) is tendered. The 
political and administrative leadership as well as the unions tacitly acknowledge 
this system, which generally works to the benefit of all concerned.
One of the major strengths of the construction and public-works system is a 
strict economic, social, and political hierarchy that separates the six major build-
ing firms from the other 90 percent of the sector, composed of small and medium-
sized enterprises with capital of less than 10 million yen; the salaried employees 
from the day-workers, who may number as much as one-third of the workforce; 
and the metropolitan center from the local governments in rural areas, where eco-
nomic activity, social stability, and political life depend largely on construction 
work provided by the central government. Using the example of Shimane-ken, 
a prefecture in the remote San’in area, Kajita Shin has demonstrated how, from 
an initial workforce made up of successive generations of laborers who have 
remained in rural areas, local civil engineering companies have created a sys-
tem of de facto prefectural interdependence. Because local governments are the 
primary funders of infrastructure construction, which often represents more than 
half the public-sector expenses (both national and local), they play a major role in 
mediating between the national and local levels (Kajita 2001).
Since the Meiji period, the government has given priority to the construction 
of infrastructure – roads, followed by highways; railroads followed by high-speed 
railways; bridges and tunnels; and harbors and airports. These interventions are 
partially derived from the historical necessity to control an environment with a 
high risk of natural disasters, and the destruction that may follow, and the need 
to connect the various parts of a mountainous island nation where travel was 
not easy. It also reflects the desire to promote industrial production above social 
welfare. Furthermore, it points to a policy of revivifying the economy through 
public works, particularly after 1973, when fiscal conservatism made room for 
Keynesian activism, and especially in the 1980s, with the introduction of neo-
liberal politics, particularly deregulation and privatization (Mochida 1993).
Public works allowed local elites to direct funding toward election finances, 
engage in corrupt practices, and create a techno-bureaucracy that responded to 
their needs (Woodall 1996). The connections between the LDP and the construc-
tion and public-works sectors were particularly marked in the Tanaka–Takeshita–
Hashimoto faction, which had held sway over Japanese political life from the early 
1970s to April 2001, until the election of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirô, who 
broke with the old factional logic. The LDP thus guaranteed a certain amount of 
public investment funds in exchange for the political and financial support of the 
public sectors. There are numerous examples of elected and public-works officials 
who have later been present in the Ministry of Construction and its public-works 
satellites (a system called amakudari), while former employees of the ministry 
have become leaders in the public-works sector.2
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The Japanese government has a long history of construction projects built 
at a loss. Among the most spectacular “white elephants,” as the Japanese press 
deems them, are three viaducts over the Inland Sea. Proposed in 1958 by the 
Ministry of Construction, these spans were approved under the New (second) 
Comprehensive National Development Plan of 1969 (Shinzensô); confirmed in 
1972 under Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s Nihon rettô kaizôron or kaizôron, 
a project for the remodeling of the Japanese archipelago that laid out guidelines 
for regional development including the construction of bullet trains and industrial 
complexes; reconfirmed by the Third Comprehensive National Development Plan 
of 1977 (Sanzensô); and finally built between 1985 and 1999, at a cost of 3.36 bil-
lion yen (1.13 billion for the Kojima–Sakaide connection alone) (Pelletier 2001). 
The traffic on these toll bridges, however, has turned out to be much lower than 
anticipated and they currently operate at a deficit. The corporation controlling the 
Seto Bridge, where traffic is two and a half times less than projected, has a debt 
of 4 billion yen. A similar case is the Seikan Tunnel, the longest in the world, 
proposed in 1964 by the Japan Railways Construction Public Corporation, which 
was linked to the former Japan National Railways (JNR) and opened in 1988 
under the Tsugaru Strait. Although the tunnel came in at a cost of 1.1 trillion yen, 
traffic has not reached expected levels. Although often presented as examples 
of decentralization and central government sponsorship of remote areas, these 
projects have generally promoted centralization by making traffic more efficient 
and faster, increasing the range of areas that can be reached on a day trip from the 
capital city. While local economies only partially benefit from these investments, 
many local LDP leaders favor projects that are financially supported by national 
investments. Meanwhile, the indebtedness of the four public highways corpora-
tions (Nihon dôro kôdan, Shuto kôsokudôro kôdan, Hanshin kôsoku dôro kôdan, 
and Honshû-Shikoku renrakkyô kôdan) is immense: 40 trillion yen in 2004, reim-
bursable over a period of 40 years.
Despite the end of the bubble period in 1990, which led to a major financial 
crisis for the government and the public–private banking system and to greatly 
increased public debt (58 percent of the Japanese GNP in 1995, up to 140 percent 
in 2001), successive governments have continued to initiate public-works pro-
jects. The most recent New Comprehensive National Development Plan, the fifth, 
prepared by the Hashimoto Ryûtarô government in 1998, maintains this policy, 
anticipating the construction of larger dikes to protect against the flooding that 
has recurred approximately every 200 years, new dams, and giant bridges over 
several bays, as well as 3,000 kilometers of highways and new lines for bullet 
trains. The profitability of these projects is highly questionable given the heavy 
deficits of this type of investment.
To date, the state-as-builder notion has remained remarkably constant over 
time, including the neo-liberal era initiated by Nakasone yasuhiro’s government 
in the mid-1980s. Its future lies in the hands of an investment and loan program 
(Zaisei tôyûshi, also known as Zaitô), under the aegis of the Trust Fund Bureau 
of the Ministry of Finance (MacCormack 2002). The funds that the Zaitô admin-
isters come from major public savings funds (pensions, life insurance programs, 
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postal savings), and are invested in large infrastructure and public projects. They 
often account for half the general budget of the national government (Udagawa 
1983). The Zaitô, as a result, serves as the financial provider of the national spatial 
planning system. The funding for these expenses necessarily comes out of other 
budgets, such as social spending, or by a reduction in the number of government 
employees. Under discussion by the Koizumi government are the privatization of 
the postal system, planned for April 2007, and of four Japanese highway compa-
nies (including the Seto Inland Sea bridges corporation) planned for 2005, two 
important pillars of the state-as-builder system. But, at the local level, the system 
is starting to change as demand for new infrastructure is decreasing in rural areas, 
where more workers are leaving their home towns, as shown by the example of 
Shimane-ken (Kajita 2001).
While the state-as-builder policy is ubiquitous in Japan – on seafronts and 
beaches, in canals and dams (more than 580), on the slopes of volcanoes, and even 
in dense forests – citizens began in the mid-1990s to challenge these projects. 
More and more frequently, they advocate dispensing with greater protection from 
natural disasters in favor of a greater sensitivity to issues of environmental pollu-
tion and quality of life, including green space, recreation areas, and public spaces. 
The new hostility of inhabitants toward these projects can be seen in the vocal, 
local opposition to the construction of the Yoshino River estuary (in Tokushima-
ken, Shikoku) and the reclamation of land in a part of Ariake Bay (in Isahaya, 
Nagasaki-ken, Kyushu), which have gained national support.
The above examples, as well as a series of local citizen initiatives on a variety 
of issues – including the presence of a military base, the construction of nuclear 
facilities, and the location of dumpsites – raise the question of local democracy 
in Japan. While the participation in national elections continues to fall (approxi-
mately 40 percent), the number of people participating in referendums can reach a 
very high level (up to 80 percent). In addition, this has translated into a new kind 
of local politician, less dependent on national directives, and a rejection in general 
of the government bureaucracy in Tokyo.
Citizens who are being asked to pay higher taxes without being consulted on 
construction projects that affect them are angry and local politicians are beginning 
to object to the choices of national or prefectural administrations. Thus, the popu-
lar governor of Nagano, Tanaka Yasuo, in his “Manifesto Rejecting Dams” (Datsu 
damu sengen) issued in February 2002, opposed technocratic solutions and called 
for green dams able to absorb typhoons and floods (Asahi Shimbun-sha 2004: 
220). As of 2006, as a result of citizen opposition and changes in the attitudes of 
local politicians, construction on 11 major dams has been halted. The time when 
opposition movements went unnoticed is clearly past.3 It is not certain, however, 
that the calls for an end to the state-as-builder concept and a reinforcement of 
local institutions are not also being accompanied by privatization in various are-
nas that will ultimately imply an even higher debt for the already troubled local 
governments. At the same time, the public-works sector is strongly opposed to 
changes of any kind.
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Tokyo: a unique local government
Of the numerous local entities, currently 15 major cities, all of which contain 
more than 1 million inhabitants, have the special status of Cabinet Odinance 
Designated Major Cities (seirei shitei toshi) – a classification created by the Local 
Autonomy Law, based on a 1956 statute and given to cities with a population 
greater than 500,000, which has important economic and industrial implications. 
These cities are now 15: Ôsaka, Nagoya, Kyôto, Yokohama, Kôbe, Kitakyûshû 
(1956), Sapporo, Kawasaki, Fukuoka (1971), Hiroshima (1980), Sendai, Chiba, 
Sakai (1989–92), Shizuoka (2005) and Sakai (2006). An even more special status 
characterizes the metropolis of Tokyo (Tôkyô-to), which occupies a unique status 
as both a prefecture and a large city. Its 23 wards have rights similar to those of 
the 15 special-status cities. Tokyo thus occupies a singular role in Japan in both 
administrative and economic terms (Toki 1992; Fujita 2003).
The attraction and power of the city of Tokyo are intimately intertwined with 
the presence of the national elite. Tokyo is home to major architectural experi-
ments and a very dynamic public sector. The city is also often the recipient of 
national government funding, notably for infrastructure construction, as well 
as being the center of the government itself and the seat of representation for 
local and provincial offices, which negotiate with central economic and political 
authorities. Until the advent of the debate on decentralization in the early 1990s, 
Tokyo’s administration had resembled the feudal system of sankin kôtai. But 
while the city, as the Japanese capital, has a unique relationship with the national 
government, it also operates under a local government. The metropolis of Tokyo 
has the highest income and expenditure level among all local governments in 
Japan; at the same time, like other local governments, TMG is in dire financial 
straits, more so, in fact, than most other cities.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the financial crisis in Tokyo was largely a 
result of shortsightedness on the part of national authorities who, by refusing to 
acknowledge that the economic bubble had burst, laid the groundwork for the 
political shock that came in 1995 with the election of two candidates, former 
theatrical actors, who were not part of the political establishment, as governors of 
the major cities of Tokyo and Osaka. The office of governor is that of an interface 
between the local and the national level: as chief of the prefecture, so charged by 
the national government, the office-holder is that government’s legal representa-
tive. Because the governor can only be removed from office by the central govern-
ment using judicial means, this office-holder enjoys relative stability. Governors 
are often former members of the national ministries, a practice known as amak-
udari.4 Their policies are based around the concept of consensus and the building 
of a wide range of alliances, extending beyond the national level and to many 
political parties (even those of the opposition) as a way to share part of power 
beyond party lines (hence the Japanese expression for this practice, ainori, which 
translates as “jumping aboard”). This collaboration puts into doubt the effective 
competition between national parties and has led to the popular impression that 
the winners have already been decided before the elections, which means low 
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voter turnout at gubernatorial elections and generally low expectations on the part 
of the citizenry. Changes, however, are beginning to occur as more “outsiders” 
accede to the position.
The new governors, Aoshima Yukio in Tokyo and Yamada Isamu (nicknamed 
yokoyama Nokku) in Osaka, were a contrast to the old. Aoshima followed a 
governor who, as an “independent” but with close ties to conservative groups, 
had served four terms. Tokyo’s new governor presented himself as an anti-politi-
cian, denouncing secret negotiations and the destruction of democracy. During 
his campaign he had criticized large-scale urban projects such as the so-called 
Waterfront Sub-center (Rinkai fuku toshin), one of the nuclei created within 
the Tokyo metropolis in an attempt to alleviate pressure on the center and thus 
forming part of the deconcentration attempts, and the Tokyo world fair, entitled 
“Tokyo Frontier,” projected for 1996. After the election, Aoshima canceled the 
fair, but was obliged to continue the sub-center project, already under way (Saitô 
2003; Pelletier 1998; Scoccimarro 1998). He had only limited success as governor 
and, contrary to his election promises, left an even higher debt level than his 
predecessor. Aoshima did not run for reelection, a retreat that opened the door for 
a new candidate outside the “traditional” ainori system, the unaffiliated Ishihara 
Shintarô, who was elected governor of Tokyo in 1999 and reelected in 2003 (Jain 
1999).
Ishihara’s career and life are emblematic of the important changes occurring 
in Japan during the past decade. Born in 1932, the governor is emblematic of 
the postwar generation.5 After becoming a well-known writer and subsequently a 
politician within the LDP, he received international notoriety as co-author (with 
the president of Sony, Morita Akio) of the book The Japan That Can Say “No” 
(“No” to ieru Nihon) in 1989, which criticized the inability of Japanese leaders 
to resist economic pressure from the United States (Ishihara and Morita 1989). 
Among other similarly oriented texts, he co-wrote with Etô Jun in 1991 The Japan 
That Can Firmly Say “No” (Danko “no” to ieru Nihon) – earning him the title 
of “Mister No” (Ishihara and Etô 1991). It is important to note that saying “no” 
overtly is extremely uncommon in Japanese society and in the rare cases that it is 
used it is interpreted as a show of strong character.
Having left the Diet in 1995, Ishihara campaigned in 1999 under the slogans 
“Change Japan from Tôkyô” and “The Tôkyô that can say ‘no’,” promising to 
reduce the deficit. He requested the return to Japan of the Yokota military base, 
which was used by the US Army, suggesting it be turned into a third airport for 
the city. He criticized the timidity of Japanese leaders in regard to China and the 
United States, and rejected, among other things, the Chinese version of the mas-
sacre of Nankin (1937–8). As a longtime politician he capitalized on his image 
as a straight speaker to attract uncommitted voters (who previously had voted for 
Aoshima yukio) and was elected by a substantial margin.
As governor, Ishihara rapidly slashed the city’s budget (public housing, new 
subway lines, and the like) and reduced the number of local government employ-
ees.6 Under his tenure the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) accelerated 
the construction of office buildings and housing and deregulated urban planning 
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laws, in particular the plot area ratio (kempei ritsu).7 In this context, Ishihara’s 
urban policy can be tied to that of the Koizumi government on a national level, in 
which the enforcement of the deregulation of urban planning has been touted as 
promoting “urban regeneration” (toshi kûkan saisei). For example, the plot area 
ratio in the Shiodome area jumped to 1,200 percent in a few years until 2005. The 
urban fabric of the 23 wards that comprise inner Tokyo is rapidly densifying and 
taller buildings are being constructed (Ishida 1998). In the early 2000s, the TMG 
even initiated plans, together with the railway company Japanese Railway (JR), 
Mitsubishi, and other companies, to commercialize air rights over buildings. A 
goal of Ishihara and the TMG is to boost the use of Tokyo’s Haneda Airport and 
further extend it into Tokyo Bay, a project that has huge financial and environ-
mental implications not only for Tokyo but also for the neighboring prefecture of 
Kanagawa. The new Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport projected the 
final, total cost (2003–7) at 900 billion yen, based on one-third shared with local 
communities (Asahi Shimbun-sha 2004: 240). This has met with ongoing protest 
from the TMG, which is currently engaged in negotiations with the national gov-
ernment.
Overall, these plans mean densification and an increase in urban renewal 
toward the south and southeast of the traditional central business district along 
Tokyo Bay in the Chûô and Minato wards.8 After many years of disputes fol-
lowing frenetic speculation, a new urban project was inaugurated in 2003 on the 
triangular site of the former JNR railway depot in Shiodome: the “Media City 
Shiodome,” destined to house electronic business headquarters (Matsushita), a 
transport center (Nippon Express), media headquarters (Nippon TV and Kyôdô 
News Service), hotels, housing, and other activities (Hohn 2002). Simultaneously 
in the mid-2000s, corridors of information enterprises are developing inside the 
city. The high cost of renovated spaces close to the city center (6.83 million yen 
per square meter in Shiodome versus 1.13 million in Rainbow Town – the new 
name of a part of the Rinkai fuku toshin sub-center) highlights the recent recen-
tralization of tertiary functions.
Ishihara is also notable for his nationalistic – even xenophobic – and milita-
ristic views. He made a series of controversial visits to the yasukuni sanctuary, 
which honors the souls of Japanese soldiers who died in combat as well as those 
of war criminals executed after 1945 (Yoneyama 1999; Hein 2004). He met with 
the Taiwanese leader, Lee Teng-hui, in November 2000, resulting in protest from 
the People’s Republic of China, and in February 2003 declared his support for the 
United States in its war in Iraq. His leadership of Tokyo serves as a platform from 
which he has promoted his ideas for the Japanese nation, apparently convinced 
that if the national government cannot adequately respond to US economic and 
global policies, then it is up to local governments to do so. While some of his 
positions have provoked strong criticism from Tokyo citizens and neighboring 
countries, Ishihara was easily reelected in April 2003 (with 2 million votes, 72 
percent of the total number of voters), with double the votes he received in his 
first election. Voter absenteeism, however, increased during this election, rising to 
more than 50 percent of voters. Although this phenomenon is typical of Japan as 
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a whole, it also signals the limits of Ishihara’s popularity.9 While the election and 
reelection of Ishihara are significant as an expression of a radical political right 
wing re-emerging, this has coincided with the strong growth of volunteerism, 
citizen movements, and various popular associations.
Moving the capital: a debate that highlights the system
The progression of economic concentration within central Tokyo (tertiary 
functions) as well as in the larger Tokyo metropolitan area (industrial functions) 
has given rise to public debate about the need to create a re-balance of inhabitants, 
economic activities, and infrastructure on the Japanese archipelago and invites the 
question of relocating capital functions. In the mid-1980s, the Japanese media, 
some political circles, and a number of intellectuals raised the issue of moving 
the Japanese capital away from its current site in Tokyo. Whether or not the 
move of the capital ever actually occurs, this topic allows for the analysis of the 
multiple and complex structures and interests implied, particularly those relevant 
to the relationship between the central and local governments. The project of 
transferring the capital has been raised again in view of the urban conditions of the 
capital, congestion and pollution, and the impact of the bubble period, which led 
to increased land prices and penalized numerous urban redevelopment projects, 
particularly those of the public sector. Writers have recurrently denounced Tokyo 
as a “black hole” (burakku horu) for its absorption of energy and capital and 
its concentration of decision-makers and decisions that are incommensurate with 
what the city gives back to the nation as a whole. Numerous publications explore 
the concept of Tokyo (Tôkyô mondai) as a problem (Pelletier 2001; Flüchter 
2002; Uchinaka 1996; Ichikawa and Fujisôken-Tôkyômondai-kenkyû kai 1995; 
Ichikawa 1996; Takeda 1997) (Figure 8.1). 
Kanemaru Shin, the powerful leader of the LDP, initiated the third wave of 
interest in capital relocation in the late 1980s.10 Some analysts saw this gesture 
as an attempt to launch a seemingly new project at a time when an old party was 
in trouble, touched by scandals and loss of members. It may be also considered 
an attempt to relaunch the Japanese economy through public works, as has been 
typical in Japan. In November 1990 the Diet voted to approve the relocation, with 
only the JCP and some outsiders, including Ishihara, the future Tokyo governor, 
weighing in against it. Political leaders of the LPD defended the idea and the Diet 
passed two laws related to the issue in December 1992 and June 1996. In 1999, the 
“Investigation Committee for the Relocation of the Diet and other Organizations” 
(Kokkaitô iten shingikai), created by the second law and presided over by Ishihara 
Nobuo (no relation to Shintarô), a former member of the prime minister’s office, 
decided on the principle of a total transfer (yoto) of the capital to a new town more 
than 60 kilometers but less than two and a half hours by Shinkansen (bullet train) 
from Tokyo.
Three sites were proposed for the new capital: the Hokuto area on the border of 
the Tochigi prefecture (Kantô) and the Fukushima province (Tôhoku), northeast 
of Tokyo; a zone on the border of the Gifu and Aichi prefectures (Chûbu region), 
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Figure 8.1 Sites under consideration for possible relocation of the national capital of 
Japan.
northeast of Nagoya; and the Mie–Kio area on the border of the Mie, Nara, and 
Shiga prefectures, on the condition that a high-speed transit network be built. All 
of these sites are located in central Honshû in close proximity to Greater Tokyo, 
Greater Nagoya, and Greater Osaka, reaffirming the importance of these centers in 
Japan. The problematic question of the need to move the imperial palace, and thus 
to question the role of the emperor in a Japanese democracy, had been excluded 
from the debate.
The idea of relocating the capital, which is at least as old as the idea of reor-
ganizing local governments, cannot necessarily be considered part of a decen-
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tralization movement. The concept of decentralization is often associated with 
a political and administrative restructuring. Effectively, however, administrative 
reorganization may imply further centralization and the fusion of ministries, 
as initiated in 1996 by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryûtarô. As the Hosokawa 
government emphasized the reform of the hierarchical relationship between the 
government and local governments, the decentralization of political and adminis-
trative functions took precedence over spatial and territorial redistribution issues. 
Considering decentralization as a purely political and administrative function has 
the advantage of casting the relocation of the capital as a simple deconcentration 
measure that may or may not be part of political administrative restructuring. The 
relocation of the capital, does not, per se, mean the creation of a new political 
and administrative system, although it can be part of it. A comparison with the 
cases of Ottawa, Canberra, or Brasilia, all cities whose construction was related 
to the establishment of a federal system of some kind, is not valid. It is unlikely 
that Japan will become a federal country. A future Japanese federation may need 
a new capital, but a new capital does not need a federation and, whereas plans 
for relocating the capital had taken precedence before 1996, the issue of political 
decentralization took precedence thereafter.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government, under a series of governors (Suzuki 
Shun-ichi, Aoshima yukio, and Ishihara) has argued against moving the capital, 
citing huge costs and possible negative impacts on the real-estate market in Tokyo 
and Japan as a whole.
The election of Ishihara reinforced the position of those who were against relo-
cating the capital. The complexity of the problem, the rivalries between ministries, 
between government and Diet, between national and local governments, between 
the national government and the private sector, between private enterprises, and 
between different factions, strengthened the opposition strategy, but it did not 
solve the issue of relocation.
The defenders of the project organized as well. Provincial prefectures tried to 
unify. Meanwhile the private sector favored the project, as a symbol of changes 
in the administrative and government structure.11 Their aim seemed to be to 
keep the provincial bureaucrats out of Tokyo so that the city could pursue its 
growth as an economic and cultural center. In September 2000, the new Minister 
of Construction, Ogi Chikage, who was also head of the National Land Agency 
(Kokudochô), in charge of the capital relocation, proclaimed her opposition to the 
project. As part of a new government established in June 2000 (after the death of 
Prime Minister Obuchi Keizô), she was appointed in order to bypass the powerful 
concrete lobby after the downfall of her predecessor, Nakao Ei’ichi, following 
corruption charges. President of the New Conservative Party (Shin-Hoshutô), 
Ogi was considered the right person to reform the system. Other members of the 
government supported her, among them Sakaiya Taichi, a famous essayist, former 
official of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and minister 
in the Obuchi cabinet, who had opposed the relocation of the capital in the early 
1990s. Given the dire financial situation, LDP leaders echoed similar sentiments, 
with Secretary of the Environment Kawaguchi yoriko pointing out that the mon-
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ies could be better used elsewhere, for example, in the improvement of the sewage 
system. Beyond the financial argument, the abandonment of the capital-relocation 
project also opened the way for the desertion of all radical decentralization ideas. 
It was thus a victory for the conservative camp, for the Tokyo government, and for 
those aiming to create a new regional body (Tôgo 2001; Watabe 2002).
The outlook for decentralization in twenty-first-century 
Japan under the pressure of globalization
The abandonment of the capital relocation project in 2000 by the central 
government seems to indicate a partial rejection of a government policy that 
had proclaimed its desire for decentralization. Nonetheless, a new law passed 
in April 2004 allowed local governments to independently establish new taxes. 
Some of them have seized on the occasion to increase their revenues and include, 
for example, a fishing tax (Fujikawaguchikô-chô, Yamanashi-ken), an automobile 
parking-lot tax (Dazaifu-shi, Fukuoka-ken), and taxes on every consumer item 
from plastic bags to mineral water, as well as on one-room apartments. In many 
cases, however, local governments fear reprisals from voters and have refrained 
from levying any new taxes.
Simultaneously, the Koizumi government is actively working towards cen-
tralization, introducing legislation for consolidating towns and villages with the 
aim of reducing public expenses and rationalizing equipment.12 The communes 
involved, however, see it as a loss of autonomy and an indicator of their disap-
pearance. Furthermore, the Koizumi government proposes a reduction of finan-
cial transfers to local authorities and the creation of regions (dôshû) formed from 
several prefectures that would disappear. Japan would thus have nine dôshû plus 
Hokkaido, which, as the governmennt announced in 2003, would be the only 
prefecture that would not be transformed and that would serve as a model for 
the new organization.13 The reorganization of Japanese space would necessitate a 
constitutional reform that would have even greater impact than the privatization 
of the postal services. The reelection of the LPD and Koizumi in September 2005 
seems to indicate that these projects will be realized.
The Japanese political, economic, and social systems are changing from 
within, as a result of a number of publicized instances of corruption, the rise 
of new citizens’ and women’s groups, deregulation, union restructuring, higher 
unemployment, and globalization. While Japan’s major cities feed the economic 
development of the nation, they are also increasingly subject to globalization 
processes and their impacts. A series of contradictions characterize this develop-
ment: the need to remain competitive on a global scale, while facing the pains of 
growth and gigantic development; the need to organize a rapidly growing urban 
body, in spite of the heritage of territorial models that hinder the existence of 
real metropolitan governance; and the necessity for governance on a metropolitan 
scale, which clashes with the desire of citizens to control what happens in their 
communities as socioeconomic differences increase. These contradictions are 
exaggerated in the capital city of Tokyo, caught between the central government, 
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which it hosts, and its interests as a global city and metropolis that controls the 
rest of the country. With few exceptions, such as tourism and military bases, the 
forces of globalization are reinforcing centralization tendencies in Japan, leaving 
only developments of limited, local importance for decentralization.
Notes
 1 Among those who have written on Japan as a top-down, hierarchical system are 
Chalmers Johnson, Kurt Steiner, Karel van Wolferen, and Gavan MacCormack.
 2 At the end of the 1980s, Hara Takehiro, a former highly placed official in the Ministry 
of Construction, became director of the Builders’ Federation, a group of 53 major 
public-works construction companies. See Pons (1988).
 3 For a discussion of earlier protests that often went almost unnoticed, during the mid-
1980s, see Ikeya (1984).
 4 Two forms of amakudari (which translates as “descending from heaven”) can be 
distinguished: a transfer from the public to the private sector after retirement, to the 
boards or as consultants to administrations, banks, or industries; and a move from the 
administrative to the political, notably prefectural, sector.
 5 At age 23, Ishihara won the prestigious Akutagawa literary prize for his novel Taiyô 
no kisetsu (1955; translated into English as Season of Violence in 1966). The story 
of a postwar Japanese youth who opposes every normative moral and traditional 
custom, this book inspired the name “sun tribe” (taiyôzoku) given to a generation 
of rebels without cause for whom Ishihara became a popular idol. Having finished 
his studies at Hitotsubashi University, Ishihara entered into politics in 1968 and held 
various important positions. In 1975, he ran for governor of Tokyo, but in spite of 
significant support, lost to Minobe Ryôkichi. Ishihara’s attempts to obtain leadership 
positions within the LDP did not succeed, probably because he was perceived as an 
ultra-conservative.
 6 Since 2000, he has eliminated 4,800 staff members (including police and school 
personnel). Some of his initiatives, such as a tax on banks with high assets, are still 
being addressed by the courts (see Nihon Keizai Shimbun February 8–9, 2000). This 
tax has already garnered large revenues. The banks have appealed; if the TMG loses, 
it will be required to reimburse the institutions with what some press sources claim 
might amount to 162.8 trillion yen (www.fpcj.jp/e/shiryo/jb/0314.html, accessed April 
2004).
 7 Among the most important measures have been the creation of new types of planned 
districts with higher land-use ratios, called “urban renewal plans” (saikaihatsu chiku 
keikaku), in 1988; the establishment of “planned districts with high land-use ratios 
for residential use” (yôtobetsu yôseki gata chiku keikaku), in 1997; and the creation 
of “districts favoring high-rise residential housing in urban centers” (kôsô jûkyo yûdô 
chiku), also in 1997.
 8 The most prominent urban renewal projects include Media City Shiodome (31 
hectares), Ôkawabata River City 21 (28.7 hectares), Harumi Triton Square (8.5 
hectares), Toyosu (110 hectares), Shinonome (16.4 hectares), Rainbow Town (442 
hectares), and Shibaura-Kônan.
 9 On the contrasts in the geography of the electorate (voters and non-voters) in Tokyo, 
see Kôno (2001).
 10 Even before the 1980s and the third wave of interest in moving the capital, Kanemaru 
Shin was the first president of the “Reflection group on the question of the new capital” 
(Shinshuto mondai zadankai), founded in 1975, which – typically – included political 
leaders from the majority and the opposition as well as representatives from universities 
and other intellectuals. As head of the Kokudochô (National Land Agency), Kanemaru 
revived the capital relocation project.
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 11 Keidanren, February 6, 1996: “We propose relocation of Capital.” It is not coincidental 
that the Keidanren, the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, chose this 
date, which is associated with the myth of the foundation of the Japanese Empire, 
to highlight its position (see http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/pol040.html, 
accessed May 15, 2005).
 12 Following on the Municipal code (shisei) and the Town and Village code (chôsonsei) 
enacted in 1888 the number of local entities dropped by about one-fifth from 71,314 
to 15,859. After a 1953 law another two-thirds disappeared, reducing the number from 
9,868 to 3,472. A law enacted in 1999 projected another reduction of two-thirds of the 
number of communes to 1,000. Between April 2004 and March 2005 more than 250 
communes fused to form 60 entities. This process is particularly important in rural 
areas such as the departments of Ehime and Akita.
 13 Hokkaidô, Tôhoku-shû (Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamanashi, Fukushima), 
Hokuriku-shû (Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa), Kitakantô-shû (Gunma, Tochigi, Ibaraki), 
Shutoken-shû (Tôkyô, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Yamanashi), Chûbu-shû (Shizuoka, 
Nagano, Gifu, Aichi, Mie), Kansai-shû (Fukui, Shiga, Kyôto, Ôsaka, Nara, Wakayama, 
Hyôgo), Chûbu-shû (Okayama, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, Tottori, Shimane), Shikoku-
shû (Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime, Kôchi), and Kyûshû (Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki, 
Kumamoto, Ôita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima, Okinawa).
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Kanto 3, 33, 34, 50, 55, 56, 58–60, 62, 65, 
67, 75, 77, 78, 132, 174













keikan ronsô 140, 147, 148; see also 
landscape disputes
keishi sôkan see Tokyo Metropolitan 
Police Department
kenchiku kijun hô see Building Standards 
Law
kenchiku kôgai see building nuisances
kenchiku kyôtei 155, 157; see also 
voluntary covenants
kenô dô see central ring road
Kensetsushô 29, 39, 57; see also Ministry 
of Construction
kenshi kyôgikai see Convention of Eight 
Prefectures and Designated Cities




kikan inin jimu see agency-delegated 
administration 
kinkô chiiki see Suburban Zone
kinkô ryokuchi hô see Suburban Green 
Space Preservation Law
Kisarazu 76
kisei shigaichi see Existing Urbanized 
Area
Kitakyûshû 18, 171
Kobe 14, 18, 26, 28–30, 33, 34, 49, 58, 
130, 131, 133, 135, 149, 150
kôchiseiri seido 30; see also land 
readjustment
Kôfu 13, 20, 60
kôgyô tô seigen hô see Factory Regulation 
Law
Koizumi Jun’ichirô 91, 109, 168, 170, 173, 
177
Kokkaitô iten shingikai see Investigation 
Committee for the Relocation of the 
Diet and other Organizations
Kokubunji 48







Krauss, Ellis 108, 118, 146
kubukai 49
kuiki kubun see area demarcation
kukaku seiri 3, 10, 28, 30, 34–6, 38, 49, 




Kumamoto 11–14, 19, 166, 179
Kure 28
Kyoto 4, 7, 18, 26, 28, 29, 33, 38, 57, 119, 
139, 140–3, 146–152, 154–161, 171, 
179
kyû toshi keikaku hô see City Planning Act 
or Law (1919)
Kyushu 10, 12, 19, 166, 170, 179
land price 17, 18, 74, 109, 139, 140, 155, 
156, 159, 174
land readjustment 3, 28, 30, 34–6, 38, 49, 
50, 55, 61, 129, 130; see also kôchiseiri 
seido, kukaku seiri
landscape disputes 140; see also keikan 
ronsô
land-use control 42, 46, 48, 49, 64
land-use planning 49, 90
land-use regulation zoning 58
land-use rights 49
Law for the Promotion of Decentralization 
(1995) 1, 25, 166
Lee Teng-hui 173
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 8, 9, 13, 
19, 41, 90, 91, 95, 101, 107, 109, 119, 
146, 151, 152, 166, 168, 169, 172, 174, 
176, 178
local allocation tax system 48
local autonomy 2, 5, 7, 44, 81, 82, 96, 97, 
104, 106, 134, 139, 140, 150, 152, 153, 
156, 161
Local Autonomy Law (1947) 36, 160
local bonds 5
local debt 83, 84, 97, 167
local democracy 170
local governance 101, 102
local government 1, 5, 7, 9–11, 13, 14, 19, 
25–8, 30–3, 37–9, 41–50, 57, 64, 65, 
67, 72, 78, 79, 81, 86–93, 95–7, 101, 
102, 104–9, 113, 114, 116, 118, 120, 
122, 123, 131, 149, 151, 153–5, 164, 
166–8, 171–7
Local Government Amalgamation 47
local taxes 5, 7, 30, 82, 84, 85, 92, 94, 96
London 17, 21, 63
Long-Term Plan for the Tokyo Metropolis 
(1982) 72
MacCormack, Gavan 109, 167, 169, 178
machi kaisho 26, 49
Machida 40, 60, 72, 76, 79
machiya 140, 146, 147, 149–151, 
154–6, 160; see also wooden houses, 
traditional
machizukuri 7, 18, 128–30, 133, 136, 137, 
150; see also community-building, 
town-building
machizukuri ordinance 133




Mano 131, 132, 150
Marunouchi 72
Maruyama 130–2
Marxist 8, 9, 19






Meiji 2, 3, 9, 25–7, 48, 55, 103, 104, 114, 
143, 168
metropolis 49, 50, 71–4, 77; see also 
daitoshi
metropolitan area 68, 71; see also daitoshi-
ken
Mie 94, 175, 179
Military City Plan 35
Minato-ku 173
Ministry of Autonomy 5, 10
Ministry of Construction 10, 29, 37, 39, 
42–5, 167–9; see also Kensetsushô
Ministry of Finance 92, 97, 98, 106, 169
Ministry of General Affairs 84–6, 91, 92, 
95, 97; see also Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications
Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications 47, 83–6
Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) 11, 12, 13, 20, 176 
Ministry of Local Affairs 57, 83, 86, 92, 
164; see also Jichishô
Ministry of the Interior 3, 9; see also 
Naimushô, Home Ministry
Ministry of Welfare 129
minkatsu 12
Minobe Ryôkichi 40, 50, 131, 178
Mishima 130








mokuzô jûtaku misshû shigai see wooden 
houses, densely packed 




môshide seido, see suggestion system
mu shitei chiku see unspecified zones
multipolar structure 69, 71–3
municipal code 3, 179




Nagasaki 9, 35, 179
Nagoya 3, 4, 14, 17, 18, 20, 29, 33, 34, 57, 
71, 129, 171, 175
naibu shigai chitai see Inner Urban Zone
Naimu daijin 27
Naimushô 3, 9, 26, 31, 57, 104; see also 
Ministry of the Interior




Nakasone Yasuhiro 8, 19, 87, 108, 169
Nara 133, 139, 175, 179
Narita 76
national capital see capital city
National Capital Construction Committee 
(NCCC) 61, 62
National Capital Construction Law (1950) 
61, 62
National Capital Development 65, 68; see 
also shutoken seibi
National Capital Region Development 
(NCRD) Plan 61–79; see also shutoken 
seibi kihon keikaku
National Land Agency 1, 71, 176, 178
national minimum 33, 97
National Science and Technology Agency 
11
NEC 10, 19
neighborhood 122, 140, 141, 143, 148, 
161; see also chô, community
neighborhood associations 7, 110, 113, 
114, 116–22, 140, 143, 144, 146, 147, 
150, 153, 154, 165
Netherlands 30
New City Development 65, 67, 68
New City Planning Act or Law (1968) 1, 
39, 40, 44, 67, 105, 107, 108, 133; see 
also City Planning Act or Law (1919), 
City Planning Law
new industrial cities (1962) 12
New Industrial City Plan (1930s) 35
New Town 20, 67
New Urban Development Area 63, 65
Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai see Architectural 
Institute of Japan
Nihon Toshi keikaku Gakkai see City 





non-profit organization (NPO) 120, 121, 






oil crisis 11–13, 68, 81
Ôita 12, 19, 179
Okinawa 179
Okusei Shingi see Mori Ôgai
okushon 17, 20
Ômiya 68, 76
Omnibus Law for Decentralization of 
Powers see Law for the Promotion of 
Decentralization (1995)
option system 46
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) 89, 168
Osaka 4, 10, 14, 17, 18, 20, 26, 28–34, 38, 
49, 57, 71, 86, 87, 93, 94, 132, 161, 
171, 172, 175
Ôsaka shigai kairyô hô sôan see Osaka 
Urban Area Improvement Law






participation 7, 12, 20, 27, 28, 39, 40, 41, 
44–6, 48, 61, 77, 101, 112, 130–7, 144, 
145, 152, 166, 170
pâtonashippu 7, 149, 151, 152, 161
Pekkanen, Robert 120, 121
Pelletier, Philippe 1, 2, 19, 40, 101, 102, 
164, 166, 169, 172, 174
Peripheral Zone 61, 62, 65, 68, 71, 75, 78
196 Index
Peripheral Zone, cities within 61
periphery 1, 2, 4, 5, 68, 164
Plan for the Reconstruction of the Capital 
11
Plan of Freeways in the Capital Region 61
Plaza Agreement (1985) 14, 88
polarization 68
policy to forcibly merge cities and 
municipalities see Local Government 
Amalgamation
pollution 18, 38, 107, 108, 118, 119, 122, 
130, 131, 170, 174




privatization 12, 87, 88, 167, 168, 170, 177
province 4, 5, 10, 11, 35, 167, 174; see 
also chihô
public finance 84, 85, 88, 91, 97, 98
public investment 13, 167, 168
public sector 7, 81–4, 86–90, 93, 98, 99, 
136, 167, 168, 171, 174
public services 7, 88, 89, 92, 95–8, 113, 
114, 122, 131
public works 8, 29, 81, 83, 88–91, 94, 97, 
110, 167, 168, 174
purehabu 139
Pyle, Robert 115
Rainbow Town 173, 178




Reconstruction Plan for Tokyo (1946) 59
referendum 98, 148, 154
regulation 28, 46, 60, 65, 67, 88, 105, 107, 
137
relocation 1, 3, 8, 11, 12, 14, 20, 35, 47, 
56, 63, 72, 174–9
research core 12
research park 13
resident tax 82, 92, 96
Residential Environment Improvement 
Program 132
rigai kankeinin 45
right to sunlight 38, 40
rinji doboku chôsa iinkai (1899) 29
rinkai fuku toshin 72, 172, 173
risâchi koa see research core
risâchi pâku see research park
risutora 148
Roppongi Hills Projects 79
ryôgawa-chô 141
ryokuchi chiiki 61; see also green space
Sagamihara 35, 55, 76, 79
Saitama 17, 19, 20, 38, 57, 59, 60, 62, 65, 
67, 68, 71, 74, 76, 78, 179
Sakae-Higashi 129, 131, 132
Sakaiya Taichi 176
Samuels, Richard 104, 107, 108
San Francisco Peace Treaty 37
sandai jigyô 29
Sanitation Bureau 26
sanzensô see Third Comprehensive 
National Development Plan
Sapporo 18, 19, 26, 57, 171
satellite city or town 56, 59, 62–5, 68, 71
Schebath, Alain 5, 7, 81, 82, 99, 106, 109, 
164, 165, 167
seirei shitei toshi see Cabinet Ordinance 
Designated Major Cities
sekai toshi 17
Seki Hajime 29–32, 49
self-governance 7, 27, 38, 110–3
self-organization 113, 143, 154
senbiki 45, 46; see also area demarcation
Sendai 14, 19, 57, 171
sentaku-sei see option system
Setagaya 133, 134, 150
Seto Bridge 169
Seto Inland Sea 170
Shakai Fukushi Kyôgikai see Council of 
Social Welfare
shi chô son gappei sokushin see Local 
Government Amalgamation
shi chô son gikai 41
shi chô son toshi keikaku shingikai 45
shibiru minimamu 40
Shibuya 72
shichibu tsumi kin 26
Shiga 166, 175, 179
shigaichi kaihatsu kuiki see New Urban 
Development Area
shigaichi kenchiku butsu hô see Urban 
Building Law
shigaichi seibi 28
shigaika chôsei kuiki 67










shin sangyô toshi see new industrial cities 
(1962)
shin toshi keikaku hô 1, 38, 39, 40, 45, 48, 
67, 105, 108, 133; see also New City 
Planning Act or Law (1968)
Shinagawa 79
Shinanogawa 12, 13, 20
Shinbashi 79
shingikai 44, 45, 152, 153, 160, 174
Shinjuku 32, 72
Shinkansen 94, 174
shinkô kôgyô-toshi keikaku see New 
Industrial City Plan (1930s)
Shiodome 173, 178
shisei see municipal code
Shizuoka 18, 19, 57, 59, 60, 171, 179
Shônai 132
Shoup, Carl Sumner 4, 5, 19, 36, 37, 39, 
50; see also Shoup Mission
Shoup Mission (1949–50) 4, 5, 19, 36, 39; 
see also Kanbe Committee
shûgiin giin, see House of Representatives  
shûhen chiiki see Peripheral Zone
shûhen toshi see Peripheral Zone and cities 
within
shukkô 48
shuto kaizô keikaku see Plan for the 
Reconstruction of the Capital
shuto kensetsu hô see Capital Construction 
Law (1950), National Capital 
Construction Law
shuto kensetsu iinkai see National Capital 
Construction Committee
shutoken 60–2, 64, 65, 68, 71, 74; see also 
Capital Region 
shutoken seibi 60–2, 65, 68, 71, 74; see 
also National Capital Development
shutoken seibi dai ichiji kihon keikaku see 
First Tokyo Capital Region Plan
shutoken seibi hô 62
shutoken seibi kihon keikaku 65, 68, 71, 
74; see also National Capital Region 
Development Plan
shutoken seibi kôsô keikaku soan 61; 
see also conceptual plan for the 
development of the Capital Region
Simcock, Bradford 108, 118
site improvement along streets 32
social capital 110
Socialist Party (SP) 117, 166 
Sômushô see Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications
Sorensen, André 1, 7, 32, 33, 39, 101, 102, 
105, 107–9, 113, 143, 150, 151, 154, 
164, 165
Special City Construction Law 37
Special City Planning Law 60, 64
Special Measures Law on Urban 
Regeneration 47
specific-use buildings control area 46
standard of living 47
state as builder 8, 167, 169, 170
state capitalism 8, 166
statutory planning 137
Steiner, Kurt 104, 116, 118, 178
sub-center 71, 72, 172, 173
Suburban Development Area or Zone 65, 
67, 68, 71, 72, 75, 76, 78
Suburban Green Space Preservation Law 
(1968) 65
Suburban Zone 61, 62
suggestion system 45
Sunlight Ordinance 39
Super Block Development System 64
sustainability 77, 102
Suzuki Zenkô 19
Tachikawa 60, 68, 72, 74, 76
Taga 35




takuchi kaihatsu shidô yôkô see guidelines 
on land development
takyoku bunsan 71, 74; see also multipolar 
structure
Tama 10, 18, 57, 67, 72, 78
Tanaka Kakuei 12, 19, 169
Tanaka Yasuo 170
Tapiola 20
taxes on land value increases 31, 32
techno-bureaucracy 8, 166, 168
technology 10–12, 19, 34, 103
technopolis 8, 11–13, 20, 165
Third Comprehensive National 
Development Plan 11, 68, 169
three-in-one reform 47
tochi zôka zei see taxes on land value 
increases
Tochigi 20, 59, 60, 62, 65, 174, 179
Tôhoku 10, 11, 174
Tôjô Hideki 9
Tôkaidô 14
tokubetsu toshi keikaku hô see Special City 
Planning Law
198 Index
tokubetsu toshi kensetsu hô see Special 
City Construction Law
tokubetsu yôto chiku 42
tokubetsu yôto seigen kuiki see specific-use 
buildings control area
Tokugawa 2, 55, 103, 110–2, 141, 142
Tokushima 170, 179
tokutei gaiku seido see Super Block 
Development System
tokutei hieiri katsudô hôjin see non-profit 
organization
Tokyo 1–5, 10, 11, 14, 17–20, 25–34, 
38–40, 42, 48–50, 55–65, 67, 68, 71–9, 
86, 87, 93, 94, 96, 103, 105, 109, 113, 
114, 116, 130–4, 142, 150, 160, 164, 
165, 170–8
Tokyo borough area 38
Tokyo Capital Government 4
Tokyo City Assembly 27, 32
Tokyo City Building Ordinance (1906) 28
Tôkyô dai toshi ken see Tokyo 
Metropolitan Zone
Tokyo Green Space Plan (1936) 56, 57
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly 38
Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) 
4, 5, 17, 27, 29, 38, 40, 42, 48, 57, 58, 
72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 93, 171–3, 178
Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department 32
Tokyo Metropolitan Zone 75
Tôkyô mondai 174
Tokyo Prefectural Assembly 27
Tôkyô ryokuchi keikaku see Tokyo Green 
Space Plan (1936)
Tôkyô sensai fukkô keikaku see 
Reconstruction Plan for Tokyo
Tôkyô shiku kaisei jôrei see Tokyo Urban 
Area Improvement Ordinance
Tokyo Urban Area Improvement 
Committee 27
Tokyo Urban Area Improvement 
Ordinance 25, 27, 29, 30, 105
Tokyo Urban Area Improvement Project 
26, 28
Tôkyô wan kanjô dôro see Bay ring road
Tôkyô-fukai see Tokyo Prefectural 
Assembly
Tôkyô-kubu see Tokyo borough area 
Tôkyô-shi see City of Tokyo (1888–1943)
Tôkyô-shi gikai see Tokyo City Assembly
Tôkyô-to see Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government
Tôkyô-to chôki sôgô keikaku see Long-
Term Plan for the Tokyo Metropolis 
(1982)




Toshi keikaku Chûô Shingikai see Central 
City Planning Council 
toshi keikaku hô see City Planning Law; 
see also City Planning Act or Law 
(1919), New City Planning Act or Law 
(1968) 
toshi saisei kinkyû tokubetsu sochi hô 





Town and Village code 3, 179
town-building 128–30, 133, 137; see also 
machizukuri, community-building
townscape 7, 139, 140, 142, 145, 146, 150, 
151, 156–8, 160, 161
Toyama 13, 28, 179
Toyokawa 35
Toyonaka 132, 136




Tsukuba 67, 68, 76
unipolar structure 11, 69, 71, 72
United Kingdom 14
United Social Democratic Party 41
United States of America 3, 4, 7–11, 14, 
18, 25, 31, 36, 50, 88, 89, 106, 109, 
117, 119, 129, 134, 146, 149, 172, 173
unspecified zones 59
Urawa 68, 76
Urban Building Law 2, 26, 57, 105
urban governance 1, 7, 101–3, 113, 122, 
123
urban planning 1–3, 7, 9, 19, 25, 56, 90, 
101–5, 107, 109, 128–34, 137, 138, 
150, 152, 155, 167, 172, 173
urban population 14, 34, 110
urban regeneration 47, 173
Urban Regeneration Areas of Urgent 
Needs 47
Urban Regeneration Law (1992) 47
urban sprawl 62, 67, 108





voluntary covenants see kenchiku kyôtei
Vosse, Wilhelm 110, 120
War Damage Restoration Plan 35
Washo-machi 28
Watanabe Shun-ichi 7, 29, 38, 40, 101, 
121, 128, 130, 133, 134, 140, 146, 164, 
165
van Wolferen, Karel 8, 178
wooden houses: densely packed 76; 
traditional 139; see also machiya
World War II 1, 3, 10, 19, 33, 35, 36, 38, 
39, 50, 57, 64, 78, 81, 89, 90, 104, 105, 
114, 139, 143, 164




Yamanashi 20, 59, 60, 62, 65, 94, 179
Yokohama 4, 5, 18, 19, 33, 34, 37, 38, 55–
7, 65, 67, 68, 74, 76, 78, 94, 131, 171
Yokosuka 60
Yokota military base 172
Yokoyama Nokku 172
yonzensô see Fourth Comprehensive 
National Development Plan
yosekiritsu seido see Floor-area Ratio 
Regulation System
Yoshino River 170
zaidan hôjin see independent foundation
zeigen ijô see transfer tax revenue source
zenkoku sôgô kaihatsu keikaku see 
Comprehensive National Plan
zone expropriation 32
zoning 33, 39–41, 45, 50, 57, 61, 67, 105, 
107, 108, 145, 155, 156, 160
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